Tag Archives: SOE

The SOE Swedish Section

This piece will probably be the last in-depth study of an intelligence topic that I shall undertake. The subject itself was somewhat accidental, but the exercise turned out to be a fascinating one: during it I encountered most of the now familiar elements of dubious memoir, evasive history, and misleading archives. Moreover, the research process uncovered a completely fresh phenomenon in the guise of an outrageous performance by the editors of a distinguished intelligence ‘journal’. While my story contains a few ‘A’ (Advanced) passages, I have given it an overall ‘B’ (Businesslike) classification.

 A warning, however: my account is choppy. An ideal story would integrate material from different sources into a coherent narrative. The problem is that every source I used is highly flawed in some way: a traditional account would include too many qualifications. Moreover, two archival files arrived very late in the research process, and it would have been difficult weaving my findings from them into the established narrative. I therefore decided to dissect each separately, as I have done with the other material. My attempt at synthesis appears in the Conclusions. Yet there will never be a definitive history of the Swedish Section of SOE: as John Lukacs constantly reminded us: ‘The purpose of history is not the establishment of truth, but the reduction of untruth.’

Now read on  . . .

Contents:

Preface

Journal of Intelligence and National Security

Other Sources

            Tennant: ‘Touchlines of War’

            Atkin: ‘Section D for Destruction, Forerunner of SOE’

            Lundberg: ‘“Karlsson”, The Amiable Spy’

Official Histories

Charles Cruickshank

West: ‘Secret War: The Story of SOE’

Cruickshank: ‘SOE in Scandinavia’

Archival Sources

The History of the Stockholm Mission, 1940-1945 (HS 7/190)

Directive for SOE in Sweden (HS 2/260)

The Draft Directive (CAB 84/4/111)

HS 2/260 (reprise)

Reports of SOE Situation in Sweden December 1942-November 1943 (HS 2/259)

SOE Office and Staff Organisation in Stockholm (HS 2/262)

SOE/Scandinavia 10: SOE Policy in Peace and in War (HS 2/10)

Late News

Pia Molander – a Reprise

Conclusions

            The Swedish Section

            The Historiography

*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *         

Preface

This report is something of a ramble, reflecting the tortuous paths I had to follow when attempting to answer a fairly simple research question that was not even of close relevance to my primary target of Soviet espionage – what was the purpose of the Swedish Section of SOE, the Special Operations Executive? Yet the exercise shows how difficult it can be to extract a reliable account of what happened in a particular domain. The same lessons emerge. Memoirs are normally unreliable, self-aggrandizing, and often contradictory. The official histories are inadequate, combining an element of bluff with a literary style that frequently opts to conceal who initiated what actions, or who took responsibility. The archival material is frequently obtuse, often redacted, and the keepers of the material do not always contribute to a reconstruction of an accurate chronology by certain practices, such as their masking the date when an item was declassified. In this particular case, documents have been categorized incorrectly by The National Archives, breaking obvious chronological rules. In addition, it seems that carelessly constructed articles can be accepted and published by the ‘scholarly’ intelligence journals without any clear oversight or critical attention. I am reminded that, in the Introduction to his Britain and European Resistance 1940-1945, David Stafford emphasized the hazards of trying to reconstruct an accurate account of SOE activities from the spattering of archival material and memoirs that was available. I was about to experience that challenge most intensely.

What was my topic of interest? Ever since I first dipped a toe in the Skaggerak, investigating the JOSEPHINE case, I have been puzzled by the existence of a Swedish Section of the Special Operations Executive in World War II, and by the fact that its reputed head was Peter Tennant, more a boulevardier than a dynamitard. My main cause of bewilderment was that SOE had been set up in July 1940 to stir subversion, and arm potential guerrilla groups, in countries that had been occupied by the Nazis. Yet Sweden was a neutral country whose leading politicians expected (at least until 1943) that the Germans would win the war – and who were, incidentally, overall much more alarmed by the possibility of Soviet incursions than any by the Germans.  Offensive acts by the British that might have threatened Sweden’s perceived neutrality could have tipped the Nazis over the brink, and prompted them to occupy the country, as they had done so with Sweden’s neighbours, Denmark and Norway. What was going on?

Journal of Intelligence and National Security

I believe now that I have sorted out most of the main threads, but the confusion has not been helped by an irresponsible publication in the intelligence press. As part of my preliminary research, I looked around for scholarly papers that might have been published after the regular historical volumes had appeared. One especially looked promising. In the October 2007 issue of the Journal of Intelligence and National Security (Volume 22, no 5) appeared an article by Pia Molander – a person undescribed, but who seems to have been a lecturer in the Department of Military History at the Swedish Defence University – titled ‘Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Swedish: Dilemma: The Special Operations Executive in Neutral Sweden, 1939-45’. Yet I was automatically alarmed by that title, since SOE, established in July 1940, could incontrovertibly not have initiated any operations in Sweden until late 1940, at the earliest, even if it had been considered by its minister responsible, Hugh Dalton, and its chief, Frank Nelson, that installing a station in Stockholm should be among its leading priorities. Perhaps it was a just a careless revision by some editor, however, and the article merited further exploration.

Yet, a few paragraphs into the article, I came across the following sentences:

            The purpose of the Special Operations Executive, as envisaged by the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, was to ‘organise, arm and control the European underground movement on a large scale’ so as to be of assistance to British military aims. The SOE Division, Section D, responsible for Sweden, was created in 1939, as part of mapping out the Swedish iron-ore fields, to assist the movements of SOE agents and Norwegian and Danish resistance figures across Scandinavia into occupied Europe.

More of this nonsense follows. Molander, claiming to have inspected the archives, again asserts that, as part of the planned activities for SOE in Sweden, in 1939 ‘plans were made for mapping out the Swedish iron-ore deposits’, and that it claimed some success in ‘attacking lines of communications, destroying strategic objectives and engaging in industrial espionage’ until Ambassador Victor Mallet effectively closed it down, forcing it to concentrate on intelligence gathering. Before that, Section D had reportedly envisaged that a neutral Sweden ‘could be used as a base from which to smuggle significant quantities of arms and personnel to Norway and Denmark’, and SOE was thus issued with a set of directives. Molander then goes on to describe some of the activities resulting from such decrees. SOE planners carved up Sweden into regional sectors, and identified principal targets for sabotage. Yet changes to priorities and political delays in allocating funds meant that successes were few. “The German occupations of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 resulted in the German naval Blockade of the Baltic Sea and Skaggerak and precipitated a dramatic decline in Swedish trade with the west,” she writes, before smoothly moving on to Operation Rubble, in January 1941.

While I was somewhat astonished that a Swedish student could misunderstand the sequence of events so badly, I detected a possible explanation for some of her confusion. I note that the error originates with some truly undisciplined categorization at the National Archives, where many source files describing events preceding July 1940 are organized under the generic HS (SOE) classification. If the institution is so careless in guiding researchers, it is no wonder that the less experienced would not notice the anomaly, and instead faithfully echo the structures imposed. (Early in September 2026 I drew the attention of the archivists at Kew to these errors, and I trust that corrections will be made. I have since had a dialogue with officers at Kew, and I shall report fully on the matter in my Year-End Round-up.)

Yet I was amazed that a reputable journal could allow this gross distortion of the facts to be published, at the time clearly unreviewed by anybody with any historical knowledge, and apparently unnoticed since. For Section D was a unit within SIS (MI6), created in April 1938, and dedicated to guerilla warfare and sabotage (‘D’ for ‘Destruction’) as preparation for Hitler’s increasingly aggressive military threats. It operated for two years, and had a large presence in Sweden, until SOE was founded in July 1940. SOE took over control of Section D (as well as two other units, MR/I and Electra House) the following month, and it was absorbed into the sabotage section of SOE (SO2) in October, after its head Colonel Laurence Grand had been dismissed. There was no such entity as SOE in the period highlighted by Ms. Molander. Churchill became Prime Minister only in May 1940. The remainder of the article has some pertinent observations, but the whole story is built out of straw.

Other Sources

I shall return to the matter of the irresponsibility of this intelligence journal later, but I first move to analyzing some of the other sources for the period, as well as the archival material. The major point to be borne in mind, however, is that, when SOE was originally set up, it consisted of two units, SO1, dealing with propaganda, and SO2, responsible for sabotage and ‘secret armies’. SO1 derived mainly from Electra House (a unit reporting to Prime Minister Chamberlain, responsible for propaganda to enemy countries), while SO2 incorporated most of Section D. (A third unit, SO3, charged with research, was soon absorbed into SO2.) Yet rivalries between the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Economic Warfare, to whose Minister, Hugh Dalton, SOE reported, in August 1941 caused SO1 to be removed from SOE and set up as a new organisation, the Political Warfare Executive (PWE). Thus, for a year, SOE indeed had responsibility for propaganda. In this context, the arrival of Peter Tennant in Stockholm in September 1939, and his role between then and August 1941, have to be seen with very keen attention. He may well have become an important SOE officer without ever having been involved in the blood and thunder of sabotage and subversion.

Tennant: ‘Touchlines of War’

Peter Tennant (probably with Amelie Posse)

So how does Tennant himself represent his career at this time? According to his memoir Touchlines of War, he had an academic post at Cambridge University, specializing in Scandinavian languages, before the war. He visited Iceland in the summer of 1938, and submitted a report on German activity there to the Admiralty, who forwarded it to the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, where it was apparently buried and ignored. In March 1939, his old friend from Marlborough College, Gordon Welchmann, who would later achieve greatness at Bletchley Park, summoned him to a code-breaking class under the head of the Government Code and Cypher School, Alistair Denniston, at Broadway Buildings, the home of MI6. (This factoid incidentally proves that, despite rumours to the contrary, GC&CS did at times act as a ‘school’.) Tennant spent several weeks there, but apparently showed no great aptitude for cryptanalysis.

When war broke out, he was summoned to Broadway again, but the Foreign Office had decided that it needed him for something else. Somewhat anachronistically, Tennant states that he reported to Chesham Place on May 25, 1939, where he was invited to join the planning staff for a future propaganda ministry, under Lord Perth. This was a confused period, when multiple agencies were vying to control propaganda, including the British Council, the BBC, and the Foreign Office News Department. Tennant was instructed to report to the last of these, in the person of Rowland Kenny. Tennant’s task was to go to Stockholm to report on the state of the Swedish media, and other matters. Taking instructions from the ambitious Rex Leeper (who, known for his empire-building behaviour, was appointed to lead SO1 in August 1940), Tennant set off or Sweden on June 24 (thus again undermining the integrity of his chronology), wrote reports that were sent by diplomatic bag, and returned to London before war broke out. His reports to Kenny had never arrived, so he had to re-create them.

On September 3, when war did indeed break out, he wound up his affairs in Cambridge having been told that he was no longer the responsibility of the Foreign Office, and reported for duty. He was, however, to be moved to the new Ministry of Information. He was ‘whisked’ off to Sweden shortly thereafter, arriving in Stockholm on September 25. He states in his memoir that he did not return to Britain until the autumn of 1941. The impression Tennant gives is that he was an employee of neither Section D nor MI6 at the time. He was described as a Press Attaché at the British Legation, and was provided with the papers to support this role. In the first years of the war, Tennant affected to know little about Section D, making only a parenthetical reference to it when offering a profile of Victor Mallet. He writes (page 109): “In 1940 Sir Charles Hambro asked me to help in the setting up of a new organisation to replace ‘D’ section which had been in charge of subversive activity and sabotage in the early days of the war.” This is a very vague and elusive declaration. For some reason, Tennant completely misrepresents the state of the game: Section D was also responsible for propaganda, which was, of course, Tennant’s mission in Stockholm. At the start of its existence, SOE took over these tasks in SO1, so it would have been quite natural for Tennant to be absorbed into SO1 when it was created, and quite a stretch for him to be charged by Hambro with establishing a new organisation.

Section D for Destruction, Forerunner of SOE

Other works confirm Tennant’s disingenuousness. In his 2017 history of Section D, Section D for Destruction, Forerunner of SOE, Malcom Atkin describes Tennant’s close involvement with Section D. On page 151, he writes: “Despite denying all knowledge of Section D in his 1992 autobiography, Tennant met with *Fraser and *Holdsworth during April [1940] to discuss the production of propaganda by *Biggs and *Rickman, and urged them to increase the volume of production.” Further, on page 164, he adds: “Despite the evidence of being in Section D once strewn in front of him, years later Peter Tennant maintained an air of innocent bewilderment over the operations of Section D in Sweden. That Section D might have been involved in funding some of his propaganda work apparently came as a revelation.” In his study of SOE in Scandinavia (to be covered later in this piece) Charles Cruickshank even classified Tennant as an ‘honorary member’ of Section D.

[* Ingram Fraser, head of Section D’s Scandinavia section

    Gerard Holdsworth, head of Section D’s sea transport service

    Alfred Rickman, Section D’s lead agent in Sweden

    Ernest Biggs, aide to Rickman, recruited locally]

The reason for Tennant’s coyness was surely due to the fact that he wanted to disassociate himself from some of the disasters that beset Section D, which not only completely mismanaged its relationship with the British Legation in Stockholm, but also engaged in some highly clumsy practices. Rickman had been responsible for some poorly concealed attempts at sabotage on Swedish soil, and had also failed to obey essential security measures. The Swedes rumbled him, and his incompetence allowed him to become a convenient scapegoat for the errors of British administration. As Atkin tersely reports: “On 28 June 1940 Rickman was sentenced to eight years’ hard labour but was released in 1944 on health grounds.” In his Chapter IX, ‘The Rickman Affair’, Tennant claims that he met Rickman only once (after the latter had been released), and that he, Tennant, was ‘blissfully ignorant of this conspiracy’. Tennant further claims that he learned of the whole fiasco only in 1985, when Craig McKay of Uppsala University, told him the whole story based on his detailed knowledge of the Swedish archives.

The problem is that, as one reads on in Tennant’s memoir, he turns out to be more and more an unreliable witness. He claims that, after Hambro’s approach, he ‘knocked together the beginnings of SOE with Malcolm Munthe’. The clear impression he gives is that Hambro was in Stockholm when he gave him the invitation (probably correct), but he betrays himself when he writes that Hambro ‘was marooned in Sweden owing to the invasion of Norway and Denmark’. The invasion of Norway and Denmark took place in April 1940, before Churchill had been appointed Prime Minister.  Tennant then describes a visit to London at the end of 1940 (having previously written that he did not return to London until 1941), during which Hambro introduced him to Brendan Bracken, Churchill’s right-hand man at the time, and later Minister of Information. Tennant writes that, before the Hambro approach, ‘the whole affair [Rickman] had bewildered me with names of organisations and people of whom I had never heard, such as Electra House and ‘D’ section’. Moreover, in Chapter X, he makes the foolish boast that Hambro had recruited him into SOE before it was started in July 1940. None of this may matter that much – are not most war memoirs constructed to emphasize the heroism of the subject, and to bury his or her embarrassing mistakes and misjudgments? Only it tends to reinforce the suggestion that what Tennant wrote about the JOSEPHINE business was likewise a mixture of fantasy and deception.

Amelie Posse

Tennant did indicate that he had cultivated several Swedes who were sympathetic to the Allies, most notably Countess Amelie Posse, who openly told him about the friends of hers who were prepared to throw over the Nazis should they invade. Posse was even in contact with evolving sabotage groups. But she was notoriously loose-lipped, and Tennant probably underestimated the risks that her circles might have been infiltrated, and that news of his associations with such groups would get back to hostile Swedes and their Nazi acquaintances, thus provoking the invasion that SOE Sweden was trying to avert.

‘Karlsson’, The Amiable Spy by Victor Lundberg

A Swedish perspective on Tennant’s contribution was provided in 2016 by Doctor Victor Lundberg of Lund University, the subtitle of his article being ‘Swedish experiences of Allied espionage and sabotage during World War II’. Lundberg introduces his article by stating that it ‘primarily uses previously confidential archival sources from the civil Swedish counter-espionage [sic]’, yet he later observes, very equivocally, when raising the topic of what Tennant actually got up to: “Due to the incomplete and fragmentary archival situation around S.O.E. in Sweden it is thought [by whom?] impossible to reach any kind of definitive answer to these questions”. In his conclusion, he adds: “In Sweden, the detailed traces of S.O.E.’s and Peter Tennant’s activities seem to be fairly well cleaned out from the national archives.”

Lund explains how a mighty counter-espionage apparatus was mobilized in response to the influx of foreigners with questionable motives at the beginning of the war. This was the Allmänna Säkerhetsjänsten, or General Security Service, known as the A.S., primarily directed at detecting communist misdeeds and influences. Its existence was not revealed until 1943, but, up till then, it had employed over one thousand people to open items of mail, intercept phone calls, censor and block telegrams, and register over 80,000 ‘politically unreliable’ Swedes and foreigners. One of these was Tennant, and he was closely surveilled throughout the war. The A.S. tracked his success in pervading Swedish social circles, and spotted how he was engaged in ‘more confidential boyish pranks from the current spy handbook’. Yet Tennant also developed more serious contacts, such as his relationship with Harry Södermann, a criminal investigator who, rather alarmingly, was responsible for training Norwegian resistance troops on Swedish soul during the war.

Other friends were the business-man and weapons-dealer John Walter (who in 1943 was sentenced to penal servitude for espionage), and the aforementioned Amelie Posse (here identified as Posse-Brázdová), who shared Tennant’s enthusiasm for plotting dangerous and dubious deeds behind the scenes, and gave him the cryptonym ‘Karlsson’. Lund links the name of Tennant (and the names of his colleagues, Munthe, Binney and Threlfall) to various acts of sabotage in 1941, after Tennant had been given his appointment of heading SOE in Sweden, but stresses that their responsibility for the crimes has never been proven. Other plans, however, were scuppered when AS agents were able to overhear Tennant and Threlfall discussing subversive plans over dinner on February 23, 1942. Tennant was also almost caught red-handed in the case of the social democrat identified solely by K.E.G.J., who was arrested in April 1943 in possession of a briefcase that included encryption keys in Tennant’s hand. Posse later revealed that she and Tennant had discussed the deployment of a stay-behind organization supplied with radio transmitters in 1941, and Tennant had promised financial and technical support for this venture.

According to Lund, Tennant probably escaped because his subversive actions did not involve any communist troublemakers, although Lund does emphasize that his collaborators were, on the other hand, ‘syndicalists and political refugees’. ‘Syndicalist’ is a vague term: I am not sure why traditional trade-union strongholds would not be seen as much less of a threat than communists, and it is difficult to picture the epicurean bon vivant Tennant fitting into that mould. Lund makes much of David Stafford’s assertion that anti-communism ‘became an increasingly important part of S.O.E.’s guiding principes’, but that, again, is debatable. Dalton’s original vision for SOE was for it to assist a post-war revolution of sorts across Europe. SOE had several notorious communist sympathizers in its ranks – most notably James Klugmann – and favored Tito’s partisans over Mihailović’s cetniks. It also appeared not to mind that much of its weaponry dropped in France ended up in the hands of communists. Lund’s explanation as to why Tennant escaped closer attention is not convincing. He expected to gain fresh insights from the British archives, but I suspect he would be disappointed.

Official Histories

It is time to turn to the ‘official’ histories, and those written by ‘respectable’ historians. Yet, first, I make some important distinctions between the organisations involved. In London, SOE maintained a Scandinavian section HQ, at first led by Charles Hambro, which was almost exclusively responsible for Norway and Denmark. The administration of that section gradually moved to Sweden, however, since the country was a convenient base for dealing with Norway (at least while the air route was available: when not, travel to Stockholm could take over a year), since the two countries shared a long, common border, over which Norwegian escapees could be smuggled, and through which material could be delivered. That entity came to be known as the Stockholm ‘Mission’. Lastly, there was the SOE Swedish Section, at its outset nominally led by Tennant, which rather incongruously also involved responsibility for a diminutive SOE Germany office.

Professor William Mackenzie’s Secret History of SOE 1940-1945, completed in 1948 but not published until 2000, reflects some of this confusion. Apart from a brief aside, he provides no account of SOE Sweden’s existence, concentrating heavily on events in Norway and Denmark. Yet he refers to the ‘Stockholm Mission’, re-established after it had effectively been destroyed by Section D’s disaster there in April 1940. He writes (p 200), in the only passage in his book that mentions Tennant:

            This arrangement was put on a more formal basis in October, when Mr Charles Hambro, then head of SO2’s Scandinavian Section, visited Sweden for the purpose. The arrangement then reached was that Mr Peter Tennant (the Press Attaché) should be responsible for SOE’s work in Sweden and into Germany, Captain Munthe for Norway, and an additional officer (Mr Turnbull) for Denmark. These arrangements stood through the war with minor personal modifications, the most important of which was the withdrawal of Captain Munthe in July 1941, in face of heavy diplomatic pressure from the Swedes.

Apart from the apparent confirmation of Hambro’s presence in Stockholm in October, this extract hints at an anomalous situation. Hambro would have been responsible for SO1 and SO2 until August 1941, when SO1 was peeled off as part of the Political Warfare Executive. The implication is that Tennant maintained both propaganda and sabotage roles after that date, and thus reported to both Harry Sporborg, the SOE Scandinavian chief in early 1941 (who barely gains a mention in Tennant’s memoir) as well as to SO1. Moreover, as I shall show, Mackenzie’s suggestion that Tennant’s appointment endured through the war will turn out to be far from accurate.

Yet by whose authority did Hambro implement a SOE station to commit sabotage and subversion in Sweden, a neutral country – and even in Germany? Apart from his facility with the Swedish language, and his extensive contacts, Tennant would appear to have been singularly unqualified to perform such a role. Indeed, undertaking subversive activities while maintaining diplomatic ties would have been very stressful and dangerous. Moreover, when SO1 was separated in 1941, what charter could realistically have been given to Tennant?

Reginald Leeper (very deftly wielding a pen)

The key to Tennant’s initial acceptance in a dual role must have been due to the fact that his boss in SO1 was none other than Rex Leeper, from whom he had received instructions back in 1939. In his history of the PWE available for inspection at CAB 102/610, and published by St Ermin’s Press in 2002 under the title The Secret History of PWE, David Garnett explains (p 36) that Leeper retained his position as head of the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office when he was appointed head of SO1. Leeper immediately threw fuel on the turf-wars that were already consuming several government departments, which Andrew Roberts describes in his Introduction to the work, Leeper challenging Duff Coooper, the Minister of Information, who wanted to control both ‘black’ (clandestine) and ‘white’ (official) propaganda. And then Dalton lost out in 1941, when he attempted to take all propaganda under his wing, and SO1 was taken away from him. Tennant survived all the wasteful wrangling that went on.

It will thus probably not surprise readers that M. R. D. Foot’s 1984 work SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940-1946 – written in a private capacity, not as an authorized history – has nothing to say about SOE in Sweden, except for commenting on operations carried out in Sweden on behalf of Norway, concerning Norwegian and British ships interned in ports of south-west Sweden. He left behind a typically elliptic sentence: “Affairs in Sweden were much trickier, because Sweden remained neutral all through the war, and in the early years was (as many of her staff remained) frankly pro-German.” Thus an opportunity to add insight was cavalierly overlooked. Tennant does not appear in Foot’s index: Foot’s coverage of Hambro is sparse (although he gives a good account of his demise and sacking), and the end-result is rather feeble.

Charles Cruickshank

A historian whose work is frequently mentioned in the literature is someone called Charles Cruickshank, who wrote what should be a seminal contribution to the debate, SOE in Scandinavia, described as an ‘official’ history of the section, which was published in 1986.  The conventional rubric can be seen: “The author of this as of other official histories has been given free access to official documents. He alone is responsible for the statements made and the views expressed.” But who was Charles Cruickshank? It astonished me that MI6 and the Foreign Office (which must have been responsible for commissioning the work) could not explain who this character was, what his career and credentials consisted of, and why he had been selected. Information on him (e.g. via Google) is sparse, although I did notice that Cruickshank had also written SOE in the Far East, likewise an ‘official’ history, which appeared in 1983, as well as Deception in WW2, published in 1980. The latter is quite an impressive compilation, while his Preface to SOE in the Far East contains some wry and accurate observations concerning the tribulations of trying to write history from dubious memoirs, archival records and oral testimony.

‘Deception in World War II’

Fortunately, the resources of the on-line SOE chat-group were able to provide some vital information, primarily from Martin Briscoe in Fort William, who managed to retrieve a Who’s Who entry on Cruickshank. Since this information will probably never be gathered anywhere else, I decided to summarize his life here. He was born in 1914, educated at Aberdeen Grammar School, and at Hertford College, Oxford. At some later stage he apparently took a D. Phil., probably at Edinburgh University. During the war, he worked at the Ministry of Supply, which was responsible for providing equipment to the armed forces. Thereafter he held a variety of government jobs, including one of Trade Commissioner to Ceylon from 1951 to 1955, culminating in a role as Inspector in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Assistant Secretary at the Department of Trade and Industry in 1973. It was not a career that pointed unerringly at showing expertise in intelligence matters.

Yet he had started writing historical works before he retired, and at some point became a fellow of the Royal Historical Society. He parlayed what must have been an enthusiastic hobby, making contributions to several historical journals as well as to the Dictionary of National Biography, into an appointment as official historian. A quick search of the (O)DNB shows that he wrote the entries for SOE officer Bickham Sweet-Escott (author of Baker Street Irregular) and for Dudley Clarke (the WW2 deception specialist known for his cross-dressing adventure). Both these pieces appeared in print only in September 2004, and are described, obviously, as being revisions of original Cruickshank work. Another SOE-group contact, Simon Fowler, recalls working with Cruickshank when he carried out that role at the Public Records Office in the early 1980s. Cruickshank died on February 19, 1989.

‘Secret War: The Story of SOE’ by Nigel West

Before tackling Cruickshank’s work, I turned to Nigel West’s history of SOE, recalling vaguely that it contained some good organizational charts on SOE. I was greatly disappointed. My edition is the 2019 Frontline version, a re-print of the original 1992 work. It has not been updated. Endnotes refer to events (such as an imminent forthcoming publication) that had been well superseded by then. West quotes from works such as Cruickshank’s in his Endnotes, not bothering to go back to the original archival material. The charts are bewildering, containing undecipherable abbreviations and a mish-mash of defined units. Names are haphazardly entered against country organizations: no precise dates are given. West makes no distinction between the Swedish Mission and the Swedish Section. He presents the succession of heads of the Mission illogically. He has no index entries for Larden or Tennant, but mistakenly describes the latter as having been in charge of the Denmark section. He has only a fleeting reference to the highly significant person of Henry Sporborg. While the book contains many sparkling descriptions of SOE operations, it is highly unreliable as a compendium or guide to the structures of the service.

‘SOE in Scandinavia’

I thus moved on to Cruickshank’s official history of SOE in Scandinavia. It is a workmanlike compilation – some of my informants tell me that it contains many errors (such as in the account of Malcolm Munthe, and the incident of the Polish submarines), but that would be no surprise in any history of SOE. It is not a very professional undertaking, nor is it a scholarly one. It contains only a page of meagre Endnotes. The index has been carelessly put together. For instance, it has only four entries for Peter Tennant: I uncovered at least six more references in the text. Too often, Cruickshank refers metonymically to ‘London’ or ‘Stockholm’, without bothering to explain which particular actor was involved. Dates are frequently missing. His text contains multiple examples of the waffle characteristic of much official history. For example, one encounters such sentences as “The need for Section D to lend a hand on overt propaganda diminished when Peter Tennant was appointed Press attaché, although it was believed there might still be occasions when his official position would make it difficult for him to do certain things.” No fellow of the Royal Historical Society should allow himself to deploy the passive voice so vaguely, and to leave the nature of ‘certain things’ so gloriously unfulfilled. Like Tennant, Cruickshank skates very quickly over important matters, such as the controversial appointment of Colonel Larden to head the Stockholm Mission in 1942, a tenure in which Larden’s attempts to instill military discipline on the SOE contingent did not go down well. Worst of all, however, is that he does not understand the use of the subjunctive in conditional clauses.

Moreover, some of his editorializing has the whiff of propaganda, such as when he makes dubious assertions, unsupported by any evidence, about the value of SOE activities to the morale of the local citizenry. As an example, his judgments are occasionally tasteless, even immoral. In a commentary on Norway and Denmark (p 169), he writes:

            With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that both countries would have made a more effective contribution to the Allied effort had all the resources of their resistance movements been thrown into sabotage, at the expense of their secret armies. This would certainly have led to even fiercer retaliation and reprisal; but wars are not won without casualties. The secret armies in Norway and Denmark were primarily intended to control the occupying forces if they refused to surrender when the war was won in Germany. Unlike the sabotage groups, they were not part of the war of attrition in enemy-occupied countries; but at least in Norway the secret army provided a means of keeping patriotism alive during the years of occupation.

‘Wars are not won without casualties’. Indeed. Yet to make an equivalence between the predictable execution of innocent hostages as reprisals for terrorist activity, and the death of troops in action, or even civilians killed in bombing raids, shows appalling judgment, in my mind. Yet that was the perennial problem for SOE. Most inhabitants of German-occupied territory probably did not want their country ‘set ablaze’. They hoped to survive the war with dignity. SOE was supposed to be restraining direct action until invasion was imminent, but it never knew how many years ahead that might be. After the assassination of Heydrich in Czechoslovakia by SOE agents, and the horrific reprisals the Nazis took at Lidice, sabotage and subversion were essentially shut down in that country. Reprisals were an item of great controversy in Norway. Cruickshank’s observations represent a highly questionable defence of a dubious counter-strategy. He ineffectively tries to refute the logic behind the instructions that the Chiefs of Staff gave to SOE, since he never explains what the outcome of more extensive sabotage would have been.

In his article in JINS of 2005, ‘A Glass Half Full  – Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Study of the Special Operations Executive’, Mark Seaman criticized Cruickshank for the shallow research and parochial perspective evident in his work on Scandinavia. He cited a Norwegian historian, Olaf Riste, who characterized Cruickshank’s compilation as ‘a haphazard collection of cloak and dagger stories that are often seriously at variance with the painstakingly researched studies already available’. A Dane, Knud Jespersen, echoed Riste’s complaint. What exactly those ‘painstakingly researched studies’ were is not clear, and I detect a whiff of sophistry in Seaman’s offensive. (I have several times criticized Seaman on this site for his lack of objectivity and his unscholarly approach to SOE history.) After all, he was a representative of the government that both engaged Foot, and then turned against him when his account began to have unfortunate political implications.

That process continued with Cruickshank. A very recent article in the Historical Journal by Christopher J. Murphy and Christopher R. Moran, on the fallout from Foot’s initial work on France (see  https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/historical-journal/article/un-livre-problematique-official-history-anglofrench-relations-and-the-fallout-from-m-r-d-foots-soe-in-france/3A94055E201836441AAFBABA56610EDA), points out that the authorities restricted Cruickshank to working from the SOE archive, and that the author ‘spent a grand total of eight days in Oslo, Stockholm and Copenhagen’. The saga again reinforces the idea that ‘official’ history is not ‘history’ but propaganda. It also highlights the fact that these ‘official’ historians were all very naïve in not requiring a contract being signed that outlined such aspects as scope, access, process, and royalties to the satisfaction of each author commissioned to perform the work. Instead they appear to have regarded the project as a career-enhancing exercise.

While the promotional emphasis of his book is very much on Norway and Denmark, Cruickshank does dedicate Chapter 3 to the SOE Swedish section in Stockholm. He dances around the topic of SOE (i.e. SO2) intervention in neutral Sweden on page 60, listing rhetorical questions about what the service should do to forestall German occupation, without explaining whether these were indeed issues discussed by the War Cabinet. Several ideas for greater activity were discussed, but Minister Victor Mallet was constantly a restraining force, and some of Tennant’s ideas were rejected by ‘London’. In 1941, Dalton became increasingly enthusiastic with the notion of increasing infiltration of agents into non-belligerent countries, but he was a man on the way out. Tennant was encouraged by ‘London’ to set up an organization for making and deploying wireless-telegraph sets, but it was not until July 1942 that the Chiefs of Staff (CoS) provided a formal directive for SOE in Sweden. In Cruickshank’s words: “It confirmed that it should continue to build a clandestine organization to go into action if Sweden was [sic: ‘were’] occupied, or came under indirect German control”. ‘Stockholm’ accordingly responded enthusiastically to the call, and identified targets to be attacked in such circumstances, such as shipyards, railway communications, and engineering industry. Yet SOE in Sweden then received discouragement. The CoS carefully qualified its previous instructions, Cruickshank representing them in his easily imitable prose:

            As it was thought unlikely that the Germans would attack before the spring of 1943, no more than this programme should be contemplated for the time being [=?]; and there must on no account be any attempt at pre-occupational demolitions of the sort expected [??] from the Rickman organization.

Whether this text appears as such in the original, or is Cruickshank’s paraphrasing, has to be determined. One of the frustrations of trying to track Cruickshank’s few references is that many end up in a black hole. In this chapter on SOE Sweden he gives CAB 80/56 (25.11.40, which provided an early outline as to how SOE’s subversive activities should be connected to strategy, but made no mention of Sweden under ‘neutral countries’), CAB 80/63 (27.7.42, the SOE Sweden directive approved by the CoS), and CAB 79/22 (8.8.42, approval of the directive) as sole sources. Yet the rubric for sn. 215 in CAB 80/63 states: “The copy of C.O.S. (42) 215 (0) omitted from this volume will not be opened to public inspection before 1993.” The potentially informative minute item in CAB 79/22 notes merely that the directive has been circulated to each Vice-Chief of Staff, ‘whose concurrence with the terms of the Directive has now been received’. A following passage has been excised. So what was Cruickshank able to read, and where? And why all the secrecy? And what happened in 1993? Was the directive released elsewhere? (I shall return to this item below.)

Colonel J. F. Larden

Yet shortly after this directive was able to be absorbed, the tide turned. Here Cruickshank mixes up the operation of the Swedish Section with that of the Stockholm Mission (possibly echoing a confusion in the minds of the Chiefs of Staff). He skates over the controversial tenure of Colonel Larden as head of the Mission. His Introduction had stated that Larden ‘was specially recruited’ by SOE in May 1942 to replace Montagu-Pollock, but Larden’s first appearance in Cruickshank’s narrative occurs when, in October 1942 he requests Captain T. F. O’Reilly ‘to finalize plans for special operations in the event of a German occupation’, presumably interpreting the directive as a call for greater action. O’Reilly briefly replaced Larden as head of Mission, and then discovered that Swedish public opinion was now more confident of an Allied victory. O’Reilly’s conclusion?

            He believed the Swedes now had the intention and ability to offer formidable resistance to Germany, should it become necessary; and that the key to their continued neutrality was Allied success on the battle fronts, which would pay off much better than anything special operations might accomplish.

            The message was clear: SOE was now largely redundant. And all this occurred before August 1943, when O’Reilly returned to Britain.

The Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Foreign Office both insisted on soft-pedalling SOE Sweden’s activities, since anything else would hinder intelligence-gathering – the domain of MI6. The focus turned to wireless-telegraph capabilities, and Cruickshank concentrates on how these developed. By June 1943, ‘it was finally accepted’ (the passive voice again) that the threat of a German invasion need no longer be taken seriously. The next directive ‘virtually ended special operations in Sweden’, although it led to a clash between the chiefs of SOE and MI6. Menzies considered the training of wireless agents a highly risky operation for no set purpose, one that might jeopardize his existing networks. Eventually, in November 1943, Sporborg (now Gubbins’s deputy) agreed with Menzies, while John Wilson, described now as being in charge of Sweden at headquarters in London, wanted his remote team kept occupied with routine activities that surely could – and should – have been carried out by MI6. (Lieutenant-Colonel John Skinner Wilson – better known for his involvement with the Boy Scout movement – is described elsewhere by Cruickshank as being the head of SOE Norway at this time, but Mackenzie and others indicate that he was by 1944 in charge of all of SOE Scandinavia.) To conclude, Cruickshank writes that, from that time, ‘SOE staff in Stockholm’ (again vague – he probably means staff of the Swedish Section) concentrated on supporting activities in Norway and Denmark for the remainder of the war.

John Skinner Wilson

As a coda, I refer to a bizarre entry by Cruickshank in his book Deception in World War II. Citing FO 188/466, he claims that, as part of Operation GRAFFHAM (itself a constituent of the BODYGUARD deception exercise), the planning of which was started in February 1944, SOE was asked ‘to study the possibility of solving the ball-bearing problem’ in Sweden by means of sabotage. The ‘problem’ was how to reduce the supply of such material to the Germans without reducing delivery to the British. The idea was foolish on multiple counts, and was soon abandoned. The fact that Cruickshank omitted any mention of it in his Scandinavia history is perhaps emblematic of an overall desire to bury the story. No mention of it appears in the Wikipedia entry for GRAFFHAM, for instance.

I now turn to the archival records. First, the history of the Mission:

The History of the Stockholm Mission, 1940-1945 (HS 7/190)

            On the sub-division of the former Scandinavian Section at the beginning of 1942, the Swedish Section remained in the charge of Mr. George Whiskeman [sic]. He also controlled the Danish sub-section and was responsible for S.O.E.’s assistance to P.W.E. for Scandinavia as a whole. When Major Threlfall had hurriedly to leave Stockholm, he joined Mr. Wiskeman at Headquarters and helped to build up the increasing supplies of material to Stockholm.

            The re-creation of the Scandinavian Region in 1943, together with the new directive banning any active preparations in Sweden itself, entailed considerable changes. Major Thompson in effect acted as Staff Officer to the Regional Head in so far as the supervision of the Stockholm Mission and the provision of supplies on behalf of the Danish and Norwegian Sections were concerned.

While this somewhat elliptic commentary does not reveal anything sparkling, it does shed some useful light on organizational matters. Wiskeman is paid very brief homage by Cruickshank, and appears in Tennant’s book in an ungrammatical and irrelevant aside. Why would his presence and influence have been so studiously ignored? Wilson appears to have taken the 1943 directive seriously, although his conclusions appear illogical. What happened to Wiskeman?

The History itself provides much detail on the politicking that occurred at the Swedish Mission, with ‘London’ trying to influence Mallet to help SOE to set up a ‘post-occupation organisation’, and Mallet refusing. In June 1941, Tennant was encouraged to make contact with subversive groups. Yet his influence appeared to be waning. In November 1941, ‘it was suggested’ [by whom?] that the Counsellor of the Legation, Mr. Montagu-Pollock, should ‘co-ordinate and supervise all S.O.E. activity for Scandinavia and that preparations should be made for a skeleton organization in Sweden itself’. This would appear to be the starting-point for setting up a more formal ‘Swedish Mission’, since Stockholm had already been used to support SOE activities in Norway and Denmark by then. Tennant’s role had been strictly confined to Swedish affairs, but now he was going to come under closer control by fresh management.

Montagu-Pollock then proposed, however, that Roger Hinks, who was at that time visiting Stockholm for the P.W.E., should ‘act as his deputy in co-ordinating S.O.E. activities with Foreign Office policy and to relieve Tennant of increasing pressure of P.W.E. work’. Was this something that Leeper was recommending? Tennant provides an interesting sketch of Hinks (an art historian), but claims that he knew nothing at the time concerning the fact that Hinks had been installed to keep an eye on his activities. Montagu-Pollock wanted Hinks to take charge of all SOE activities in Scandinavia: not surprisingly, given his background experience, ‘he was not considered suitable’. Moreover, it would have caused managerial problems back in London, with Wiskeman left adrift.

By early 1942, further tensions surfaced. Tennant was recorded as being pre-occupied with SOE work, and with neglecting the Press Department. A further shake-up was called for. In another anonymous attribution, “Major (later Lt. Col.) George Larden was proposed as S.O.E. director and co-ordinator in Stockholm.” Larden was a full-time army officer (something antithetical to the spirit of SOE from the start, but an appointment probably engineered by the martial Gubbins), and Mallet regretted the suggestion of his appointment. Yet London informed Mallet that ‘owing to the expansion of S.O.E. work’, the change was necessary: Mallet had to succumb. Montagu-Pollock also objected. Hinks came back to England with a permanent posting as Second Secretary. In March, Larden’s appointment was approved by the Swedish authorities: he arrived in May with cover of Assistant Military Attaché. Tennant (rather predictably) had known Larden’s ‘tall blonde FANY assistant’ from his Cambridge days. All he had to write about Larden’s tenure was: “His efforts to subject local SOE personnel to military discipline did not appeal to the undisciplined individualists he found under his command”.

In fact, in April 1942, Tennant had returned to the UK to discuss post-occupational work, and went back to Stockholm the next month ‘fully briefed’. That same month Larden arrived, and soon recommended that Tennant be relieved of his responsibility for the Swedish Section, instead recommending that Mr. Hingly should take over. ‘London’ (the same ‘London’ that had just taken pains to brief Tennant?) counter-proposed that Croft, whose return to active service had been requested by the War Office, should take up the post, but the War Office would not agree to his release.  And then, in July, the shocking Directive for Sweden arrived, ostensibly drawn up by the War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee, and approved by the Foreign Office. “In this directive it was laid down that there should be set up without the knowledge of the Swedish authorities, as complete an organisation as possible, only to operate if Sweden was [sic: ‘were’] invaded by Germany, or otherwise came under German control.” What was this? The new pseudo-military policy, supported by Larden? Had Tennant been briefed on it? Nothing is stated. As I shall show later, matters were slightly more complicated.

For whatever reason, Larden did not last long. As soon as October ‘it was suggested’ – again, the infuriating passive voice – that Larden be recalled for active service. Montagu-Pollock took back control, Larden left Sweden in December, and T. J. O’Reilly arrived to take over control of the Swedish section with the assistance of Latham and advice of Tennant. As I explained above, according to Cruickshank, O’Reilly had been invited to Stockholm by Larden himself, to finalize plans for the execution of the July directive, but he took over from Larden when the latter fell out of favour. Tennant has no mention of O’Reilly in his index. All in all, these proceedings suggest an almighty muddle, with doves and hawks arguing in London, no clear directives reaching Stockholm, and impetuous appointment changes being made.

Succeeding events probably reinforce the reason why the Chiefs of Staff wanted to bury the August 1942 Directive. In January 1943, the Mission responded, and a new version of SOE plans was received from Stockholm, although the historian does not state what that document contained, or to whom it was sent. Tennant became active again, trying to gain approval for an approach to Ehrensyärd, the Deputy Chief of the Swedish General Staff, ‘for the legalization of the S.O.E. Swedish organization from the Swedish point of view’. This was a bold move, probably made in the belief that the General Staff now understood the way the war was going. The outcome of this idea is not declared, but a new directive for Sweden was drawn up, indicating the inadvisability of any extension of SOE activities in Sweden. Primarily to safeguard MI6 interests, ‘Stockholm was not to extend the existing W/T organization without further instructions from London, and was to cut out the word ‘sabotage’ and instead substitute the term ‘surreptitious economic measures and propaganda’. The fangs were declawed.

In November, it was decided that the Swedish wireless-telegraph and internal organisations should be liquidated and that the Swedish Section should devote itself to obtaining intelligence for SOE operations into other countries. O’Reilly completed his spell in Stockholm, and returned to London. In January 1944, Tennant (still head of the Press Department) was instructed to shift his propaganda efforts from Sweden to Germany. The Foreign Office advised Tennant not to show too much enthusiasm for the Norwegian or Danish troops in Sweden, lest it upset the Russians – a typical FO stance for the time. Tennant then had to witness the emasculated Swedish section being taken over by Hopkinson: Tennant offers some background information to Mallet’s manoeuvres in Touchlines of War. This essentially consisted of the winding-down of the Swedish Section. The author signed off by lamenting the absence of clear directives for work in Stockholm. After all, if SOE were to be restricted merely to intelligence-gathering, was that not the defined charter of MI6? Wilson took time to defend the bureaucracy in London, and to highlight the demands of negotiating with multiple bodies.

There follow further observations on the operation of the Mission before a chapter titled ‘Swedish Section’ appears. It confirms that Tennant started out as head of the section, but that his contacts established from his role as Press Secretary impeded his ability to have direct contact with agents. He thus worked more in an advisory role. Meanwhile, most efforts were spent on wireless communications infrastructure, although some shadier work in the area of sabotage did take place. This section covers the vacillations that drove Swedish policy, and leads again up to the bolder August 1942 directive. Again, no details of the directive are offered. The report states only: “It was decided to set up without the knowledge of the Swedish authorities as complete a post-occupational organization as possible, only to operate if Sweden were [sic!] invaded by Germany or otherwise came under German control”, and it continues by citing a letter from Hambro to Sutton-Pratt, the Military Attaché, emphasizing that no SOE activity should provoke an attack by Germany. Yet the account goes on to provide a rich summary of the proposals that the Swedish Mission sent to London in November 1942 (presumably corresponding to the January 1943 response identified above). These included plans for sabotaging a variety of targets, from iron-ore traffic, power-stations and sub-stations, locomotive rolling-stock, etc. etc. – a truly shocking roster that was presumably part of the Larden doctrine.

It took the Chiefs of Staff a few months to respond, with a more guarded outlook. In April 1943, they emphasized setting up wireless-telegraph groups capable of communicating with the UK, and stressed that it was essential that these activities not be disclosed to the Swedish government. A clear preference for letting the Swedes proceed with their own subversive arrangements was voiced, and on April 28, the following significant advice was issued, described as follows:

            On April 28th a letter from Mr. Warner of the Foreign Office to Colonel Wilson of S.O.E. HQ stressed that the risks of German invasion of Sweden were now so remote that it was not worth running the risk of having our S.O.E. activities detected by the Swedes. This letter was written at a time when practically the whole of the Swedish Organisation had been discovered by the Swedish police (as described in the chapter on wireless).

On May 12, a new directive essentially put a stop to any new initiatives. Sporborg wrote to Mockler-Ferryman (ADE, Director of the London Group) on November 17 that the Swedish organization was now superfluous. (The chapter on wireless offers a sanguine account of some embarrassing mishaps.) There follow some interesting accounts of Air Operations, and the relationship with the American WESTFIELD mission, but the story ends there.

I now turn to the infamous 1942 ‘Directive’ to the Swedish Section.

Directive for SOE in Sweden (HS 2/260)

I was delighted to find this item, although a little alarmed that its title referred to the directive ‘for SOE in Sweden’, and covered the period January 1942 to November 1943. Was this directive targeted at the Mission, or at the Swedish Section itself? Moreover, I expected a small file (how could there be much material relating to a simple directive?), but then discovered there were 113 pages to peruse. There had clearly been some controversy, and the directive had obviously undergone some substantial changes in the twenty-three months covered by the file

Henry Sporborg

My first impression was that Henry Sporborg was very closely involved with the negotiations. That surprised me, as Sporborg was nominally AD/S, that is head of Northern European Operations, at the time. (It is a nightmare trying to sort out the various symbols and codenames used for the departments of SOE, since their deployment does not suggest any firm logic, and many of the charts that have been issued are undated.) Yet in HS 8/965 (a register of SOE symbols and organization charts, outwardly describing 1940-1943, which cannot be a very useful guide, given the changes that occurred during that period), AD/S is clearly described as having that role: reporting to him are ‘D/R’ (France, Holland and Belgium), ‘S’ (or D/S, unidentified, but certainly Scandinavia), ‘X’ (which was Germany) and ‘J’ (which I determined was the strange assortment of Switzerland, Italy, Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia). Elsewhere, I learned that under ‘S’ was ‘SD’ (Denmark) and ‘SN’ (Norway). Sweden does not merit an entry, since apparently there was at that time no dedicated HQ entity looking after the interests of the Swedish Section. Yet, in Appendix 1 of his book, Nigel West lists Sporborg as AD/S as well as being ‘PPS to SO’, namely Personal Private Secretary to the Minister (if one trusts Mackenzie’s nomenclature, where Dalton is given as ‘SO’). By 1943, however, when Sporborg was promoted, it seems that he was actually an important liaison between Hambro (then CD, head of SOE) and Dalton’s replacement, Lord Selborne.  The chart in HS8/965 actually identifies him as V/CD, i.e. Hambro’s deputy, which could not have taken place until later in 1943.

What seems clear to me is that Sporborg continued to involve himself closely with Scandinavian affairs despite his promotions. (He and Hambro had both started with Sweden.) What is also astonishing is the absence of G. O. Wiskeman in the negotiations over the directive. For Wiskeman is clearly listed as being the head of the Scandinavian Section in multiple places, over several years. According to HS 8/965, he was replaced as D/S by Lt.-Col. Wilson, who, soon after July 1943, was promoted from his leadership of Norway (SN) which he had held since January 1942, to take over the whole Scandinavian section. One might quickly conclude that Wiskeman was not a very effective manager or leader. Perhaps that is why Cruickshank’s sole reference to Wiskeman in his book is to write that ‘in 1941 a Sweden and Baltic subsection developed, with George Wiskeman as head de jure, and Sporborg de facto . . . ’. If Sporborg had to dive down from his lofty perch to deal with Swedish matters, maybe he did not trust Wiskeman on much else. Yet another chart (also undated) in HS 8/965 shows Sporborg as A/DS, with France and Scandinavia reporting to him, while he is also directly responsible for Scandinavia, with Wiskeman handling Sweden (probably the Mission, not the Service), and Finland. On this chart, Hambro appears as A/DA, a symbol that is not listed elsewhere (and is probably not the same as AD/A), but Hambro is indicated as being responsible for all European activities, and is clearly deputy to Frank Nelson (CD), the chief.

The action really started early in 1942, at a time of turmoil. Dalton was replaced by Selborne in February. In April Frank Nelson (CD) retired because of ill health and Hambro was appointed to replace him. Thus the characters behind the symbols invisibly change. E. H. Cookridge wrote (in Inside SOE): “By May 1942 there was a great shake-up in SOE directorates and many section chiefs were replaced.” He adds that Sporborg had taken over the entire Western Directorate in 1941, and records that Selborne asked him, at the end of 1942, to replace Gladwyn Jebb at the Ministry of Economic Warfare as one of his chief advisers (PPS to SO). Cookridge also stated that ‘it was fortunate that Sporborg continued to exercise considerable influence on SOE matters’, thus appearing to confirm that he combined his AD/S role with that of PPS to SO, and later with that of V/CD. (Is that quite clear?)

Thus, when the earliest entry in the file appears, dated January 2, 1942, we have to note that it is written by D/CD, and is to be circulated to CD, AD/REG, AD, M and AD/S. According to M. R. D. Foot, D/CD was allocated to a deputy to CD who concentrated on administrative matters (a Mr M. P. Murray, but who is someone who turns out to wield more clout than might at first appear). CD was obviously Nelson, AD/REG is unidentifiable, AD is Hambro, M is Gubbins (in charge of Operations), and AD/S is Sporborg. D/CD makes some uncontroversial remarks about the inadvisability of trying to introduce ‘toys’ (i.e. ‘explosives’) and arms to the Swedes. Yet, by April 4, Tennant (aka ‘4401’) is being recalled to discuss exactly that – post-occupational work in Sweden, and a few days later AD/L (Guinness in Intelligence) informs L (Intelligence – possibly Air Commodore Boyle, but who in fact was known as A/CD) that CD wishes to get out a directive to the Swedish Country section ‘so that they can prepare a country plan for post-occupational activity’. It sounds very much as if the new broom is already making his mark. Hambro picks up Dalton’s thrust for more action in neutral countries, and strikes before Selborne gets settled, in anticipation of Nelson’s imminent retirement. That streak of subterfuge and secrecy was to be what caused Selborne eventually to fire Hambro.

Work began on a paper to be submitted to the Foreign Office, titled ‘Preparation for Post-Occupational Work in Sweden’, in which the claim was made that ‘the Swedish authorities had been informed that any subversive activity being carried on in Sweden was directed against Norway, Denmark or other occupied territory – not Sweden’. Sweden did not want to collaborate on talks concerning possible German aggression. Gubbins was very enthusiastic about getting his subversive activities underway in Sweden, but noted to Sporborg: “If ever we undertake the work of organizing resistance in Sweden, we must make absolutely sure that it is done entirely unofficially with no contact whatsoever between any General Staff or Foreign Office officials.” Thus a dangerous initiative was being started, in which Hambro’s plans were to be concealed both from his domestic masters as well as from the Swedish authorities.

Frederick Warner (friend of Guy Burgess, familiar to coldspur readers) in the Foreign Office met Sporborg on May 15 1942,  and tried to put a damper on things, in homage to the necessarily cautious opinions of his boss, Orme Sargent, and of the Minister of State, Anthony Eden. Sporborg responded with his own account of the meeting, correcting Warner on a point concerning wireless activities that were not yet complete. Next, however, he threw out a disturbing comment, namely that ‘the impending arrival of Larden will be very useful’, adding that he would direct the operation properly, and that he was about to leave for Stockholm. Readers will recall that the history of the Mission noted that Larden’s appointment had been approved by the Swedes back in March 1942, so Hambro had obviously been plotting his course for some months.

Yet the anomaly in Larden’s appointment was that he took over the role of head of the Stockholm Mission, not just the Swedish Section. Sporborg’s comments indicate that Tennant was surely destined to come under Larden’s control, with his overt claim about ‘proper’ direction of the operation. Had Sporborg told Tennant, during his recent visit to London, that he would soon be directed by Larden, not by HQ? Moreover, the history above clearly states that Larden, soon after he arrived, wanted to relieve Tennant of his position as head of the Swedish section, presumably because he did not submit to the military discipline that Larden demanded. This was a monumental gaffe by Hambro and Sporborg: Tennant was Hambro’s man, Tennant had been brought back to London for briefings, and then Hambro appointed someone singularly unsuitable to take over not just the Mission, but Tennant’s skeleton unit as well. Larden’s short tenure was terminated in October, and he returned to ‘active service’ in December, with Montagu-Pollock taking over again. Meanwhile, negotiations over the directive continued. On June 2, Lt.-Col. D. R. Guinness (D/L) sent a new version to the secretary of the Joint Planning Staff. The document has a fresh ‘Object’: “The object of S.O.E. in Sweden is to prepare, without the knowledge of the Swedish authorities, as complete an organisation as possible. This organisation will only operate if Sweden is invaded by Germany or otherwise comes under complete German control”.

The Draft Directive (CAB 84/4/111)

For the record, the original text of the June 3 1942 Draft Directive can be found in CAB 84/4/111. It refers to the directive prepared by SOE ‘for its operation in Sweden’, but the details indicate that it concerns the Swedish Section. The distinctions may however have eluded the members of the Joint Planning Staff. Initially, the JPS seemed a bit nervous about any commitment, and tried to pass the buck back to the Foreign Office:

            The view was expressed that the right course was for S.O.E. to agree with the Foreign Office the terms of a Directive to their organization in Sweden: it should not then be necessary to submit this Directive to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for approval.

What is significant, however, is the fact that the draft Directive had been created by the staff in Sweden, and then submitted to the JPS for approval! Readers may agree with me that this process has an irregular aspect to it, since one would expect that those in control would be in adequate command of the situation to be able to dispense orders to dependent bodies off their own bat.

Moreover, SOE reported through a different Ministry: procedurally, this was an odd policy to adopt, as if the Foreign Office could override whatever charter the Ministry of Economic Warfare had been working under. The Foreign Office had obviously given themselves cover, too. In an Annex to the Directive, a note from SOE stated:

            The directive has also been discussed with the Foreign Office who, though approving it in principle, feel that the present moment is not an opportune one for implementing it in full. They have therefore asked S.O.E. to obtain direction as to the earliest date by which the Axis might be in a position to invade Sweden. This information will enable the Foreign Office to estimate the date by which restrictions must be raised if S.O.E. are to complete their preparations in time.

Thus the instructions appear to be: Ensure that your subversive groups are ready for anything when the Germans invade, but be careful not to let the Swedes know anything about what you are up to beforehand  – an impossible task.

For the Directive continues with specific assignments:

Preparations should be aimed at finding organisers in each district who should: –

  • Be provided with trained operators and W/T sets capable of communicating to Great Britain.
  • Reconnoitre and prepare plans for attacking the targets in their districts. For this purpose each organiser must be given a clear directive.
  • Recruit suitable resistance groups and agents to implement these plans.
  • Reconnoitre suitable reception points for airborne stores and personnel.
  • Prepare plans for collecting or seizing local arms or stores of demolition material.

This wording (carefully crafted by the SOE Swedish Section, of course) clearly places safeguards around the activities, indicating the instruction that no actions could take place until the Germans invaded, but it then lists subversive preparations to be made by anointed Swedish citizens, directed by the British, which could surely not remain undetected by any self-regarding domestic security service. Such conflicts would condemn the whole plan.

HS 2/260 (reprise)

I return to the SOE in-house history. Echoing the JPS minutes, it records that the secretary of the JPS wanted nothing to do with the directive, and therefore advised Sporborg that SOE should seek approval from the Foreign Office for its proposal. Moreover, by now SOE had indeed sought guidance on when it thought that the Germans would invade Sweden.  The Joint Intelligence Staff responded that the Axis could not undertake operations against Sweden unless they had defeated Russia, thus not before spring 1943. Even then, it would be an unlikely event unless it were forced upon them by any British operation in Norway. This was probably not what Sporborg and Hambro wanted to hear. Warner continued to point out that the Swedes were bound to learn of any subversive plans, which might have deleterious results, but Hambro was, in July, still warning of the danger of delay.

Thus matters dragged on into 1943. The Soviet victory over the Germans at Stalingrad in January 1943 made an invasion of Sweden much less likely: this was the turning-point of the war. A new version of the directive was issued on April 4, now addressed to ‘the Head of the Swedish Country Section’ (as if the Mission had been taken out of the loop after the Larden fiasco). It does not reflect many changes, although the Object has been watered down to “The object of S.O.E. activities in Sweden is to minimize the benefits which might accrue to the enemy, through his control, established by whatever means, over Swedish industries and services.” The clause ‘without the knowledge of the Swedish authorities’ remains, with a whiff of desperation perhaps. Wiskeman is now involved again, possibly because Sporborg has taken on his new role with Selborne. By the end of April, the War Cabinet had got wind of SOE’s plans, and expressed its dismay.

Stewart Menzies, the MI6 (SIS) chief, had now become involved, and his influence is apparent. The War Cabinet Secretary wrote to Group-Captain Grierson, the SOE Liaison Officer, making admonitory points, namely that SIS should have priority over SOE; that the FO & SIS stated that it was impossible to carry out tasks without knowledge of Swedish authorities; that detection of such by the Swedes would curtail valuable SIS activities not just in Sweden, but also in Norway, Germany and Denmark. The only reason for running the risk would be if the likelihood of German invasion of Sweden – now an improbable event – rapidly increased. Nothing beyond the provision of W/T capabilities should be considered desirable. SOE should therefore review its directive with FO and SIS. Menzies, predictably, even took offence at the more modest objectives of the directive in setting up wireless-telegraph networks. He was understandably concerned as to how such activity might undermine his own structures.

The directive was dying. By June, Peter Tennant was reporting that Swedish civil defence was now an item of public debate. The Swedes were self-sufficient. Boheman even told Hambro that they could manage on their own. Some feeble attempts were made to create an even more watered-down directive, but the diehards in SOE now had to accept the arguments of the FO and SIS. On November 17, Sporborg issued a memorandum that pointed out that there was no longer any reason to have an organization in Sweden (presumably ‘a Swedish section’) at all. Later that month it was liquidated. That Tennant remained in Sweden, and found useful things to do, is not questionable. But that is not the story of the Swedish Section.

Reports of SOE Situation in Sweden December 1942-November 1943 (HS 2/259)

To illustrate how the archival material frequently is in contradiction with itself, I offer a synopsis of the above file (that I discovered late in the research cycle), which consists essentially of Captain T. F. O’Reilly’s report when he completed his term in Stockholm in August 1943. I realize now that Cruickshank must have had access to this, but it appears that he only skimmed it, and did not cross-check much in it, since several of the statements of his that I reproduced earlier can now be seen to be erroneous (as are some in HS 7/190). On the other hand, one cannot trust O’Reilly for absolute accuracy or compete honesty, either, since he fails to comment on the demise of Larden, who had specifically requested that O’Reilly be sent out to Sweden to draw up plans for the Swedish Section. It was supposed to be an assignment lasting three months, but O’Reilly ended up as head of the Mission, and was there for over ten months, longer than Larden lasted.

The bulk of the file is taken up by a report, titled simply ‘Swedish Section Report’, first dated 3 December 1942, sent by D/S to D/CD (0) and AD/S. (The signature below the submission is undecipherable, but it does not look like the initials of Wilson or Wiskeman. From the wording, it may well be that of his assistant.) A commentary on the report, issued by ‘6216’ (verifiable in HS 8-978 as T.G. Hopkinson) states: “Although its content was mainly the work of 6216, its scope and lay-out were partly determined by 6201.”  The symbolization used here is very difficult to track. For instance, in 1944, according to HS 8-978, Tennant was allocated ‘6203’, whereas he had been ‘4401’ earlier in the war. Wiskeman, the nominal S, is still identified as ‘6200’, but the entry for ‘6201’ has actually been redacted in the file.  ‘6201’ could have described the hapless Larden (since O’Reilly would not yet have been up to speed), and then O’Reilly himself, and have been left blank after Reilly returned (as indeed it was, according to the records). It is indeed clear that O’Reilly is one of the officers who was assigned ‘6201’. In his report (see below), having re-affirmed that the section’s activity should be restricted to exploratory activities, he refers to the ‘the revised version of Part II of my [my italics] paper ‘S.O.E. and Sweden’, dated 6th January 1943  . . .’, thus claiming authorship while diminishing the contribution that Hopkinson had made. The issue of authorship of the report is a bit murky in other regards, as I shall show later. Tennant’s apparent failure to contribute anything to the report is bizarre.

The text is cautious, emphasizing the fact that the Foreign Office has banned any but ‘exploratory’ activities in Sweden, so as not to disturb the neutrality status. Yet it reflects a deep understanding of the opportunities for sabotage and disruption should the Germans try to occupy the country. It offers a comprehensive analysis of why the German might invade – or why they might refrain, because of the twenty to thirty divisions required to stay in control of such a large country, for instance. Yet the report must have been edited after its author completed it, since Hopkinson’s annotations of April 1943 state that he wished to ‘correct the impression that the Swedish organization is better organized and impressive than it actually is’, adding that ‘in reality the Swedish organisation is a skeleton rather than a body and progress is slow’. (Here, I believe he is referring to the body of Swedes collected by SOE rather than the Swedish section itself.) Hopkinson’s report contains a lot of detail on W/T matters, and on dropping-points, but nothing much of significance. It was forwarded by Wiskeman (S) to M/GD (one of the General Staff) on April 30, 1943. Wiskeman records the distressing fact that two or three members of the organization (again, Swedes) have since been arrested.

The last major entry is O’Reilly’s report, as highlighted in the file’s description (above). His comments concerning the members of the Swedish Section are puzzling. First of all, he declares that he was sent to Stockholm at Larden’s request, but says nothing about the latter’s being recalled the same month. He states that Croft, Tennant and Latham were the only members of the Swedish Section, unaccountably overlooking Hopkinson, who had clearly been heavily involved with it. He states that Tennant’s ‘expert knowledge of Sweden’ was not exploited properly since, he could spend little time on SOE affairs on account of his other duties. (Readers may recall that the Official History of the Stockholm Mission claimed that it was the other way around. Perhaps Tennant was playing one against the other while pursuing his social engagements.) Latham was the W/T expert; Croft was interested in Norwegian affairs, a strange admission when SOE in Norway was presumably being handled by the Mission. In any event, Croft returned to England before Christmas 1942. It left a threadbare set-up.

O’Reilly then reveals more about his achievements. In referring to the earlier report, O’Reilly states that his personal views on SOE activities were expressed in the revised version of the report dated 6 January, 1943, which would suggest that a more robust line had been taken by someone else in the report’s first draft – presumably by Larden. O’ Reilly took the opportunity to tone it down after Larden’s recall. His was clearly an advocate of a hands-off approach: the Swedes were quite capable of looking after themselves. He wrote:

            The best way for the Allies to ensure Swedish neutrality and to strengthen Sweden’s will to resist German pressure or aggression was not by S.O.E. taking action in Sweden but by the Allis winning victories on the battlefronts.

This was not the thrustful and aggressive doctrine that Gubbins, Sporborg and Larden had encouraged. O’Reilly was more cautious, and much more sensible. He was shocked when he found that many of the ‘Swedish members of the organisation’ (as they were dubbed) were more enthusiastic dynamitards than passive wireless operators, and he clashed with Tennant over the issuance of sabotage tips to such groups.

The Swedish government was now becoming much more confident in defending itself.  Colonel Ehrensvärd, Deputy Chief of the Swedish General Staff, even published a book on the subject of Total Resistance in Total Warfare. O’Reilly and Tennant wanted to approach Ehrensvärd with offers of help, but they were overruled by a lukewarm Foreign Office and a solidly oppositionist War Office. O’Reilly’s report concluded on that point, and when Wilson (D/S) sent on the report to AD/E on 4 November, he noted that the account of his mission ‘is in a sense only of academic interest’. He was correct. SOE Swedish Section had reached the end of its usefulness – if it can be claimed that it achieved anything of much utility at all.

SOE Office and Staff Organisation in Stockholm (HS 2/262)

This file is in many ways a goldmine – a trove of utterly absorbing correspondence, mainly between SOE staff in Stockholm and London, covering the period November 1941 to September 1945. It contains well over two-hundred and fifty pages. Yet it is also very daunting: it is bespattered with such an alphanumeric soup of codewords, symbols, aliases and keys that any researcher will have to keep an accurate, time-dependent concordance at hand in order to be able to identify the players accurately.  On the other hand, it is not comprehensive: especially after the initial negotiations, as the status of SOE in Sweden in 1942 becomes more controversial, it omits some major happenings, and overlooks the contribution of figures whose presence has been revealed by other archival material.

The records start soon after SO1 (propaganda) was split off from SOE, and given to the new PWE organization, and three months before Dalton’s ouster as Minister responsible, in February 1942. They immediately throw up some conflicts that the correspondents seem unable to acknowledge. For example, Peter Tennant, who has the role of Press Secretary, and had been anointed by Hambro as SOE head for the embryonic Swedish Section, is also in charge of PWE work (which is, of course, no longer a responsibility of SOE), and is thus neglecting his Press tasks. In addition, since more responsibilities for neighbouring Scandinavia countries (i.e. Norway and Denmark) are being transferred to Stockholm, a complementary business structure is being developed in the Swedish capital, which raises the probability that local personnel will have their reporting divided between managers in Stockholm, and their true sectional leaders back in London. That is a perennial organizational challenge. Lastly, the chiefs in Baker Street appear to overlook the particular requirements of the Swedish Section, which are subsumed to the needs of the Mission.

Roger Hinks

The search for an ‘SOE co-ordinator’ starts. Montagu-Pollock, Counsellor at the Legation (also known simply as ‘Pollock’), has designs on the job for himself, but receives discouraging noises from SOE HQ. Instead, he recommends bringing in a friend, the art historian Roger Hinks, who would seem an unlikely choice, since he is a homosexual working at the BBC (and was also infamous for having damaged the Elgin Marbles at the Tate Gallery in the 1930s). It seems hardly the profile to fit in with Colonel Gubbins’s ‘warrior king’ model, although Gubbins’ influence was less strong at this period of the war. Rather astonishingly, Hinks was flown out so that the staff could look him over. He passed muster, but soon after his return to a permanent assignment he was not judged fit for the job, and relegated to PWE work, on which he sat out the war.

The primary tussle was between the naturally cautious Foreign Office, whose man Pollock was, and the more martial minds in SOE, such as Turnbull (who managed Denmark), Gubbins, and Hambro. By the end of the year, Gubbins was pressing for stronger leadership in Stockholm, but Hambro’s administrative deputy, Murray, pointed out to him the problems of inserting a soldier into a high position in the Legation. The Foreign Officer’s Peter Loxley was similarly disenchanted with the idea, but Gubbins insisted that, while Pollock could carry out some administrative tasks, it was vital that an executive head be appointed. Pollock continued to push his case, and he advised London that the attitude of the Swedish government to substantial expansion would be very negative.

The records reflect fresh light on Wiskeman and Tennant. Wiskeman (at the time responsible for all of Scandinavia) is much more prominent in the correspondence, and thus appears to play a much greater role than other archives would suggest. It perhaps indicates that it was his files that were being collected. Yet he appears removed from the realities: he never goes out to visit the Mission himself, and plays a bureaucratic role. Tennant plays a subtle game: he knows he is indispensable to the Press Section and to the PWE group, since his contacts and knowledge of the country are unmatched, but his work habits are not good. He abandons his Press team for days at a time, and he often by-passes the Minister in his dealings with London (he also has a direct friendship with Gubbins, to whom he sends personal letters written by ‘Oscar’). He thus provokes Mallet’s annoyance, who complains about the amount of time that Tennant spends on SOE work during office hours – a resentment shared by Pollock. It seems that Tennant’s preference was for skulduggery and schmoozing: after all, he does appear as head of the Swedish Section in the organization charts. Some letters state that he is overworked, but he may have been playing people off against each other.

The quest for a ‘Big White Chief’ continues, and by the end of January 1942 Gubbins has come up with an artillery man, the experienced Colonel Larden. Gubbins plans to install him as Assistant Military Attaché, as cover, but he provoked the inevitable objection from the existing Military Attaché, Croft. Pollock points out the vanity of the idea if no large-scale operation in northern Europe is yet contemplated. But Gubbins is relentless: the shake-up in February means that he is now responsible for all of Northern Europe, and he plans to throw his weight around. Tennant warns him about the weak cover planned: Gubbins thanks him for his insights but reveals to him his more aggressive policy. He wanted a man in charge who would see that ‘it is conducted efficiently as a military plan’. That was, however, not the type of environment that the Mission was probably hoping for.

And so the summer rolls on, with the conventional gripes: Tennant not doing his job, problems of priority on the BOAC flights (with the NKVD gaining too many seats). There is bad publicity in Stockholm over the yacht that Tennant acquired for secure testing of wireless transmissions. Croft is miffed (about Larden, no doubt), and he wants to return to London. Tennant resists Croft’s planned departure, but the War Office overrules SOE. Now it is Tennant’s turn to be upset: Pollock has recommended that Larden take over Tennant’s responsibilities for post-occupational Sweden, which would appear to be a usurpation of Wiskeman’s and Tennant’s authority. Tennant starts mentioning names to replace himself, namely Hingley (sic: an external businessman) and Butler (the internal candidate), but the former is considered unsuitable, and Butler (6206) rules himself out. Nevertheless, Larden gets his six-weeks’ training, and at some stage (not noted in the file), he leaves to do Gubbins’s bidding in Stockholm. It was probably in late May or early June that he arrived: new symbols for staff appear at the end of July. Larden has been assigned 6201, and Tennant’s 4404 has been replaced by 6203.

Astonishingly, there is nothing more about Larden in the record until a memorandum by Warner in the Foreign Office to Wiskeman, dated October 8, discusses a fellow named Boyes as a replacement for Larden! There is no exchange of correspondence on what went wrong. It is true that the War Office had stated that it could withdraw him at any time if it needed him elsewhere: indeed, a month later, Wiskeman notes that Larden ‘is being withdrawn at the request of the War Office’, but other evidence (from Wiskeman) indicates that life at the Mission was intolerable under him, and that the personnel can’t wait to see the back of him. Wiskeman and Pollock refer to him, sarcastically, as ‘our friend’, and he leaves in mid-December, actually outstaying his welcome. It is telling that Croft jumps right back to Stockholm after his departure.

What is equally surprising is that, on the last day of 1942, Larden submitted a very disciplined report on his ‘Completion of Tour of Duty’, carefully overlooking the fact that it effectively lasted not much more than a few months. In this report, he covered important operational aspects such as security and micro-photography, hinting perhaps that not all was well before he arrived. He did, however, point out that the Head of the Scandinavian department (Wiskeman) had not visited the country, something he obviously viewed as regrettable. Wiskeman meekly agreed with the overall findings of the report, but there is no record of what actions Gubbins and Sporborg took as a result of it. (Maybe Gubbins was too embarrassed at the downfall of his man.) And, apart from one or two desultory letters in the spring, the record goes dark until a flurry at the end of the year. There is no discussion of a replacement: the role of O’Reilly (see above) and his in-depth report are completely ignored, which is really inexplicable.

In early 1944, Tennant had another spat with Mallet over propaganda in Sweden and Germany. And then another Big Cheese enters the scene, a Major Philip Thompson, given the unfortunate symbol of SS. He spent a month auditing the operation, and wrote a long report, mostly about routine administrative matters, although he did point out that Tennant (still officially chief of the Swedish section) did want to do more for SOE than his now allotted task of helping with the training of members of the exiled Norwegian police force. Yet Tennant also recognized that he should concentrate on the extra work imposed on the Press Section by PWE and the Ministry of Information. From other sources, however, we know that, by this time, any role the Swedish Section might have had in the conduct of the war was over. The last page of the file – an organization chart – shows Tennant’s role blanked out.

All in all, a very strange – but fascinating – confection. So much jousting and jockeying and politicking, but all very inconsequential. Did they not know that there was a war on?

SOE/Scandinavia 10: SOE Policy in Peace and in War (HS 2/10)

Lastly, I make a brief mention of a broad historical brush on the development of SOE policy in Scandinavia. It is worth including since this file, HS 2/10, carries some broader lessons about the challenges that SOE faced. To be sure, it adds practically nothing to the detail covered elsewhere (and Sweden is barely touched), but it does reflect how the gung-ho boosterism of 1940 and 1941 gradually dissolved into a more somber assessment of the opportunities. The first entry, a report titled ‘Subversive Operations in Scandinavia’ was written by Hambro on December 16, 1940, for the attention of the Minister, Dalton. Its first paragraph reads:

            It is the policy of this organization to put ourselves as rapidly into a position to render active assistance to Allied Military operations against the enemy in Scandinavia and particularly in Norway, and also to create the maximum of interference and diversion in the event of a German invasion or attempted invasion of the United Kingdom.

Thereafter he lists some aggressive plans, apparently ignorant of the fact that all Allied forces had been withdrawn from Norway by June 1940. ‘Assisting Allied Military operations’ was by then an invalid concept.

A short memo on ‘quid pro quos’ with the Swedes follows on March 21, 1941, but, a few days later, Hambro is asking for clearer directives from the Prime Minster himself. Yet the spirit of unjustified optimism endured: another March paper concludes that, with a decisive blockade on Zealand, ‘Norway would incidentally fall like a ripe fruit and Sweden would probably have to join the Allies’. Thereafter, the file is of some considerable historical interest in its assessment of conditions and opinion in all Scandinavian countries (including Finland). After the summer of 1941, however, it is clear that the leaders of SOE are becoming much more sanguine about the SOE’s chances of achieving major sabotage, and how relevant it will be when there are no short-term prospects for Allied forces invading Denmark or Norway.

I noticed one wry passage that pointed to the bureaucratic confusion that reigned at this time. It was written – apparently by Sporborg –  in April, 1941, after ‘the disaster of Libya’, and it concerns intelligence about Scandinavia. Sporborg writes, making a plea for a centralized Scandinavian Intelligence System:

            The Service Departments all have their own ‘Intelligence’ Sections for Scandinavia, whose privileges are jealously guarded by pundits wrapped in red tape and every new department forms its own ’Intelligence Services’ which are nine time out of ten, even as the Service Departments, staffed by people having no knowledge of the country on which they have to keep watch. The result is an army of ‘Intelligence Officers’ whose various sections haphazardly collect items from other department intelligence services and so the spate of bumph goes circling and circling around.

The irony was that SOE was not primarily an intelligence-gathering service: that role belonged to MI6. Sporborg appears to overlook that fact. Moreover, the growth of rival intelligence groups sounds just like what was happening in Germany.

In December 1941, Hambro was still urging for a more energetic policy for infiltrating agents into countries that were still non-belligerent, but by March 1942 even he started to question how valuable were the agents that SOE has sent in to occupied countries, and whether they could be trusted to carry out what they had been commissioned to do. In June, the Chief of the General Staff, Alan Brooke, has to make a general appeal to military bodies and governments-in-exile to give SOE ‘the closest and most whole-hearted co-operation’, strongly indicating that such assistance had been withheld in the past, and suggesting, perhaps, that he would rather not become involved too closely with a problematic business. One thinks of Bomber Command and MI6, in particular.

By now, the threat of reprisals has caused a more restrained approach to dropping arms in (for instance) Norway, and a reminder is issued that no inhabitants should be encouraged to rise up ‘until there is a certainty that they will be supported by Allied military forces’. In fact, Hambro reports in July 1942 that SOE is receiving a greater degree of recognition by ‘other services’, but that may be because its wings have been clipped. By the end of December of that year, Churchill has authorized the Chief of Combined Operations (Mountbatten) to intensify ‘small-scale raidings’, a move that naturally diminished SOE’s opportunities. And thus 1943 arrives, with the tide of war turning. A formal but undated paper appears, which outlines the role of SOE in terms that should have been obsolete by now, but emphasises the necessity of SOE’s close consultation with other services. A year without any records passes before a November 1944 memorandum appears that informs SOE leaders that the Chiefs of Staff have delegated SOE’s operations to SHAEF.

Late News

On the eve of the day of the posting of this report. I happened to read, in the October 14 issue of the Spectator (which arrived that afternoon) a review of a book by Johan Wennström, titled The Stay Behinds: Sweden’s Cold War Guardians. In describing Sweden’s wartime ‘stay-behind’ organisation, the reviewer, Alan Judd, offered the following:

            It originated from several initiatives during the second world war, among them one called the Tuesday Club and another called Homeland Stewardship. The enterprise was formalised in January 1943 by a Swedish government directive instructing the entire population to resist an invader at all costs.

How come I never learned anything of this from the British archival material?

Pia Molander – a Reprise

Returning to Pia Molander’s article, having earlier established its chaotic introduction, I wondered whether she accurately picked up the pieces once SOE actually took shape. Unfortunately, the rest of her article is a mess. Her chronology is utterly haphazard: for instance, in a section ostensibly about Section D, she suddenly inserts a passage that derives from documents dating from 1942 and 1943. She switches backwards and forwards in years quite erratically, so that no proper narrative drift can be detected. A paragraph starts off by describing Tennant’s being sent to London in January 1944, as part of the OVERLORD preparation. A few sentences later, we are told: “Meanwhile in February 1941, Mallet reluctantly agreed to allow SOE representatives to operate inside Sweden . . .” She jumps suddenly from Naval Attaché Denham’s activities to the end of 1943, when the ‘SOE preparations to meet an axis invasion could now be discontinued’.

It is sad that the author ransacked so many different sources without having any methodology by which to address them, and without building any proper time-line, or set of organizational structures, to give the events context, and allow her to write a proper narrative. She does not understand the difference between the Swedish Mission and the Swedish Section. It is even sadder that the Editors of The Journal of Intelligence and Natural Security did not have the wit to reject the article, or, at least, to require it to be re-written from scratch to meet any quality goals. Take a look at the list of members of the Editorial Board at https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/fint20/about-this-journal#aims-and-scope. Many distinguished names. They should be ashamed of themselves.

Conclusions

I provide these in two categories: a) the assessment of the endeavours of the Swedish Section, and b) an appraisal of the state of the historiography.

The Swedish Section:

This story is not a whodunnit. No single character or cabal caused the demise of the Swedish Section. It was created haphazardly, stumbled on without achieving much, and then was folded up. Yet a vast amount of time and energy was spent on trying to resolve poorly-defined problems in an environment where too many institutions had an interest, and a say, in what SOE Sweden was up to. No clear leadership came from the top – which is perhaps why Gubbins moved to bypass the chain of command. Men defended what they were doing, and sometimes misled their bosses on how busy they were, or what exactly they were up to. After all, Stockholm was a more comfortable place than many others in which to spend the war years, even if the threat of German occupation loomed for a while.

In many ways, the travails of the Section are emblematic of the struggles of SOE itself. Several presumably smart men (and men mainly they were), under extreme pressure, conceived some ill thought-out plans and made some poor decisions. Given that SOE had been an insistent part of Winston Churchill’s strategy, it would be hard to resist an implicit call for further action in the campaign to harass the enemy. Yet the dimensions of geography and government demanded a selective and discriminating approach for each country targeted. ‘Setting Europe Ablaze!’ may have been an exciting slogan, but the ramifications of what that meant in practice needed to be closely examined. As I wrote before, most of Europe did not want their house to be set on fire. Moreover, SOE was admittedly in a political jam. It was supposed to have non-military leadership, reporting to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, yet had to seek approval for its ventures from the Chiefs of Staff while the Army and Bomber Command failed to support it. In turn, the CoS wanted the Foreign Office involved, while all the time SOE had to deal with  opposition from MI6 for interfering on its intelligence-gathering turf, as well as to negotiate with the Political Warfare Executive and various other bodies.

In a significant passage in SOE’s first directive of 25 November, 1940, appeared the following passage:

            On a long view, it should be the particular aim of our subversive organization to prepare the way for the final stage of the war when, by co-ordinated and organised revolts in the occupied countries and by a popular rising against the Nazi party inside Germany, direct and decisive military operations against Germany herself may be possible.

Thus the emphasis was on occupied countries and patriot armies, the latter to be equipped and trained to take action to support conventional military forces. The policy did not encourage general sabotage, or assassination, even though, retrospectively, such activities were justified on the basis that they consumed enemy resources, and prevented their being transferred to more important military fronts. And the biggest unknown was, of course, ‘the final stage of the war’. When would that be? How many years could SOE keep alive a potential patriot army, and conceal its existence and supplies from the eyes of the Germans? In addition lay the awful prospect of reprisals, which soon became a shocking reality from Czechoslovakia to the Netherlands, from France to Norway.

Each country under occupation was different, and demanded individualized treatment. Poland was too far away to receive regular supplies: in any case, the Poles had developed a strong patriot force. Czechoslovakia was essentially shut down after the massacres of Lidice. Norway was under complete Nazi control, while Denmark, much smaller, and with little space for concealment, was allowed by the Nazis to maintain a Danish government in place. Many countries had governments-in-exile, to whose sensitivities homage had to be paid. France was particularly troublesome, because of de Gaulle and the Free French, but it was geographically close, and alongside Belgium and the Netherlands, gained special treatment since the return to the Continent would almost certainly start there. Yet Sweden was a neutral country, overall more inaccessible than Poland, and the mandate for SOE was directed at ‘occupied’ countries. What business did SOE have provoking subversion in Sweden?

SOE overall had problems finding capable persons to fill its ranks (one thinks of the hapless Buckmaster, for instance), yet it managed to build a vast bureaucracy to support a raft of many misguided ventures. Its leaders also showed alarming frailties. Over the Swedish Section, Hambro showed the impetuosity and secrecy that would later cause his downfall. Gubbins, the military man, was too gung-ho, and too disrespectful of the civilian mandarins who wielded strong influence. Hambro initiated a disastrous series of appointments of station chiefs for the Stockholm mission, without apparently explaining what they were supposed to do. Wiskeman was weak, and provided no real leadership, and he was eventually replaced by one of his reports. Sporborg, it seems, was devious in how he treated Tennant, while forcefully encouraging the dispatch of Larden, who quickly showed that he was a misfit. They all utterly misjudged what the implication was for Great Britain’s interfering aggressively in the civil defence of a neutral state that they wished to preserve as an ally, and, based on the testimony of the personnel who worked in Stockholm, they caused confusion and demoralization.  

SOE gained several successes, such as the destruction of the heavy-water plant in Vemork in Norway, and the destruction of the Gorgopotamos bridge in Greece, but these accomplishments could have been achieved by special military detachments. Hundreds of brave men and women in the field lost their lives, some purely accidentally, by dint of enemy watchfulness, but many by poor selection criteria, inadequate training, and flawed security procedures – and the inevitable reprisals. Officers in London were largely detached from the slaughter, and looked out for their next medals. Fortunately no lives were lost directly in the Swedish Section, but its launching and follow-up were largely a colossal waste of effort. Sadly, the character who comes out of this saga with most dignity, the Foreign Office’s Peter Loxley, was killed in an aircraft crash on his way to Yalta.

The Historiography:

The Case of SOE at the National Archives may be a unique phenomenon, but it set in place an embarrassing series of blunders. By categorizing files that should have belonged to another classification entirely (primarily the Section D records that antedated the establishment of SOE in July 1940), the archivists at Kew successfully (though unintentionally) misled a researcher whose knowledge of the subject she was investigating was so inadequate that she was unable to spot the error. She consequently wrote an atrocious article that mangled the chronology and structures of the intelligence units in question.

She then submitted her article to one of the supposedly most prestigious journals in the intelligence world, The Journal of Intelligence and National Security (JINS). Who approved her article, or how many revisions were required before sign-off was given, is unknown. Perhaps the person responsible was impressed that it contained seventy-three Endnotes, and thus reflected a rich array of published and archival sources, and the editor simply accepted it as it was. What is certain is that this person was equally as inexpert in the intelligence history of the years leading up to WWII, and through the creation of SOE, to spot that anything was amiss. In this way the article sailed into publication.

What is astonishing, and truly scandalous, is that no one appears to have challenged JINS on the publication of such an undisciplined piece. That may be because no one of influence and authority read it: one would think that if a person had been appointed to the Advisory Board of such a distinguished journal, that expert would assume the duty of reading each issue when it came out. Even if not every member were familiar enough with SOE to judge it, one would think that at least the following names would have leaped out of their armchairs when they encountered such nonsense: Aldrich, Andrew, Cormac, Davies, Dilks, Ferris, Freedman, Glees, Goodman, Phythian and Wark. Yet not a single protestation appears to have emerged. The article has lain untouched for nineteen years.

Yet that negligence extends to the subscribers, too. No one who would presumably have dug out this article for their own research purposes appears to have made a squeak, either. Does anyone read these articles? Does anyone subscribe voluntarily, and pay out of their own pocket? Or is everything bundled under those institutional subscriptions? If anyone noticed something anomalous, were they too idle to write a letter to the Editors, pointing out their cavalier approach to historical truth? It is almost as if this is a factory operation. Ambitious ‘scholars’ need to publish articles. The journals need to fill their pages, and to show enough volume and regular publication in order to justify the expensive fees they charge libraries and academic institutions. But nobody pays much attention to them. Quality goes by the wayside.

JINS was obviously not the sole source for my research into SOE’s Swedish Section, but readers will no doubt understand, from my forays into archival material and memoir, and into ‘official’ histories, that trying to understand complicated matters like the birth and death of such units is difficult enough without the ‘authorities’ conspiring to leave boulders in the path that have to be cleared away before serious work can begin.

(A richer than normal set of Commonplace entries for this month can be seen here.)

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Special Bulletin: ‘The Airmen Who Died Twice’ – Part 3

(This bulletin contains the third segment of my study of ‘The Airmen Who Died Twice’, which explains why two Soviet agents were carried on board a British Lancaster aircraft in September 1944, a flight that ended in disaster when the plane crashed into a hill in Norway. For the previous two segments, please turn to Part 1 and Part 2.)

The Lofotens

Chapter 5: Intelligence Manœuvres

The implications of co-operation between the RAF and the NKGB in infiltrating Soviet citizens with subversive objectives into a third country occupied by the enemy are highly significant. It is such a sensitive issue that one would have to conclude that one of Britain’s wartime intelligence organizations was involved. Admittedly, southern Norway was beyond the regular range where the Soviets were able to drop agents for intelligence purposes, but they would not have sought British assistance unless it were not a routine operation. It does not appear that they wanted to parachute in a spy or saboteur blind, without some sort of reception committee. Hence they must have been seeking help from British or British-trained contacts on the ground. Such a pattern is not unprecedented, but the utter lack of any reference, in the records of the RAF and the intelligence agencies, to the joint operation over Norway points not just to a highly clandestine operation, but also to a monumental embarrassment when it ended so dismally and tragically.

The two institutions that maintained networks in countries occupied by the Nazis were the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, sometimes known as MI6). The first was essentially a sabotage organization, a civil unit reporting to the Ministry of Political Warfare, although many of its leaders were military men. It had been created by Winston Churchill in 1940, specifically to cause havoc behind enemy lines. SIS, on the other hand, was an intelligence-gathering service with some history that worked more by stealth. It resented SOE’s very existence, since the business of sabotage tended to draw the attention of the enemy, while the agents of SIS worked as quietly as possible. Moreover, the fact that SOE had agents in the field meant that they were also a provider of intelligence. Claude Dansey, the assistant chief of SIS, made it his mission to undermine SOE whenever he could.

Hugh Dalton

SOE had an occasionally very strained relationship with the governments-in-exile of the countries where they built their networks. Hugh Dalton, the first minister responsible for SOE, was a socialist who viewed the mission of his organization to enhance the possibility of implementing socialist ‘revolutions’ throughout Europe after the Nazi foe had been defeated. Such a strategy was anathema to most governments-in-exile which, composed of members of the pre-war ruling class, hoped to reinstall the previous form of government, and its attendant privileges, after the war. In addition, Dalton was a notorious showman, who misrepresented SOE’s achievements in Norway, and over-promised to Churchill what the section could achieve. In turn, Churchill, ever the romantic, in February 1942 told the Norwegian government-in-exile that Norway would be the first country to be liberated – a foolish claim.

On the ground, however, much of the strongest resistance to the fascists came from underground communist groups, who had suspended their disgust when the Nazi-Soviet pact occurred. After June 1941, when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, and Stalin’s dictatorship became an ally of the western democracies, these cells renewed their vigorous ambitions for proper (not Daltonian) revolution. A pattern across Europe occurred whereby weapons and supplies dropped by parachute, intended for patriot forces, frequently ended up in units taking orders from Stalin. The perennial problem with SOE was that its strategy was apparently to prepare patriot armies for the coming arrival of British troops, but that event often took years in the making, or never happened at all, which was damaging to morale. Moreover, there was a permanent risk of arms caches being discovered by the Germans, or simply falling into disrepair. SOE’s management of expectations was poor, to say the least.

Frank Foley

This pattern repeated itself in Norway. Before the war, the SIS station in Oslo reported through Stockholm, but after some embarrassing events in Sweden, Frank Foley (who had been posted to Oslo in September 1939) returned to London in early 1940, and was put in charge of the whole of Scandinavia and the Low Countries. The Royal Navy soon made demands on SIS for intelligence on German naval movements along the coast. The arrival of SOE agents complicated matters, however: Norway was too thinly populated for networks to remain isolated, and there were several clashes between the two organizations. Moreover, SOE initially worked independently of both the Norwegian government-in-exile, and of Milorg, the military arm of the Norwegian Home Front, which, despite its name, was more focused on the future liberation of the country than attention-drawing sabotage adventures. SOE kept clear of it, as it regarded its security as lax. Likewise, the small communist groups also stayed apart from Milorg. They criticized it for its passivity, and were less concerned about Nazi brutalities.

The Lofotens Raid

Thus some harsh lessons were learned. The reprisals after the Lofotens raid of December 1941 triggered Norwegian animosity to SOE, which led to the establishment of a Joint Anglo-Norwegian Committee in London in February 1942. In January, a new SOE Norwegian section was split off from the Scandinavian unit, and the very pragmatic John Wilson had been appointed its head. Yet it took time for the Committee to exert any influence. In April 1942, mismanaged landings at the community of Telavåg, involving mis-steps by both MI6 and SOE in which two Gestapo officers were killed, led to fearsome reprisals. SOE accordingly made contact with Milorg in September of that year, in a spirit of collaboration. It took the first major operation undertaken by SOE and Combined Operations forces (commandos), the November 1942 attempt to land gliders in an attack on the Vermork heavy-water plant, to change policy. The assault was a disaster. The participants were executed: severe reprisals on the civilian population followed. Both Milorg and the government in London were horrified, and their disgust led to a more cautious approach to sabotage. The eventual sinking, in February 1944, of the steamer carrying heavy water on Lake Tinnsjo bolstered SOE’s reputation, but twenty-six persons were drowned in the process.

Reprisals after Telavag
Norsk Hydro, Vermork

1943 was a transition year. After Milorg had supported, in April, an attack by the communist Sunde’s group on labour offices in Oslo, the government in exile called it to stop collaborating with communist organizations. In May, at a conference in Sweden, Milorg agreed that its future activities would be determined by the Allied Supreme Command, and that its mission would be to prepare for liberation. Norway had a role to play in diversionary exercises away from the main European theatre (Operation TINDALL, as part of the COCKADE deception plan), and some weaponry was parachuted in for the Norwegian resistance. Yet SOE itself suffered a major setback that autumn, when the infiltration of its Dutch and French circuits was discovered by the Chiefs of Staff. SOE survived (thanks to Churchill’s intervention), but was put under military control, the Norwegian Section of SOE coming under Special Forces Headquarters in May 1944. Soon afterwards General Eisenhower sent out a stern message to the Norwegians that, in the wake of the Normandy landings, no national uprising should take place, as the Allies had no immediate plans to invade their country. A predictable lowering of morale ensued, and, in recompense, some steady carefully-targeted sabotage operations were encouraged.

The early months of 1944 had created a new climate, however. In February, the Foreign Office reported that uncontrolled sabotage by the Communists was increasing, sometimes with the aid of arms supplied by SOE. That was not part of the plan. In May, the Germans tried to press-gang Norwegian workers for work in the Reich, and hundreds of youths fled to the mountains, thus creating a kind of Norwegian ‘maquis’. An unuathorized but efficient group known as the ‘Oslo Gang’ reached a peak of sabotage activity in August. On August 17, Milorg executed a very damaging operation in which an oil storage depot at Son, on the Oslofjord, was exploded. More serious plans for guerrilla attacks were forged, and in May 1944, four sites were identified for the congregation of partisans, one of which was at Elg, north-west of Oslo – a few miles from Nesbyen, the site of the crash. Two men parachuted into Elg on August 31, 1944, and over a hundred men assembled there, with weapons and food stockpiled. That same month Jens Hauge, the head of Milorg, had travelled to London for four weeks of consultations with SOE, Army chiefs, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and the Norwegian government-in-exile, and he crossed back into Norway from Sweden.

Meanwhile, SIS in Sweden had been experiencing its own tribulations. The Admiralty applied pressure on the organization to provide intelligence on Kirkenes, on the Norway/Russia border, which led to a catastrophic joint project with the Soviets, where two SIS agents were flown into an airbase in August 1942. Instead of parachuting them in promptly, however, the Russians held them for two months, and then dropped them, improperly equipped, into Finland rather than Norway. They were captured, handed over to the Germans, and shot. Soon afterwards, the hapless head of station John Martin was replaced by the Russian-speaking Cyril Cheshire, but the lessons from trying to collaborate with the Soviets on clandestine operations appeared not to have been passed on, and properly internalized.

Improbably, the closest cooperation between SOE and SIS occurred within the section of SOE that worked in the Soviet Union. At the end of 1941, an exchange of missions between London and Moscow had been set up, with an old WWI Russia veteran George Hill appointed as leader. He took a small group with him to start negotiating with the NKVD on shared sabotage endeavours, while the obdurate Colonel Chichaev took up a corresponding post in London. The whole project was highly controversial, since the Soviets wanted SOE help in parachuting agents into Western Europe, which was out of reach of their aircraft. The governments-in-exile would have had a fit if they had known that a British intelligence unit was abetting a potential Communist revolution in their home countries. Moreover, the Foreign Office – quite enthusiastic about ‘co-operating’ with Soviet diplomats – was alarmed at the prospect of collaboration with Communists in more murky quarters.

As it turned out, the operation (named PICKAXE) was for many reasons a disaster, and incriminations started to flow both ways. Collaboration was called off in practical terms by early 1944. Yet by then, the SOE mission in Moscow had been badly abused by the NKGB (as the NKVD became). Hill had probably been appointed by Menzies, the head of SIS, and he represented both SIS and SOE in some of his agent management roles. Unfortunately his cipher-clerk, George Graham (who was of Russian aristocratic birth), allowed himself to be suborned by NKGB intrigues, with the result that Soviet intelligence gained access to SIS codes and cyphers. How that helped Stalin in his preparation for Yalta is an untold story.

A further group in the drama was the 30 Mission, a British military unit sent out to Moscow in 1941, charged with exchanging military intelligence as a way of improving Allied combat against the Nazis. This was another troubled enterprise, since the officers who went there mostly returned in disgust after a short spell, frustrated by Soviet obtuseness and secrecy. Its negotiations had to take place via contacts in a department of the NKGB, and its direct exchanges with the Red Army (and even more so, the Air Force, which was subsidiary to the Army and Navy) were few and constrained. With the Arctic Convoys playing a large role in sustaining the Soviet Union’s goodwill, and ability to counter the Wehrmacht, a large body of sailors and other men was required in Murmansk, a presence that alarmed the NKGB, for fear of ideological infection of the local populace. 30 Mission was the hub through which all the problems and challenges had to be routed: General Martel, and his successor, General Burrows, tried vainly to make the Soviets see reason, and concluded that resolution and hard bargaining produced better results than attempts to please their reluctant hosts.

Voskresenskaya-Rybkina

Last but not least was the offensive arm of the NKVD/NKGB. In July 1941, after Barbarossa, Pavel Sudoplatov was appointed director of the Administration of Special Tasks, charged with sabotage and political assassination abroad. (Sudoplatov had been overall responsible for the murder of Leon Trotsky in 1940.) One of his closest associates was a woman called Zoya Voskresenskaya, also known as Rybkina, via marriage, and as a working alias, Madam Yartseva. Rybkina was sent by Sudoplatov to Stockholm, ostensibly as the press attaché to the Ambassador, Alexandra Kollontai, but in fact as the head of the NKVD station, which exercised a firm control over the activities of all the staff. Her husband, who went by Boris Yartsev as a junior diplomatic official in Stockholm, returned to Moscow in 1943, was present at Yalta, and met his death in Czechoslovakia, in 1947, in one of those mysterious car crashes that prematurely took the lives of intelligence officers who fell out of favour.

In his memoirs, Sudoplatov wrote glowingly about his protegée, who had actually been his handler in Helsinki at the beginning of his career. In 1942, Sudoplatov was also put in charge of collecting information about atomic weaponry, and agents working for Rybkina in Sweden gained information from Lisa Meitner, who had discovered fission with her nephew, Otto Frisch. Sudoplatov claimed that the British knew about the NKGB’s networks in Sweden, and that they were collaborating with the Soviets on joint sabotage operations in Europe. Like many agents who worked under Beria, she was purged (but not imprisoned or killed) after Beria’s own execution.

The deHavilland Mosquito

Yet the most remarkable aspect of Rybkina’s possible contribution to this story is the journey she made to the United Kingdom in February 1944. The VENONA transcripts inform us that Vasily Razin, the First Secretary at the Stockholm Legation, informed Lt.-General Pavel Fitin, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate in Moscow, that IRINA (Rybkina) had successfully arrived in England, by air, on February 6. This flight was operated as part of the so-called ‘ball-bearing’ run, almost certainly deploying a modified Mosquito. It was actually run by the Norwegian Air Force, but under civilian registration, with crews wearing BOAC uniforms and carrying British passports. It was a harrowing and dangerous experience: there was room for only one clandestine passenger, in the bomb-bay. Niels Bohr, the atomic scientist, was one beneficiary, and almost died from lack of oxygen.

The Mosquito Bomb-bay

Why permission should be granted to a known Soviet intelligence agent to take advantage of such a facility is mysterious, and can only point to some very high-level and secret negotiations. What is more, soon after Rybkina arrived, Colonel Chichaev had a private meeting with Colin Gubbins of SOE, a record of which may never have been made. Whether these events were related to the sudden movements in August, 1944, when Colonel Burrows of 30 Mission was recalled to London, his opposite number in the NKGB, General Slavin, disappeared abroad on some unspecified business, Jens Hauge, the head of Milorg, also travelled to London to meet with SOE officers, and two SOE agents were parachuted into the mountainous country north-west of Oslo, is still a matter of speculation. The coincidences are remarkable, yet the need for extreme secrecy over the negotiations with Stalin probably indicates that the particulars of the parachute drop were not on the agenda of the meetings.

Chapter 6: Stalin’s Organs

‘Smersh’ by Vadim Birstein

The rationale behind Stalin’s constant re-organization of his security apparatus is sometimes hard to unravel. In 1943, he separated some functions from the NKVD (The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) into a structure that had briefly existed in 1941, the NKGB (The People’s Commissariat for State Security). The latter was supposed to focus on the territories that had been briefly held between 1939 and 1941, and were shortly expected to return under Soviet rule, such as the Baltic States. But it lacked ample security forces. The NKVD had its foreign mission withdrawn, and concentrated on domestic affairs, such as surveillance of the citizenry, and management of the GULAG. At the same time, Stalin created a new body, SMERSH (‘Death to Spies!’), peeling off those cadres in the NKVD responsible for monitoring disaffection and cowardice in the armed forces. According to Pavel Sudoplatov, Stalin made this move to prevent his NKVD chief Lavrenty Beria from interfering with military promotions – and demotions.

SMERSH existed between April 1943 and May 1946. Its head was Viktor Abakumov, who, like many of Stalin’s security and intelligence chiefs, came to a grisly end. Yet, while its initial task was to root out corruption in the military, it soon took over a more aggressive role identifying and eliminating real or imagined opponents of the Soviet regime in newly conquered territories. Moreover, while the initial threat was identified as German infiltration of the armed forces, its innate suspicion of foreigners in general meant that it turned its attention on the presence of Allied forces on Soviet territory. Notably, supervision of the American air bases in Ukraine had become the responsibility of SMERSH, alongside keeping a close eye on the naval mission in Murmansk supporting the convoys, and on the short-lived presence of PARAVANE operational staff at Yagodnik.

Foreigners might not only be spies: they might also exert a pernicious influence on Soviet citizenry, and the records show that the organs assiduously kept a watch on any liaisons between Soviet citizens and members of the visiting armed forces and their support crews, and followed up with dire threats. Yet the war diaries of the PARAVANE operation do indeed show that some officers showed a more than casual interest in Soviet installations of technology, such as communications. The fact that such interest paled into insignificance against the wholesale theft of Western technology and ideas that the GRU (Military Intelligence) and the NKVD/NKGB had been undertaking for years was irrelevant to the earnestness of SMERSH’s hunt to extirpate any such activity.

Mikhail Ryumin

A SMERSH officer submitted a report on the PARAVANE operation on October 6, 1944, casting doubts on the true motives of the RAF members who led it. The report was probably written by a sadistic thug called Mikhail Ryumin, who was head of the Counter-Intelligence White Army Flotilla, reporting directly to Admiral Panteleyev in Archangel and Abakumov in Moscow. Ryumin had moved up the NKVD ranks by being a protégé of Nikolai Yezhov, the short-lived executor of Stalin’s most dreadful purges, but had survived after Yezhov’s execution. He was later a prime mover in the so-called ‘Doctors’ Plot’, a mirage of Jewish conspiracy conceived by Stalin, and he even denounced his boss, Abakumov. Stalin fired him for incompetence, however, and, after the dictator’s death, Beria had Ryumin arrested and executed.

Ryumin’s report shows that he had a hazy understanding of the PARAVANE mission, emphasizing the failure of the attack on the Tirpitz as a cover for the true objective of seeking information about Soviet military installations (“It can be concluded that under the pretext of the shuttle operation, the flight had an exclusively reconnaissance purpose.”). He refers to the loss of one Lancaster over Norwegian territory, but indicates mistakenly that the return flights were undertaking another bombing raid on the battleship. As evidence for his conclusions about ulterior purposes of the mission, he lists misleading data about the weight and explosive capacity of the Tallboy bomb, the pilots’ cancellations of call-signs on the radio, and an understatement of the number of officers and men who would be arriving (which was, in fact, justified).

The fact that he had been kept in the dark about the true circumstances surrounding the change of plan is shown by the fact that he attributes the haphazard landings at various airfields to a deliberate ploy by the RAF to determine the location, size, and condition of those same airfields. Of course, his report may have been crafted to show the appropriate communist diligence in disparaging the RAF’s failure to sink the Tirpitz, the objective of Operation PARAVANE. Its timing, moreover, could be significant: it was submitted to his boss, Abakumov, three days before the start of the so-called ‘Tolstoy’ Conference in Moscow, where Stalin hosted Churchill and Eden, and the notorious agreements about the carve-up of Europe were made without Roosevelt’s presence.

Group Captain McMullen

Yet some inappropriate nosing around was undertaken by some of the RAF contingent (see Chapter 3). Captain Abercrombie, who had joined the (military) 30 Mission in Moscow the previous April, sought permission to take photographs without constraints, and asked questions about the radio and power stations in Archangel. Ryumin also had negative things to say about a Lieutenant-Colonel Happen, who, after a request by Group Captain McMullen to travel via Moscow, Stalingrad and Tehran to Cairo been rejected, apparently made disparaging remarks and spread ‘anti-Soviet sentiments’. The fact was that the RAF members generally had good relations with their opposite numbers in the Soviet Naval Air Force, and probably said too much in unguarded moments. Such conversations were bound to be overheard by or reported to the SMERSH commissars embedded in the units. (An Appendix to the War Diary refers to ‘the sprinkling of N.K.V.D. personnel (male and female) to check that the interests of the Communist Party are not prejudiced’.) The Diary nevertheless expresses great appreciation of the support they received, especially from Colonel Loginov, who was Chief of Staff to the Commander of the Air Forces of the White Sea Flotilla, and McMullen wrote generous letters of thanks. These commendations (which may have been largely political) would have cut no ice with Ryumin.

Pavel Sudoplatov

One significant Soviet officer who was familiar with Ryumin (and had a low opinion of him) was Pavel Sudoplatov, who had been appointed head of the NKVD ‘Special Tasks’ unit in July 1941. Sudoplatov, who had engineered the assassination of Trotsky, was thus responsible for sabotage behind enemy lines, as well as further assassinations. He also took on a major role in handling disinformation exercises to fool the Germans about a potential anti-Soviet movement within the Soviet Union, as well as Operation MONASTERY, which aimed to penetrate the Abwehr’s intelligence network behind Soviet lines. Abakumov was jealous of Sudoplatov’s role, wanting it for himself, and challenged him in 1942 to turn over all radio deception games against the Germans to him. He was partially successful, but Sudoplatov kept the MONASTERY operation, as well as the COURIERS operation, which claimed the existence of an anti-Soviet faction within the Russian Orthodox Church. Thus the rivalries between Sudoplatov and Abakumov may have contributed to some mis-steps in the execution of the mission to Nesbyen.

The relevance of these connections is important in the PARAVANE story because of Sudoplatov’s relationship with the NKVD officer Zoya Voskresenskaya, also known as Rybkina, after her marriage to another NKVD officer. She had worked for Sudoplatov at the beginning of the war, planning sabotage, and training partisans, when she and her husband were suddenly sent to Stockholm, where she was appointed nominally the press attaché to the Ambassador, Alexandra Kollontai, and took up the name Yartseva. Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, a neutral country, was, like Portugal’s Lisbon, a nest of spies and intelligence-gathering, and it controlled through regular communication the Stalinist faction of the Norwegian Communist Party, as well as providing it with funds. Yartseva was actually the most important person in the Embassy, and was also responsible for controlling the receipt and transmission of all the intelligence coming from the Soviet Union’s Rote Kapelle network in Germany. (Ian Fleming’s Rosa Klebb was reputedly based on her.)

Voskresenskaya-Rybkina

Sudoplatov’s relationship with Yartseva went back many years, since she had actually been his controller in Finland in the early 1930s, and they stayed in close touch. Yartseva had more recently been involved with Sudoplatov’s COURIERS operation, controlling members of the clergy in Kalinin. Sudoplatov also claimed that Yartseva was part of his management team on the ENORMOZ (atomic weapons) project, but his version of events has been challenged by Western experts. Yet they did have another important colleague – Colonel Chichaev, the NKVD representative in London charged with liaising with SOE and its Russian section, and maybe even handling some of the NKVD’s nest of spies. Chichaev had spent time at the Stockholm Embassy in 1940, working with Yartseva.

These threads would come together as Stalin’s strategy for Scandinavia took shape. His ambitions were overall modest for neighbouring territories that were not to be occupied by the Red Army. Finland was problematic. It had a long border with the Soviet Union, and after losing a war in 1940 against the Communist regime – in which the Red Army was at first humiliated – the country had dangerously aligned itself with Nazi Germany, in the belief that Hitler would be the victor. While Stalin respected the Finns for their courage, he resolved to exploit them because of their support of the Fascists rather than waste military forces in conquering them. He was anxious to gain strategically useful territories from them, such as islands in the Gulf of Finland, in order to give him protection for the port of Leningrad and the Baltic States, and regain ownership of the Petsamo (Russian: Pechenga) region in the far north, with its valuable nickel mines. Moreover, the Communist Party was strong in Finland, although Stalin had purged many of its leading members in Moscow.

Pechenga

Sweden was not really a consideration: it had remained neutral during the war, and was geographically not so relevant. Norway had been occupied by the Nazis, and harboured a somewhat subdued resistance movement. Despite the lack of contiguity, some of Stalin’s ministers had pressed for Sweden and Norway to come under the Soviet ‘sphere of influence’, with Norway’s Communist Party a potential asset. The Norwegian government-in-exile was fearful that the Red Army would make incursions through the north of the country, and in early 1944 made appeasing overtures through the Soviet ambassador to avert the possibility. While Stalin probably found satisfaction in keeping that threat alive, and gaining concessions from the Norwegians, he in fact did not want to move Red Army divisions to Norway. He would prefer that the British take responsibility for clearing the country of Nazi troops, although he did not want the latter pouring into Northern Russia. (The negotiated restoration of Pechenga would present the Soviet Union with a narrow border with Norway.) Thus, in the summer of 1944, he pressed Churchill and Eden to take a leading role in the liberation of Norway, and gained a concession from them in August that Finland naturally fell in his bailiwick, and that the British had no strategic interests there.

The western Allies wanted to consolidate their assaults into western Europe and Germany before dealing with the Wehrmacht in Norway: to that end the Chiefs-of-Staff had developed an operational feint called RANKIN designed to pin German troops in Norway through the D-Day invasions. On the other hand, the British did not want premature uprisings in Norway, hoping to preserve the partisan forces to hold their fire until the real day of reckoning. They were aware, however, of maverick Communist Party guerrilla units continuing to cause trouble. Yet Stalin, as in France, did not want any Communists to engage in provocative behaviour and risk turning the Americans against him before the Nazis had been beaten. Thus British and Soviet needs in the area began to converge. Stalin wanted to sign a pact with Finland, using it as a proxy.  He planned to demand from it the harassment of German divisions in the north of the country, as he wanted to move the few divisions he maintained on the Finnish border to the vital German battlefield, and he sought British assistance in the endeavour.

On September 19, 1944, a few days after the PARAVANE Operation was executed, the Moscow Armistice was signed by representatives of Finland, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The British War Cabinet had reviewed its protocols as early as September 7. They laid out some strict conditions: for example, the withdrawal of Finnish troops to the frontier as it existed in 1940; Finland to be responsible for disarming German land, air and naval forces in the country; the transfer to the Soviet Union of critical territories, such as Pechenga; the provision of up to three hundred million dollars’ worth of goods as indemnification for Soviet losses; and the handover of airfields in southern Finland for the Soviets to attack German forces in the Baltic States. Whether this last item was part of a quid pro quo with the British for the use of Soviet airfields in the attacks on the Tirpitz is not stated. But the timing is intriguing, and Stalin was accustomed to including ‘secret’ protocols in his political agreements.

The negotiations that led up to this agreement are regrettably opaque. Yet the intrigues in sending Yartseva to London in February 1944, and the subsequent meetings (see Chapter 5) must have had some serious objectives. Stockholm was a notoriously isolated location: it took the Petrovs nine months to reach it from Moscow in 1942. For Yartseva to gain approval from the British and Norwegian governments for a valuable place on the ball-bearing run to Leuchars in Scotland (and presumably a return flight) must have meant that they considered she had both clout and information of great value, and that it was both safe and wise to allow her to have discussions with Chichaev. What political backdrop could have led to such a concession?

(The final part of this story will appear on April 15.)

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The Demise of PROSPER

Major Francis Suttill, aka ‘Prosper’
  • The Story So Far
  • Morgan and Operation COCKADE
  • COCKADE and the Historians
  • Prosper’s Torment
  • Betrayal
  • The Dangle
  • SOE’s Strategy & The Chiefs of Staff
  • The Aftermath, and Conclusions

The Story So Far

(see also https://coldspur.com/bridgehead-revisited-three-months-in-1943/ and https://coldspur.com/feints-and-deception-two-more-months-in-1943/)

The French operations of SOE in the first half of 1943 have been beset by confusion and contradictory instructions. The Chiefs of Staff have dithered between acknowledging that a serious assault on Normandy cannot take place until 1944, while maintaining vain hopes that some minimal attack may be made in later in 1943, if only to distract German forces from the Russian front. Winston Churchill has continued to promote the cause of striking a bridgehead in Normandy. Both British and American Chiefs of Staff have lost focus on what SOE should be doing to support these muddled policies. SOE itself has received new orders which reduce France to a lesser priority than Yugoslavia and Italy, and emphasize sabotage rather than providing weapons to secret armies. Yet in the first few months of 1943, the parachuting in of weaponry to potential guerrilla forces in France has increased markedly, even while SOE officers are being warned that the important PROSPER circuit has been infiltrated by Abwehr spies. These officers are also aware that Henri Déricourt, an organizer of landing-sites in France, has been in touch with Sicherheitsdienst officers in Paris. Lt.-General Frederick Morgan, aka COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, this Commander in fact not yet having been appointed), has received bizarre instructions from the Chiefs of Staff, and has started planning diversionary campaigns for Northern Europe, under the umbrella codename of COCKADE. Francis Suttill, the leader of the PROSPER circuit, makes two visits to Britain, the first at the end of May, and a second shorter one in early June. The guidance and instructions that he receives during these two visits will turn out to have tragic consequences.

In this report, I address the following research questions:

  • In what manner was the proposal for COCKADE approved?
  • What effect did its approval have on Suttill’s behaviour and eventual demise?
  • Why were the infiltrated circuits not closed down immediately German infiltration had been detected?
  • How did the decision affect SOE? Why did arms shipments to France continue to increase after the 1943 assault was called off?
  • What did the Chiefs of Staff know about the LCS/SOE rogue deception plan?

And the overarching question remains: Why has the Foreign Office behaved so obstructively in withholding information about the PROSPER case?

Morgan and Operation COCKADE

The TRIDENT Conference

While discussions between John Bevan, the Controlling Officer, and the Joint Planning Staff had been going on for some weeks, on June 3 Lt.-General Morgan completed his draft of Operation COCKADE, the deception scheme designed with a view ‘to pinning the enemy in the West, and keeping alive the expectation of large-scale cross-Channel operations in 1943’. General L. C. Hollis circulated it to the Chiefs of Staff two days later, this group having just returned from the TRIDENT conferences in Washington, D.C.  COCKADE itself consisted of three subsidiary operations, STARKEY, WADHAM and TINDALL, all of which were designed to culminate in September of 1943. STARKEY is the most relevant to this story: WADHAM was entirely a deceptive operation designed to convince the Germans of an American landing in Brittany in September, while TINDALL represented a distraction in Norway. It is thus worth reproducing STARKEY’s description here:

            An amphibious feint to force the GAF [German Air Force] to engage in intensive fighting over a period of about 14 days, by building up a threat of an imminent large-scale landing in the PAS DE CALAIS area. The culminating date should be between 8th and 14th September.

The first startling aspect of STARKEY was that it involved some real assaults, not just rumours. Morgan’s instructions had specifically called for the German Air Force to be brought into battle. Yet such ‘feints’ designed to engage the G.A.F. (‘intensive fighting’) were necessarily dangerous, since, if the latter responded to the bait, lives might have been lost, and the political backlash when the attack turned out to be half-hearted could have been disastrous. (Morgan drew attention to such ‘undesirable repercussions’ in the last paragraph of his submission, but recommended that considerations of them not influence the decision.)  The second important dimension was the location of the threatened large-scale landing, namely in the Pas de Calais area, away from the coasts of Normandy where the 1944 entry would take place, but on a heavily-defended area where the German response would be expected to be very robust.

Operation STARKEY

The proposal for STARKEY is very odd. Its objective is implicitly declared to be ‘to present a realistic picture of an imminent large-scale landing’. Morgan’s reasoning seems to be that the German Air Force would be brought to battle only ‘by the threat of an imminent invasion of the Continent’, since its forces were severely depleted. “To give our fighters the greatest advantage the threat must be mounted against the PAS DE CALAIS”, he added. Yet, since that area was so strongly defended, the operation would require heavy involvement of the Royal Navy, the RAF, as well as the US 8th Air Force, and would constitute a diversion from strategic heavy bombing efforts. Why would those forces commit so readily to something that was only a feint? If the objective had been to destroy what remained of the GAF, and it were accompanied by a high degree of confidence, Morgan’s plan might have received vigorous enthusiasm from his military colleagues. Yet he bizarrely refers merely to the chance of succeeding ‘to draw the GAF’, and that ‘14 days intensive fighting is probably the maximum that we can reasonably maintain’. Was Morgan recommending an air battle that the Allies could well lose, or was he just rather casually indicating that the threat of invasion would not be taken seriously without such a provocation?

Apart from the fact that the feint itself was an illusion, as it did include a real desire to engage the enemy, the focus on the Pas de Calais was itself very risky. Morgan himself admitted that it was a very well-defended region. Would the Germans take hints of an attack in that area seriously?  It should be recalled that they had successfully obliterated the Dieppe Raid the previous year. Yet the overall desire ‘to keep the enemy pinned throughout the summer’, as Morgan later qualified the objective, thus hoping to improve the chances of the advance on Sicily, and providing help to Stalin in the East, dominated the plan. After all, these were the express instructions issued by the Chiefs of Staff back on April 26. Moreover, part of it mysteriously suggested that, should the GAF be beaten and a rapid seizure of the Pas de Calais achieved, that would signal a possible ‘complete German collapse or withdrawal’.

Yet this naïve thinking about targets constituted a fatal flaw. The detailed text of the COCKADE plan included some puzzling sentences concerning the choice of the Pas de Calais. Having explained how heavily fortified the area was, and the most strongly defended, Morgan described the level of bombardment that would be required ‘over a limited period’ (a very unmilitary, evasive and indefinite bureaucratic phrase) to give the impression that a large-scale landing was imminent. But then, amazingly, Morgan went on to write:

            Port capacities in the PAS DE CALAIS are insufficient, even when undamaged, to supply a force of more than about nine divisions. We cannot therefore expect the GERMANS seriously to believe that invasion of the Continent is intended if we leave our deception plan to this area, and certainly we shall not contain all his reserves, if they are badly wanted elsewhere. At the same time the paucity of landing craft (actual or dummy) available in this country . . . . will make it clear to him that simultaneous cross-Channel operations in more than one sector are not feasible. We must therefore lead him to suppose that a major part of our plan is a long sea voyage ship to shore operation partly from this country but mainly from the USA.

Surprisingly, given the short timetable involved, the minutes of the War Cabinet show no further discussion of COCKADE for a while. Indeed, on June 17, Morgan moved on to the real and authentic 1944 Operation, apologizing to the Chiefs of Staff for the delay in submitting his initial plans for OVERLORD, and added they would be available on July 15. The next reference to COCKADE appears in a note by General Hollis on June 23, where he presents a response from Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers of the US Army, and Commanding General of ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, United States Army), in which Devers agrees generally with the conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting of June 21 concerning COCKADE. Then, rather incidentally, the matter of COCKADE is brought to the Prime Minister’s attention by General Hollis on June 23, where we learn obliquely that the War Cabinet has approved the operation. (Churchill would of course have been briefed on the plan before the War Cabinet set eyes on it. The official minutes for the meeting at which the approval was made do not appear in the official series.) It is in fact Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, who is responding to Churchill’s request for information on raids (Mountbatten’s bailiwick), whereupon Mountbatten refers to concurrent raids being undertaken as part of COCKADE. Thus the fact of the War Cabinet’s decision on COCKADE appears only as Annex 2 to Mountbatten’s note.

Yet valuable details about the negotiations can be found elsewhere. It is in the War Office archives (WO 106/4223) where a fuller account of some of the discussions that took place earlier in the month appears, and some highly important observations are evident. For example, as early as April 29, Sir Alan Brooke had voiced his disagreement that the news of the setting up of expeditionary forces ‘should be allowed to leak out through the channels at the disposal of the Controlling Officer’. Yet that recommendation does not appear in the report as listed, and must have derived from discussions. This cryptic statement presumably means that he disapproved of a policy of using ‘double agents’ through Bevan’s TWIST committee, although he did not explain why he was sceptical about that channel, nor did he offer an alternative.

Admiral of the Fleet Dudley Pound

A discussion took place at the Chiefs’ meeting on June 8, just after the return from Washington, when it was resolved to discuss the plan with Morgan while the Joint Planning Staff performed its detailed analysis, and then to meet with Morgan again. Morgan started off by stating that it might be difficult to bring the GAF into battle, and that ‘in order to provide a sufficiently convincing display of force, that battleships for bombarding the German coast artillery had been included for use in the later stage of the plan’. This worried Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, who urged ‘very careful considerations’ before the employment of battleships in the Channel could be sanctioned. Likewise, Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, could not agree to a major diversion of bombers to meet Morgan’s requirements.

Air Marshall Charles Portal

Later, a discussion concerning, rather archly, ‘Control of Patriot Organisations’, followed. The meeting recognized the importance of preventing premature risings in the occupied countries ‘and it was generally agreed [not unanimously?] that all patriot organisations must be warned that there must be no general rising without our definite instructions.’ Morgan was invited to consult with S.O.E. on this matter. On these, and other topics (such as the shortage of landing-craft) the Joint Planning Staff was instructed to report.

Further doubts surfaced the following day. A significant commentary – presented anonymously, from the War Office – appears, dated June 9. The note encourages the more detailed analysis being performed by the Joint Planning Staff, but ‘ventilates’ for the preliminary discussion the following two important points: 

            Air Battle: One of the main advantages, which it is hoped to attain is a profitable air battle. Is the Chief of Staff convinced that we can be sure of obtaining this advantage?

            Political Repercussions: We shall eventually find ourselves in a position where German propaganda can represent that an attempted invasion has been repelled. Premature rising by Resistance Groups on the Continent may be difficult to avoid and their action might be detrimental to success on a later occasion.

Having received an individual invitation to do so, John Bevan, Controlling Officer of the London Controlling Section, responded to Morgan’s plan, and his memorandum was presented to the Chiefs of Staff on June 11. His opinions were strangely meek and uncritical, but then he was after all the architect of the plans, since their conception had antedated Morgan’s appointment. He appeared to approve of STARKEY and WADHAM, but pointed out that the Germans were unlikely to believe that the Allies could carry off three such operations simultaneously in September. His comments were mainly directed at TINDALL, and the chances of the Germans transferring forces hardened by cold weather to the Russian front. He completed his report by suggesting that, after the operation had been called off, it should be described as a ‘dress rehearsal’ rather than a feint, in order to protect ‘secret sources’, presumably the network of ‘double agents’ passing on intelligence about the operation to their Abwehr controllers. In his diaries, Alan Brooke records that Morgan came to see him on June 17 ‘to discuss various minor difficulties he has come up against’. What they were is not said, but Bevan presumably wanted Brooke on his side at the coming meeting.

The Chiefs of Staff took note of Bevan’s memorandum, but accepted his recommendation about publicity. In any case, on June 21, the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) issued its comprehensive Draft Report. In its introduction, it somewhat surprisingly expressed confidence in the plan’s conception, but added, rather weakly, the opinion that it ‘should succeed in pinning German forces in the west’, and that ‘it may also provoke an air battle and will provide most valuable experience’. It moved quickly over WADHAM and TINDALL and focused on STARKEY, where it boldly pointed out that:

11. The object of the plan, as stated, is to convince the enemy that a large scale landing in the Pas de Calais area is imminent and to bring the German Air Force to battle,

12. There is no intention of converting STARKEY into an actual landing if sudden German disintegration appears to be imminent. Entirely separate plans are being made for the possibility of an emergency return to the Continent.

The planning of Operation STARKEY is accordingly being limited to purely deceptive measures involving no plans for a re-entry to the Continent.

These were very significant reminders to the Chiefs of the Casablanca resolutions, and the seriousness with which they were taken is shown by the fact that the recommendation of ‘should therefore’ in the printed text has been emended to ‘is accordingly being’ in manuscript, reflecting that the Chiefs had endorsed this particular observation.

The JPS also highlighted the political repercussions, and, in consequence, a vital paragraph soon appeared in the protocols, running as follows:

            The reactions to these operations of the inhabitants of the occupied territories will require to be controlled by the issue in advance of the most careful directions. The Political Warfare and Special Operations Executives have therefore been instructed to prepare detailed plans setting out the measures which should be adopted in order to prevent any premature rising by the patriot armies.

This is also a very important statement. While the plan had explicitly excluded any role for ‘patriot armies’ in the STARKEY operation, the JPS implicitly ordains that SOE agents should in no manner encourage French resistance members to expect or support any invasion in 1943. (Given the confirmed policy that invasion could not occur until summer 1944, ‘premature’ presumably meant any time before then.) As far as the build-up of arms, and exhortations over the wireless were concerned, however, all this well-intended foresight was too little, too late, and appears to have been expressed in complete ignorance of what was happening on the ground. In France, many ‘patriot armies’ had been supplied, and were eagerly expecting the invasion.

The War Office records include the minutes of the decisive meeting that took place on June 21. There were several caveats: Mountbatten agreed with Pound on the battleship issue; Portal appeared to have succumbed half-heartedly to the demand for bomber support; Brooke raised an important point about the repercussions from bombing targets in France, and possible civilian deaths. Some awkward questions were deferred, but the plans were essentially approved.

The argument behind the whole COCKADE plan thus appeared to be:

  1. We shall launch an unserious attack on the Pas de Calais.
  2. We hope to engage the GAF, but have a slim chance of destroying it.
  3. The Pas de Calais is the best defended area of the French coastline.
  4. The area is not large enough to support an invasion-capable force.
  5. The Germans will not take this attack seriously.
  6. We hope to supplement the air attack with bombardments by battleships (if the Royal Navy agrees).
  7. We are, however, not confident that a presence of battleships will be useful.
  8. We shall thus pretend to launch an assault on Normandy as well, with an even flimsier feint.
  9. We shall augment this with the pretence of the unlikely arrival of a fleet from the USA.
  10. In this way the Germans will be convinced that a massive assault is imminent.

It does not take the brain of a military strategist to conclude that this was an absurd proposition. Why on earth would the Germans be taken in by it, especially as Allied forces were amassed in the Mediterranean in preparation for an assault on Sicily or the Balkans? Was German intelligence so bad that the Wehrmacht would take seriously the threat of a major assault across the Channel as well? Even on August 7, the Chiefs of Staff were discussing what reduction of German forces would be necessary to make a 1944 cross-Channel operation possible. Moreover, Churchill, responding to Stalin’s querulous complaint about the further deferral of the assault, wrote to him on June 18 about the futility of wasting vast numbers of military personnel:

            It would be no help to Russia if we threw away a hundred thousand men in a disastrous cross-Channel attack such as would, in my opinion, certainly occur if we tried under present conditions and with forces too weak to exploit any success that might be gained at very heavy cost.

That opinion should have put the kibosh on any notion of exploiting ‘German disintegration’.

What is more, the COCKADE plan is evasive and uncomfortable about the use of propaganda, misinformation and leakage to abet the project, especially when it relates to SOE and MI6 networks in France. Yet, at the time they considered the COCKADE plan, the Chiefs of Staff must have known about the recent increase in shipments of arms to France, and the campaigns already organized by the PWE to encourage the notion of an imminent invasion. If that activity ceased, the Nazis would conclude that the military movements were indeed a sham. But if they continued, in order to bolster the credibility of the feint, the Germans would take a very serious interest in infiltrating the networks in an effort to learn more about the date and place of the opening of the ‘Second Front’. That outcome could only be disastrous – in various ways. Therein lay the extreme moral dilemma: deceptions can exploit ambiguity about the location of a surprise attack, but they cannot dice with the actual existence or nonexistence of such events.

And the outcome of the assault could also have been catastrophic. What were the chances of success of any bridgehead, if substantial German forces were maintained in France (hardly ‘pinned’, it should be stated)? The continued presence of such strength was, after all, the objective of the Allies, and the outcome might be that a weakly supported bridgehead would have to face a vigorous backlash, and probably be destroyed or expelled. As further evidence of muddled thinking, just a week before, at the TRIDENT Conference in Washington, Sir Alan Brooke, in apparent defiance of CASABLANCA resolutions, had enigmatically stated that the ‘dispersal of German forces is just what we require for a cross-channel operation and we should do everything in our power to aggravate it’ – exactly the opposite of what was then planned. Strategic thinking was all over the place: it was a mess.

About this time the whole flimsy infrastructure fell apart. On June 24 Francis Suttill (Prosper) was arrested in Paris, and soon afterwards, he and Gilbert Norman, in a sad effort to save lives (but not their own), encouraged their networks to reveal where their weapons, smuggled in by SOE, were hidden.

COCKADE and the Historians

The coverage of the early days of COCKADE by the prominent historians has been spotty. Michael Howard, in Volume 5 of British Intelligence in the Second World War, records the drawing up of COCKADE plans, but leaves its timing (June 3) to an Endnote. He then haphazardly goes on to describe how resources (‘double agents’ of B1A) were enlisted to communicate aspects of COCKADE: “From the beginning of May, a stream of messages passed through more than a dozen sources, reporting rumours, government announcements and regulations and observed troop movements.” That is a clumsy and obvious anachronism: such events may well have been going on, but they were in support of other initiatives (or put in process by premature anticipation of COCKADE, as I showed in my analysis of XX Committee minutes), and not activated as a formal response to an inchoate and unapproved COCKADE. Howard then swiftly moves on to the preparations for late summer, and reports how the Germans did not rise to the bait, the OKW failing to be deceived as to Allied intentions. Nevertheless, he relates how von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief West, anxiously watched air-drops to resistance movements in France. That was on August 31, however, when the mop-up of the PROSPER network had been under way for some time. Even when STARKEY had been called off, von Rundstedt reputedly feared a major landing as late as November 1943. Yet no forces were transferred to prepare for any such threat. In fact, the opposite occurred.

Roger Hesketh’s’ Fortitude’

In his insider history of FORTITUDE, Roger Hesketh gives scant attention to COCKADE. He dubs STARKEY an obvious failure, as it did not succeed in engaging the German Air Force. Moreover, he points out the fallacies in drawing the enemy’s attention to its most sensitive spot – the Pas de Calais. He drily added: “To conduct and publicise a large-scale exercise against an objective that one really intended to attack during the following year would hardly suggest a convincing grasp of the principle of surprise.” In Operation Fortitude, Joshua Levine likewise classifies COCKADE as a failure, but submits that the exercise offered useful experience for the double-cross system, and, rather weakly, that it gave the planners ‘the opportunity to consider the logistics of a cross-channel operation in advance of OVERLORD’. On the other hand, the only mention of COCKADE or STARKEY in M. R. D. Foot’s SOE in France is an (unindexed) amendment he made in 2004, when he had to concede that SOE agents were exceptionally used for purposes of deception in the promotion of STARKEY. This is a very telling addition that Foot slipped past the Foreign Office censors.

Anthony Cave-Brown

It was Anthony Cave-Brown, in his monumental Bodyguard of Lies, who actually moved closest to the truth, although his rather chaotic approach to chronology and his tendency to add irrelevant detail subtract from the clarity of his thesis. As with the other authors, he mixes up pre-COCKADE planning with the events in July and August. Using American archival sources that came to light in 1972, however, he is able to show that SOE agents were used in July and August, right through to the conclusion of STARKEY on September 9, 1943, to mislead the French patriot armies about the imminent invasion – a probable source for Foot’s amendment. In this way he is able to counter the claim that Bevan’s wartime deputy Sir Ronald Wingate made in 1969 that there was no connection between the LCS and SOE. The tension is clear: the Foreign Office wanted to bury the notion that SOE had been acting contrary to official policy, but the facts had come out.

Moreover, Cave-Brown lists the exploitation of the media that occurred, mainly in August 1943, to project the certainty of a coming invasion. The United Press put out a bulletin that informed the world of a move by the Allies in Italy and France ‘within the next month’, and even the BBC, on August 17, broadcast an ambiguous message that must have been interpreted by Frenchmen and Frenchwomen to mean that they should prepare for the imminent assault. As Cave-Brown writes: “The Associated Press and Reuters picked up this broadcast and made it world news.” All this activity by SOE and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) caused major concerns for Bevan and his team at the LCS. Such efforts were of course in defiance of the careful edict issued by the Chiefs of Staff about avoiding premature action by patriot forces. Matters were out of control.

Cave-Brown also points out that COCKADE was a failure because Hitler was convinced that the Allies were bluffing, and actually withdrew over two-thirds of his army from the West.

            Between April and December 1943, a total of twenty-seven divisions of the thirty-six in the western command were pulled out for service in Russia, Sicily, Italy and the Balkans – a compliment to A-Force’s Zeppelin operations on the Mediterranean at the expense of LCS’s Cockade operations in London.

Thus the aims of COCKADE were directly confounded by the clumsiness of the plan. Moreover, the withdrawal of these German divisions could ironically have allowed the Allies (in Cave-Brown’s opinion) to have ‘walked ashore’ in Brittany in the summer of 1943, virtually unopposed – a theory that demanded analysis in depth elsewhere. For example, Walter Scott Dunn, in Second Front Now, was one who claimed that the reduction in strength of the German Western Army in the autumn of 1943 could have permitted an Allied assault to take place if the Combined Chiefs of Staff had taken the possibility seriously.

Yet Cave-Brown massively mixes up the timetable when he moves to Prosper’s arrest, the subsequent mopping up of his networks, and the confiscation of arms, making the same mistake that others have made – that the events leading to the betrayal of Prosper were part of the COCKADE/STARKEY deception plan. As he writes (p 338: his sources are not identified, and the details are unreliable):

            Moreover, the SOE/PWE plan for Starkey made provision for deliberately misinforming F section agents in the field; even before that plan had been approved by the Chiefs of Staff and become fully operational in mid-July 1943, certain key F section agents were flown to London for “invasion” briefings, and others sent to France with instructions to carry out “pre-invasion” activities. They were to be informed, at the proper moment, that Starkey was only a rehearsal; but by then, for some of them – including Prosper – it would be too late.

While it is true that John Bevan, in early May, collaborated with Morgan on the first drafts of the COCKADE plan (as I reported in April), Bevan exploited the presence of a real (but insubstantial) attack on the Pas de Calais planned for September as an arrow in the quiver of the rogue operation that was already under way with Prosper’s network.

What everyone failed to note was that, when Suttill arrived in London in May for his briefings, the notion of an invasion in the summer of 1943 was still boiling in some quarters – and that excited him. But when he came back for the express meetings in early June, after Churchill’s return, and when Morgan had just prepared his COCKADE plans, Suttill learned how matters had changed. He was either told the truth, namely that the new programme involved a massive feint, and that he was being asked to support that activity by continuing to ready his circuits for something that had to be described as real, or he was deceived into thinking that an invasion was still on the cards, but had been deferred until September. It was almost certainly the latter, as if the authorities had set out to manipulate him and his circuits, they would not want to run the risk of his undermining the whole project. And, if they had the nurtured the evil objective of having Suttill reveal the date only under torture, the extraction of the truth under pressure would have been even more convincing. What they probably told him was thus not a total lie. In any case, he was devastated.

Prosper’s Torment

As I described in my April posting (https://coldspur.com/feints-and-deception-two-more-months-in-1943/) , the various accounts of Francis Suttill’s reactions to what he was told in London are all flawed because they deal inconclusively with the contradictions in his arrival and departure dates. (I presented then an original theory that Suttill made two visits to the UK, in late May and early June, a hypothesis that neatly resolves all the contradictions in the various accounts.) Thus all the hints and attributions that appear in the works of Foot, Fuller, Marshall, Cookridge, Suttill and Marnham have to be re-interpreted in the light of Visit 1 (where Suttill is encouraged to believe that a real assault is imminent) and of Visit 2 (where he is made aware of the COCKADE plan that refers to some form of attack in September, and learns of the need to restrain his forces until then).

For example: When Cookridge writes that “Suttill had also arranged at Baker Street for the pace of arms and explosive deliveries to be stepped up” (not that that was in his power), it indicates clearly that the meetings must have occurred at the end of May, when Suttill’s enthusiasm was bolstered by the increased activity, and hopes of an early invasion. Since Marshall (relying very much on what Henry Sporborg told him) imagines there was only one visit, and concentrates on the post-COCKADE briefing, he asserts that the visit was not initiated by Suttill’s request, but that he was called back to London specifically by Churchill, even though Churchill was not in London at the end of May. “Could the great network hold out until July?”, he imagines Suttill thinking before the invitation. Marnham, echoing Suttill Jr., obviously cannot explain the call from Churchill, and declares that Suttill requested the May visit himself, because he was concerned about security, and needed to talk to his bosses about it.

Further: When Marshall, in turn citing Fuller, reports that Suttill informed Jean Worms (the leader of a sub-circuit called JUGGLER) that ‘they would have to hold out until September’ (p 178), that statement confirms that the discussion must have taken after his second visit: not only that, he gives the impression that a real invasion will be occurring in that month, confirming that the STARKEY plan (or a part of it) has been explained to him. (We cannot confidently tell whether that is how the COCKADE operation was described to Suttill, or whether he decided to misrepresent reality in the cause of the greater deception.) Marshall had earlier (p 161) asserted that Suttill had been ‘knocked sideways’ by the news that the invasion would not take place until the first week of September. Again, it is not clear whether this was the impression given to Marshall by Sporborg, who would have known at that time (unlike Buckmaster) that it was untrue, but may have also represented the facts to Suttill dishonestly.

When Marnham writes (p 116) that rumours started in the Sologne at the end of May that an invasion was imminent, the author accurately echoes what Cookridge wrote, while providing an accurate date for Suttill’s first return from London. Yet, a couple of pages later, when Marnham describes Suttill as returning from London, with the belief that an invasion was imminent, and on June 13 refusing to pay heed to Culioli’s requests that parachute drops be stopped, the chronology does not allow him to point out that this occurred after the second visit, when Suttill was aware that the invasion was no longer imminent. (Marnham has recently communicated to me his agreement with my hypothesis that there were two visits.) Suttill’s actions here suggest that he was putting his whole weight behind the rogue LCS deception plan.

On the other hand, when Francis Suttill Jr, describes his father’s decision that the area behind the Normandy coast was ‘one of the areas where arms were most needed to support an invasion’, but that the drops (on June 10) took place further south because of the presence of German troops in the area (pp 176-177), the author simply reflects a total ignorance of the circumstances by which arms were still being flown in in contravention of the new COCKADE policy. Earlier (p 161), Suttill had introduced a drop near Mantes on June 16/17 where ‘some of the material was destined for the communists . . . .; the rest was hidden for the group to use in the expected invasion’, he likewise is completely tone-deaf about the political climate and machinations. He bases his dismissal of his father’s briefing by Churchill purely on the fact that Churchill was not in the UK at the end of May, and ignores the evidence of a June encounter.

It is thus impossible to determine with complete assurance what went through Suttill’s mind, whether he was given the full and accurate account of the STARKEY deception plan, and thus decided that he should be responsible for possible sacrifices to aid the deception, or whether he was misled into thinking that it would culminate in an invasion in September that could be supported by resistance forces, and was therefore justified in keeping his networks on the alert. What his cited statements do confirm, however, is that he believed an invasion was imminent when he returned at the end of May. The overwhelming evidence from the arms build-up in the spring, and the continued shipments into June and beyond after the COCKADE plan had been approved, suggests that he was a victim of the unsanctioned cowboy deception effort being masterminded by LCS, with the complicity of senior SOE officers.

Yvonne Rudellat

Irrespective of both visits, Suttill was doomed. I can add little to the story of how Pierre Culioli and Yvonne Rudellat were trapped by the Sicherheitsdienst at a checkpoint, where the Germans discovered hand-written names and addresses being carried, and crystals to be passed to wireless operators. Careless talk and casual meetings led to the inveiglement of Suttill after Norman and Borrel had been arrested. Readers can turn to the works of Foot, Marshall and Marnham to learn the details. When Gilbert Norman was shown copies of private letters that Déricourt had carried back and forth between France and the UK, he gave up. He was impersonated in his role as wireless operator, and brought to despair when London rebuked him (in fact his ghost operator) for not performing the necessary security check to indicate that he was not transmitting under duress. He and Suttill then made a deal with their captors that, in exchange for the lives of their agents and collaborators, they would reveal the locations of the arms-dumps. The deal was not honoured. Scores of resistance workers were quickly executed, as were Suttill, Norman, Borrel and others, later, in 1944.

Betrayal

Henri Frager

Suttill believed that there was at least one traitor in his midst: after all, that is why he sought the recall in late May. His colleague Henri Frager, who was being manipulated by the deceptive Hugo Bleicher of the Abwehr, had been complaining about Déricourt, and these criticisms had resonated with Suttill, who recalled Déricourt’s overall casualness in his operations, as well as his unjustified interest in the private lives of his contacts and passengers. Just before he was arrested, Suttill confided these fears to Madame Balachowsky, who, with her husband, a distinguished biology professor, had organized a circuit in the Versailles area. He also mentioned to her that he believed that the Germans had an agent in Baker Street.

When the initial investigations by MI5 into Déricourt’s possible unreliability took place in November 1943, a curious flashback to July took place. In one of the Déricourt files at the National Archives (KV 2/1131, p 16) appears an extract from notes that a Miss Torr had taken on July 9, during a study of GILBERT (Déricourt) and ‘the PROSPER circuit and its connections’. It runs as follows:

            The arrests in this circuit started  . . . . .  in April (1943)  . . . .  When PROSPER went back to France at the end of May, he found the security of his circuits further compromised by two things  . . . . . secondly GILBERT (see below) had had a good deal of trouble, partly through being too well known in his former identity, partly through the indiscretions of HERVE, trained by us but sent out by the D/F section on a special mission. GILBERT went south to lie low, and for a while everything went well.

This is an extraordinary entry, as much for what it does not say as for what it reveals – and for its timing. The ellipses clearly refer to some embarrassing information. The arrests of April were of the Tambour sisters by the Gestapo: Suttill foolishly tried, through an intermediary, to pay a ransom for their release, but was shockingly hoodwinked. The first of the items excised from Torr’s report may have been the suspicions that Pierre Culioli was indulging in Black Market transactions, or it may have been the fact that Edward Wilkinson was arrested on June 6, and that subsequent German raids ‘led to the recall of Heslop a few weeks later’ (as Francis Suttill, Jr. records). In any case, there was enough serious concern about infiltration and betrayal to demand protective action.

How HERVE contributed to Déricourt’s problems is elusive. (I have not yet been able to establish who he was. Buckmaster refers to an agent Hervé in They Fought Alone.) Elsewhere in the file, it is reported that, after his return to France on May 5, Déricourt found his security endangered by the fact that his colleagues were far too careless in their social gatherings in Paris, and that his real identity was known to too many people. The note continues:

            When he was finally asked by someone at a bar if he had had a good Easter in London, he felt it was time to take steps, and therefore he went down to Marseilles, partly to see someone we wished him to exfiltrate, and partly to lie low. Here he came up against the Luftflotte, and owing to their attentions, had to go about with some of his old friends and make a show of being friendly with the people who put had put up his name to the Luftflotte.

This was an obvious lie that Déricourt used to suggest that these encounters were the first that he had with the German authorities.

The note then goes on to say that Déricourt ‘came back to Paris to help organize the June Lysander operations’, without offering any dates. Suttill’s son remarks, however, that, on the same night (June 20) that his father spoke to Madame Balachowsky about his concerns, ‘a Lysander operation organized by Déricourt failed because he did not appear, nor had he collected the two passengers who were booked to return to London, Richard Heslop and an evading RAF officer’. Using the file HS 6/440, and quoting the testimony of Jacques Weil, Suttill Jr. states that Déricourt had been arrested for a short time before Prosper’s arrest, and concludes:

            It is also possible that he may have been warned by the Germans about something that was planned that night not far from the landing grounds he was proposing to use at Pocé-sur-Cisse, near Amboise’.

A cool analysis might suggest that, with these exposures well-known, the senior officers of SOE should immediately have taken precautionary measures to inoculate against further infiltration, such as sealing off circuits, stopping meetings and the sharing of resources, terminating flights and shipments for a while, and ensuring the general quiescence of all network activity until the hubbub appeared to have subsided, and a full investigation had been completed at Baker Street. Yet, as has been made clear, nothing of the sort took place. In fact, when Déricourt sent a letter to F Section at this time, explaining his contacts with the Germans at the Luftflotte, Nicolas Bodington (Buckmaster’s number 2) on June 21 made his infamous annotation, available on Déricourt’s file: “We know he is in touch with the Germans and also how and why.” Robert Marshall crucially reported on what he was told by Harry Sporborg on March 21, 1983:

            There existed a standing instruction (though SOE tended to think of it as more of an understanding) that when it was known that one of their networks had been penetrated, then the LCS had to be informed (usually through MI5), ‘so that the network in question might be exploited as quickly as possible for deception purposes’. In this case the information had travelled in the opposite direction and the LCS was simply informing the SOE that the decision to exploit PROSPER had already been taken. Neither Colonel Buckmaster nor any of the other F Section officers was ever informed of this decision. (All The King’s Men, p 162)

After three days of intense interrogations of Suttill, Norman and Borrel, on June 28 Kieffer of the Sicherheitsdienst presented his prisoners with photocopies of correspondence carried on flights organized by Déricourt, identified as deriving from the agent known as BOE/48. The manner of their betrayal became obvious to the three.

The Dangle

From any perspective, contact by an agent of officer of SOE with a member of one of the enemy’s intelligence or security services should have been regarded as highly dangerous and irregular. Thus it is difficult to conclude that the decision to encourage or allow Déricourt to maintain his contact with Boemelburg was either innocent, or propelled by serious policies of tradecraft. Yet the possibility that Déricourt was somehow able to mislead the Sicherheitsdienst to the advantage of SOE’s objectives in landing agents and supplies has been allowed to remain in the air. When M. R. D. Foot wrote about the events, he referred with minimal commentary to Déricourt’s testimony of February 11, 1944, under interrogation:

            German intelligence services did better out of intercepted reports from the field, which they certainly saw, and saw by Déricourt’s agency. When challenged on this point, he made the evasive reply that even if he had made correspondence available to the Gestapo, it would have been worth it for the sake of conducting his air operations unhindered. (SOE in France, p 270)

This must be one of the most outrageous statements ever made about the history of SOE, implying that, for some reason, if the Sicherheitsdienst turned a blind eye to the arrivals and departures taking place under their nose, they would ignore the implications, and forget about the possible threat to the Nazi occupation of France in the form of saboteurs and secret armies. And yet, this was presumably the mindset of Buckmaster and Bodington, who repeatedly came to Déricourt’s defence, and expressed their regard for him and his work. With Buckmaster, it was out of ignorance and naivety: with Bodington, duplicity and conspiracy. (The renowned and very security-conscious SOE agent Francis Cammaerts said that Bodington ‘had created  a lot of death’ in France.) Even after MI5 and SOE learned, through interrogations in early 1945, about the purloining of courier mail, they both continued stoutly to defend Déricourt.

Thus one returns to the overarching question concerning the motives and behaviour of Boyle (responsible for Security), Gubbins (responsible for all of western Europe), Dansey (Assistant Chief of MI6), and Bevan (head of the London Controlling Section): what were they possibly thinking by allowing Déricourt to consort with the Nazis, and why on earth did they believe that the Sicherheitsdienst would be fooled by any ploy that they concocted? After all, Déricourt had been spirited out of France to Great Britain, and had soon returned under control of a British Intelligence Service. The Nazis would be naturally very suspicious, even brutal. If SOE/MI6 believed that, since they had employed him, when he was out of their sight he was controlled by them, they were under a delusion. Similarly, if they believed that Déricourt could act as a useful transmitter of disinformation to the Germans without damaging the integrity of their networks, they were similarly massively mistaken. It is very difficult to conclude other than their motivations concerning the safety and security of PROSPER and other circuits were dishonourable.

The obvious question must be asked: If the objective was to ‘pin’ German forces in NW France in September, why was Déricourt not used simply to pass on by word of mouth the date of the phony STARKEY attack? What was his role? The answer is that he was engaged well before the COCKADE operation was conceived, and thus was deployed for more devious ends. Déricourt was not told of the details of STARKEY: he was a lowly air movements officer, and would have been such an obvious plant that the Germans would not have trusted what he said, or expected him to be able to gain such secrets. It would all have been too clumsy and transparent.

On the other hand, a whole subcurrent of suggestions (for example, from Rymills) has flowed that Dansey had been trying to infiltrate the Sicherheitsdienst for a couple of years, and that Déricourt was his latest candidate. Marshall is one of those observers who suggest that Déricourt was installed in France to gain intelligence on the working of Boemelburg’s organisation, presumably to help safeguard MI6’s agents in France, but such a dangerous game would have been hardly worth the candle. In any case, given Déricourt’s background, as someone who had passed through Britain’s security apparatus, the Germans would have been very cautious before exposing any valuable information to him.

The essence was that Déricourt had not been a Vertrauensmann, sent to Britain to infiltrate British intelligence by convincing the British authorities of his loyalties, with the goal of then being sent on a mission to France. If SOE’s intentions were devious but benign, the only way that Déricourt would have been able to survive would be by claiming he was a Nazi sympathizer, after which the Sicherheitsdienst would have made demands on him that would have threatened the circuits. And that is what happened: he volunteered a level of cooperation to the Gestapo, subsequently being given his BOE/48 appellation. Boemelburg must have wondered why, if Déricourt were willing to reveal details of SOE landings and take-offs, he would behave so indiscreetly over his contacts with the Germans, which (as is clear) were being communicated back to London. They were nevertheless happy to take the obvious facts and exploit them, as the process carried no risks for them, but would have been suspicious of any more covert messages. As Rymills wrote, questioning the account of Déricourt’s actions by the Sicherheitsdienst officer Goetz:

            However intelligent or unintelligent one believes Boemelburg might have been, it does not ring true that he would have accepted Déricourt’s account of his visit to London under British Intelligence auspices without demur. Anyone who confessed to the head of an enemy’s counter-intelligence that he had been recruited and trained by British Intelligence before being parachuted back into France as their Air Movements Officer would most certainly have been subjected to a rigorous interrogation in depth lasting a considerable period of time. Apparently, he did not even spend three days in the German equivalent of the London Holding Centre. Would anyone with one iota of common sense believe a story about London seething with communists? Could it possibly have been a simple as that? If it were, Déricourt was taking a gigantic risk – literally putting his head in the lion’s mouth.

The nature of the leakage was probably more subtle. Suttill knew the date of the invasion, but would probably reveal it only under torture – which is what happened. And, as has been suggested by Frank Rymills (see https://coldspur.com/dericourts-double-act/ ), some of the letters that Déricourt allowed the Gestapo to photocopy may have been forged by MI6 specialists, and carried revealing messages about the circumstances of the planned invasion. Déricourt was the courier and purloiner for these deeds: the events occurred at the same time as the famous MINCEMEAT deception operation of early May 1943. The Germans were much more likely to be taken in by well-crafted forgeries than obvious disinformation. As Marshall writes (p 190):

            From all the interrogations and written material that had been gathered, Boemelburg was sufficiently confident to send a report during the third week of July to Kopkow in Berlin that stated the invasion would fall at the Pas-de-Calais during the first week of September.

In one respect, therefore, the ruse had been successful. The Sicherheitsdienst passed on the planned date of STARKEY to von Rundstedt and Army Group West.

SOE’s Strategy & the Chiefs of Staff

What was going through the minds of Hambro and Gubbins, if, indeed, they were in control of SOE’s destiny? Marshall (in the anecdote cited above) indicates that the fact that COCKADE was a deception plan, and that the decision had been made to exploit PROSPER, was communicated to SOE ‘about the time’ that Suttill met Churchill, namely in early June. Yet the TWIST Committee’s conspiracies, and the increase in shipments of arms and supplies to France, had been going on for months already. Déricourt was already some kind of ‘agent in place’, in contact with Boemelburg, All this suggests that the maverick project to promote the notion that a real assault on the North-West French coastline was planned for 1943 – probably because Churchill devoutly hoped it to be true when the Committee was set up towards the end of 1942 – was very much alive and kicking, and that the notion implicit in STARKEY that the feint could conceivably be turned into a reality allowed the TWIST activity to gain fresh wings without flying completely in the face of military strategy.

A more resolute Hambro and Gubbins could have stood up to the COCKADE presentation, and said: ‘Enough!’, especially as the details of the plan did not then allow for, or encourage, the idea of subterranean work by SOE to further the work of the deception. In principle, their circuits could have been protected until the time of the real invasion. They could have insisted that the military aspects of the plan be pursued as specified, without any hints of assistance and preparation across the Channel, or, better still, they could have advised that a poorly conceived project like COCKADE should be abandoned immediately, as it would jeopardize assets needed for OVERLORD the following year. They then should have called for a suspension of arms shipments to France.

Yet, with the pressure for COCKADE to be launched, the SOE leaders were hoist with their own petard: movements were already in place for providing weapons and ammunition to an evolving patriot army, and, if that process suddenly ground to a halt, the illusion of an assault in September would have evaporated completely. If there had been no predecessor introduction of arms, the Germans might not have been suspicious. So Hambro and Gubbins had to buckle under, and hope that the inevitable sacrifices would not be too costly.

The Chiefs of Staff must have known what was going on, even though the outward manifestations of their thinking suggest otherwise. The early minutes studiously avoid any discussion of the possibility of SOE’s defying the established rules to support patriot armies in France (no longer a top tier target country) prematurely. In his diaries, General Sir Alan Brooke very carefully stressed that, if any impulses for carrying out an invasion in 1943 were still detectable, they came from his American counterparts (Marshall and King), and he earnestly repeated his assertion that such ideas issued from those who had not studied and imbibed the Casablanca strategy that outlined why southern Europe had to be engaged first. Yet one activity must have been known to the Chiefs: the increased use of aircraft to fulfil SOE’s greater demand for drops. Given the previous fervent opposition by Air Marshall Harris to the diversion of planes from its bombing missions over Germany, and the reliable evidence of the increase in shipments in the spring of 1943, it is impossible to imagine that this change of policy was somehow kept concealed from the eyes and ears of the Chiefs of Staff.

One might conclude that, at some stage, the Chiefs came to the conclusion that the presence of substantial SOE networks in France, and their connections with armed resistance groups, instead of being a hazard that had to be controlled, could instead become the main source of rumours of the invasion, a much stronger factor than all the dummy operations in the Channel. At the end of June (as I described above), the PWE and SOE had been invited to suggest what actions they might take to forestall any premature risings. This led to some very controversial exchanges.

SOE and the PWE are on record as approving the COCKADE plan. On July 18, General Hollis introduced to the War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee a paper, dated July 8, developed by PWE, with SOE’s ‘full consultation’, that outlined the plans to deal with some of the less desirable fallouts from the STARKEY Operation. The brief is given as:

  • To counter the repercussions of STARKEY upon the patriot armies in Europe,
  • To counteract the effects of the enemy’s counter-propaganda presenting the outcome of STARKEY as a failure to invade.

The report constitutes a very bizarre approach to STARKEY, as it manifestly assumes that the effort will be entirely a feint, with no references to an engagement with the GAF, or to the following-up with possible beachheads to take advantage of a German disintegration. On the contrary, the paper reminds readers that ‘the operations contemplated include no physical landings’. Thus it is a recipe for dealing with the disappointments when STARKEY is shown to be a blank.

A quick explanation of the political problem is set up, but with very woolly terminology. The anonymous author observes that ‘the expectation of early liberation is at present the main sustaining factor in resistance’, but he does not make any distinctions between groups dedicated to sabotage, and the misty ‘patriot armies’ that are supposed to be waiting in the wings. In any case, these bodies (the author states) will be in for a major disappointment as winter approaches. The argument takes a strange turn, presenting the fact that, since there will be no landings, there will be no obvious cue for uprisings that would then have to be stifled, and further states that ‘it is to our advantage’ that:

             . . . the Occupied Peoples of the West, while prepared for the intervention which the operations imply and for active co-operation in such intervention, would naturally prefer that their own countries should not be devastated by the final battles.

This seems to me to be an utterly irrelevant, illogical and unsubstantiated hypothesis. It is not clear who ‘these Occupied Peoples of the West’ are, but if pains must be taken not to subdue the enthusiasm of potential ‘patriot armies’, what were the latter expecting would happen in the ensuing invasion? That the major battles would all take place in other countries, and that the Nazis would fold? Then why were the French being supplied with so much weaponry? The author is surely delusional. Yet he goes on to say that ‘the peoples of the West’ will overcome their dismay that COCKADE was only a diversion because they will learn that HUSKY is giving encouraging results.

The paper then goes on to outline what PWE and SOE should do, namely engage in a communication and propaganda exercise to convince the patriot armies to stay their hand until they receive the order from London to start the uprising. The report includes the following startling paragraphs:

            15. It is suggested, however, that the P.W.E./S.O.E. has a positive contribution to make to the success of COCKADE itself.

            16. the object would be:

To assist the deception by producing the symptoms of underground activity, prior to D day, which the enemy would naturally look for as one preliminary of a real invasion.

It goes in to give examples of operations ‘on a scale sufficient to disturb the enemy, but would be so devised so not to provoke premature uprisings or to squander any stratagems or devices needed in connection with a real invasion ’such as printed instructions on how to use small arms, and broadcasts by ‘Western European Radio Services’ on how the civilian population could make itself into ‘useful auxiliaries’.

This seems to me to be utterly cynical. During a period immediately after the arrests of Suttill, Norman and Borrell, and the betrayal of arms and ammunitions dumps, when news of the crackdown by the Gestapo was being sent to London by multiple wireless operators (including over Norman’s hijacked transmitter), the PWE and SOE contrived to recommend coolly the creation of ‘the symptoms of underground activity’. This suggestion was made at exactly the time that SOE and MI5 were performing a careful inquiry into the penetrations and arrests. [N.B. The news was not confined to SOE.] Either the spokesperson was completely ignorant of what was going on (highly unlikely) or he was wilfully using STARKEY as an opportunity to provide an alibi for the collapse of the networks.

Furthermore, for the seven days leading up to D-day (actually the September 1943 date for STARKEY), the units suggested that leaflets should be dropped addressed to ‘the patriots’, telling them that the forthcoming activity was only a rehearsal. Astonishingly, the author then suggests that the B.B.C. should be brought in ‘as an unconscious agent of deception’, encouraging the notion that a coming assault were real until the broadcasting service, like the press, would be informed that the operations were only a rehearsal. This initiative was a gross departure from policy, since the B.B.C. had carefully protected a reputation for not indulging in black propaganda, and instead acted as a reliable source for news of the realities of war throughout Europe.

A final plea (before outlining a brief plan as to how the PWE and SOE should play a role in this deception) is made for a concerted effort to enforce the idea that patriot armies should be subject to the control of the Allied High Command, but it is worded in such an unspecific and flowery way that it should have been sent back for re-drafting:

            We should, from now on, even more systematically build up the concept of the peoples of Occupied Europe forming a series of armies subject to the strictest discipline derived from the Allied High Command in London.

Build a ‘concept’? To what avail? How would ‘peoples’ form a ‘series of armies’? How would discipline be enforced – for example, with the Communist groups, or even with de Gaulle’s loyalists? The paper seeks to maintain that, only through the communications of the Prime Minister and others to the ‘contact points’ established within western Europe, and ‘upon the evidence of the genuineness of our D day instructions, will depend the favourable or unfavourable reaction to COCKADE’.

If the Chiefs of Staff had spent any serious time reviewing this nonsense, they should have immediately cancelled the whole COCKADE operation, as its rationale and objectives were surely nullified by the probable embarrassing fallout. In any event, their concerns should have been heightened by an ancillary move that occurred soon afterwards. As Robert Marshall reported, on July 26, Stewart Menzies, the head of MI6, sent a note to the Chiefs of Staff, via Sir Charles Portal, that claimed that SOE in France was essentially out of control, and that SOE should be brought under MI6’s management. Of course, this was an utterly cynical move as well, since Dansey had been responsible for infiltrating Déricourt into the SOE organisation. But Gubbins could hardly accuse the vice-chief of MI6 of being ultimately responsible, since he would then have to admit how woefully negligent he had himself been in exercising proper security procedures in his units.

Instead, Gubbins read the note, was highly embarrassed, and tried to counter that the groups under his control ‘had not been penetrated by the enemy to any serious extent’, rather naively implying that they had of course been penetrated, and that he was confident that the degree of such was minor. He shamelessly tried to conceal the full extent of the damage from his masters, but failed to make his case.  On August 1, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee recorded their opinion that SOE had been ‘less than frank in their reports about their situation in France’.

SOE was in trouble. Yet STARKEY was not cancelled, and the propaganda campaign continued. Gubbins ploughed on, recommending increasing aid to the French field to the maximum, and noting that ‘the suffering of heavy casualties is inevitable’. And then Hambro, Gubbins’ boss, had to respond to a negative memorandum from Portal about diverting bombers to support SOE’s operations. In a long letter to the Chiefs of Staff dated July 26, Hambro essentially cooked his own goose, since he showed that he was not familiar with official strategy, and that he was also not in control of the (largely phantom) armies whose strength he had exaggerated. He made a plea for more air support, claiming that maintenance of the effort was essential if SOE were to fulfil its mission. He added, however, two damning paragraphs highlighting relevant factors, which merit being quoted in full:

  • The recent increase in our operations has, as may be expected, resulted in an increase of enemy activities to counter them and a consequent higher wastage rate among our men in the field. The maintenance of our organisations at their present strength and day to day activity therefore requires an increase in our present effort.
  • People on the Continent are certain that the Allies will invade in 1943. This feeling will be confirmed by the recent developments in ITALY. Daily reports from the field reiterate that people of occupied countries are relying upon the Allies returning to the Continent in the Autumn of 1943.

If the Allies do not return to North-west Europe, there will be a serious fall in morale, and, consequently, in the strength of the Resistance movements, which depend very greatly for their vigour upon the existence of a morale which gives the will to resist. The only way of countering the deterioration will be by showing the people of occupied countries that the Allies have not failed them. This cannot be done by propaganda and broadcast alone, but requires to be backed up by a steady flow of greatly increased deliveries of arms and other essentials.

Hambro was not helped by the propaganda campaign behind COCKADE, but he showed an alarmingly naïve understanding of the military climate, and the realities of SOE operations. His statements about the possibility of a widespread return to the Continent in 1943 were absurd and irresponsible, given the Casablanca decisions, and what the resistance in (for example) Norway was being told.. He simplistically grouped together a large number of disparate nations and their populations (‘People on the Continent’), as if generalisations about their predicament, their hopes and expectations could sensibly be made. Every country was different – a truth with which Hambro was not familiar. He proved that his organisation could not control the aspirations and activities of the groups who were in fact dependent upon SOE, and he showed that the tail was actually wagging the dog. He tried to finesse the matter of ‘wastage rates’ in his field agents without admitting the gross penetration by the Germans that had occurred. In all, he tried to preach to the Chiefs of Staff that they should endorse policies they had already rejected. It was no surprise that he lost his job a month or so later.

The Aftermath, and Conclusions

This chapter essentially closes with the arrest of Francis Suttill (Prosper). Yet there is much more to the story. In late July, Bodington paid a surprise visit to Paris to investigate what had happened to Prosper’s network. It was an extraordinarily rash and stupid decision: he was watched by the Sicherheitsdienst, but was allowed to return home unmolested. The assault aspect of COCKADE turned out to be an abject failure, as the Wehrmacht ignored any rumours, or feints to engage the GAF. (Brooke does not mention it in his diaries.) Even the continued activity of SOE in France, designed to keep many Wehrmacht divisions ‘pinned’, did not prevent the release of troops to the Balkan and Russian Fronts. Arms drops to French resistance workers continued. The Nazis seized more arms caches, and arrested and executed more agents and resistance workers. Déricourt came under fresh suspicion in the autumn of 1943, and was eventually ordered back to the UK, and interrogated at great length. After the war, he was put on trial by a military court in Paris, but Bodington exonerated him. SOE, having been rebuked, came under the control of the military men late in 1943. OVERLORD was, of course, successful, in June 1944, and was abetted in some notable incidents by patriot armies.

I recommend readers turn to Marnham, especially, for the dénouement of Déricourt’s story. Chapter 20 of War in the Shadows, ‘Colonel Dansey’s Private War’, gives an excellent account of the self-delusion and distortion that surrounds the case of his treachery. Yet that may not be enough. I point out again that I believe that Marnham’s account is flawed because of some key misunderstandings or oversights. Déricourt was not a Sicherheitsdienst officer who was ‘turned’ at the Royal Patriotic School in Wandsworth; he was an amoral individual who ingratiated himself with the Nazis by criticizing ‘communist-ridden’ London. The shipments of weaponry in the spring of 1943 were not in early anticipation of the COCKADE plan, but the result of a rogue LCS operation that had been going on for months. COCKADE was essentially the child of Bevan, who passed it on to Morgan. Francis Suttill crucially made two visits back to the UK in late May and early June, which fact has enormous implications for the ensuing events. The SOE tried to deceive the Chiefs of Staff over the penetration of its circuits. These ‘lapses’ do not undermine the strong case that Marnham makes about the tragic manipulation by SOE & MI6 of the doomed French circuits, but it does mean his story is inadequate. And there may be more to be unravelled. At some stage I may want to return to the enormous archival material that consists of the files on Déricourt as well as those on Hugo Bleicher, and other German intelligence officers. Yet it will be an exhausting and challenging task, trying to reconcile the testimonies of so many liars and deceivers.

I believe there is a serious need for a fresh authoritative and integrative assessment of SOE’s role in the events of 1943 and 1944. Olivier Wieviorka’s 2019 work The Resistance in Western Europe, 1940-45 is a valiant contribution, but he skates over the complexities a little too easily, with the result that he comes out with summarizations such as: “The statistics confirm that, before 1944, the British authorities did not believe it useful to arm the internal resistance”, an assertion that is both frustratingly vague but also easily contradicted. (Some of the less convincing conclusions may be attributable to an unpolished translation.)

Halik Kochanski’s epic new work Resistance: The Underground War Against Hitler, 1939-1945, covers a vast expanse of territory in a integrative approach to international resistance, but it therefore cannot really do justice to every individual situation. Some of her chapters are masterpieces of synthesis, but many of her stories are re-treads of familiar material. Moreover, she relies almost exclusively on secondary sources, and treats all as equally reliable. Kochanski nevertheless offers a very competent synopsis of the downfall of the Prosper circuit, and the ripple effect it had on other networks. She mentions Déricourt’s treachery, but does not analyse it in depth, however, merely drawing attention to the contradictions in Buckmaster’s two books. She classifies All the King’s Men as ‘conspiracy theory’, and praises unduly Francis Suttill’s Shadows in the Fog, as if it were the last word on the subject. She does not appear to have read War in the Shadows, and her account lacks any inspection of the historical backdrop. Operation COCKADE does not appear in her Index. In addition, her chronology is occasionally hazy, and she is vague about the intelligence organizations. She does not distinguish between the Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst, and misrepresents SOE’s leadership.

David Stafford’s 1980 work Britain and European Resistance 1940-1945 is still the most thorough and scholarly account of the War Cabinet debates over the role of SOE that I have found, but it needs refreshing. His Chapter 5, ‘A Year of Troubles’ delves deeply into the various committee records, and describes well the cognitive dissonance that he frequently perceived in the musings and decisions of the Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Intelligence Committee, but the author casts his net too closely. Stafford resolutely refuses to believe that any manipulation or treachery could have taken place by SOE in the demise of the French networks, displaying too much his trust in the integrity of the leaders he admires. COCKADE is never inspected in his analysis, and STARKEY appears only in one short clause. He focuses too much on official British government sources. He has thus found no evidence to support the charges of betrayal, stating that it appears ‘a far-fetched and highly improbable notion’ because of the risks it would have involved for the 1944 landings, thus perhaps displaying a little too much reliance on the sagacity of the decision-makers. He knows nothing of the TWIST Committee. Moreover, his chronology for 1943 is all over the place, and he fails to point out the contradictions in such phenomena as Selborne insisting that the constant distribution of arms (that were not supposed to be used at the time) was necessary to maintain the morale of patriot forces.

The minutes of the War Cabinet, with their omissions and elisions, are not a reliable guide to how the Chiefs of Staff debated these thorny issues. One could easily gain the impression that the Chiefs had a short attention span, did not really understand what SOE was up to, and found the whole business of clandestine activity, double agents, subterfuge and unofficial armies all very unorthodox and unmilitary, and thus irrelevant. Yet I suspect that they did have a good idea of what was happening, but did little about it because of the sway of their leader. The whole saga has Churchill’s brushwork on it –  from the enthusiasm about SOE’s sabotage activity, through the romantic attraction of dirty tricks, to the love of haphazard tactical impulses that drove Brooke to distraction. Churchill plotted with Bevan and Dansey; Gubbins was his favourite; and the notion that he engineered the activities of the TWIST Committee behind the backs of the XX Committee is utterly plausible. His bringing Suttill back to the UK for urgent private consultations is completely in character. And the whole melodrama was driven by the fact that Churchill had made a fatal private commitment to Stalin about the ‘Second Front’, and he was absurdly in awe of the Generalissimo.

A paper-trail that comprehensively explains the events of summer 1943 will probably never be found, so we must rely instead on steadily improving hypotheses. I believe that the plotting by Claude Dansey to undermine, if not destroy, SOE coincided with Winston Churchill’s desire to show Joseph Stalin that a substantial offensive effort was to be undertaken in North-West France in 1943, and the initiatives converged in the secret processes of John Bevan’s TWIST Committee. Thereafter, the monster took on a life of its own, and was impossible to control. The real project to supply more arms to the French Resistance suddenly came face-to-face with an official Chiefs of Staff/COSSAC deception plan, which specifically forbad premature use of ‘patriot armies’. The Chiefs however then realized that the agencies of SOE could provide a more telling indication of a coming invasion than any movements of phony troops and war-craft could. The directors of SOE fell into a trap, and, knowing they had Churchill’s backing, made the impermissible mistake of trying to deceive their bosses. Churchill did not punish Dansey for his chicanery, nor Bevan for his secrecy, and he overlooked Gubbins’ appalling supervision of SOE, since he had supported the Prime Minister’s whims. Gubbins’ career was thus saved. But it was all a very dishonourable episode in the conduct of the war.

Gubbins’ embarrassment in this saga is particularly poignant. Two months ago, I explained why I thought his reputation has been grossly exaggerated. After the war, Gubbins tried to put the blame for the destruction of the PROSPER network on Dansey. As Lynne Olson reports in Last Hope Island, quoting Anthony Cave-Brown’s biography of Stewart Menzies, “C”, Gubbins told William Stephenson, who had headed British Security Control in New York, that Dansey had betrayed a number of his [presumably, Gubbins’] key agents in France. This opinion was conveniently echoed by Gubbins’ deputy, Harry Sporborg, the witness who provided so much testimony to Robert Marshall:

            Make no mistake about it. MI6 would never have hesitated to use us or our agencies to advance their schemes, even if that mean the sacrifice of some of our people.

Such dissembling is highly disingenuous. (By then Dansey was dead.) Gubbins was supposed to be a tough, military man. Was he suggesting that he could be outwitted and undermined by the rather effete Claude Dansey? No, Gubbins knew exactly what was going on, and could have been forthright enough to pull the plug at any time, had he been paying attention, and taken the time to think through the implications. Whatever Dansey’s motivations and machinations were, Gubbins behaved equally as irresponsibly. The cynical treatment of the French partisans was, moreover, replicated exactly in Greece at the same time, in an attempt – a successful one, admittedly –  to convince the Germans that an attack was coming through the Balkans rather than through Sicily.

Some analysts might conclude that the sacrifice of the PROSPER network was justified if it helped Stalin’s cause, and discouraged him from making another pact with the Nazis. But that would constitute another colossal misjudgment of the dictator’s attitude and intentions: he would not have cared less about the attempts by western politicians to appease him, and considered their approaches contemptuous. He learned from his spies what their games were, and he would do exactly as he pleased to further his own ambitions for power and survival. He was able to manipulate Churchill and Roosevelt with devastating results for eastern Europe.

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‘Bridgehead Revisited’: Three Months in 1943

Casablanca Conference

“I have nothing but documents here, but to understand history you have to overcome the documents. By themselves, documents will never be enough.” (Vladimir Naumov, from Jonathan Brett’s Inside the Stalin Archives, p 232)

“Historians make imperfect judgements about incomplete evidence, and some of what they write about (above all, human intentions) may have been intrinsically uncertain at the time.” (Noel Malcolm, in Times Literary Supplement)

“Even this is hard to explain to overseas colleagues who find it still difficult to understand why the British do not want to make public the part they played, as shown in Foot’s SOE in France, in the achievements of those years. They wish to have available histories, as complete and official as possible, to be compiled with all blemishes and failures as well as successes – to show the essential links which SOE provided between the Resistance and the outside forces of liberation.” (Douglas Dodds-Parker, in Setting Europe Ablaze)

Contents:

Introduction

1. January: Decisions at Casablanca

2. February: Churchill’s Faux Pas

3. March: SOE Receives its Directive

4. Arms Shipments to France

5. Interim Conclusions

Introduction:

As a continuation of my investigation into the PROSPER disaster, in this report I use primarily SOE records and War Cabinet and XX Committee minutes, and secondarily contemporary diaries and letters, as well as biographies and memoirs, to try to establish how high-level military strategy in the first quarter of 1943 became converted into low-level deception activity. I shall follow up with an account of the events of the second quarter next month.

The key research questions seem to me to be:

* When did SOE start to become an agency for deception as well as sabotage?

* Who authorized this change of policy?

* Why did SOE engage in activities that suggested a 1943 invasion was imminent?

* Were the officers employed in carrying out the strategy aware of the deception plan?

* Why did the perpetrators believe that the Germans would be deceived by Déricourt, such an obvious plant?

This report is largely a chronicle. I have withheld my comments of analysis and interpretation except for reasons of improving the narrative flow, and in the hope of aiding the intelligibility of the train of events. I shall undertake a deeper analysis in a couple of months or so.

The story so far:

(for a full description of the events in late 1942, see All Quiet on the Second Front?)

As the Chiefs of Staff started to think about offensive operations against the Axis powers in Europe, the agencies of deception were refreshed. John Bevan replaced Oliver Stanley as head of the London Controlling Section, and soon afterwards created the TWIST Committee to develop and execute deception plans to assist Operation OVERTHROW. MI5, largely responsible for the XX Committee, which was not judged ready for large deception exercises, casually condoned the creation of the rival unit. MI6 was in fact the impetus behind this new initiative, wanting to use its own ‘double agents’ to spread confusion. Under this scheme, Henri Déricourt was recruited and trained for the role of enabling landing-areas for SOE flights from Britain into France.

The Status of SOE:

In its two years of existence, SOE had enjoyed a chequered history. Its first minister responsible, the controversial and ebullient Hugh Dalton, had caused ripples because of his strident left-wing plans for ‘revolution’ in Europe, but had been replaced by the calmer and pragmatic Lord Selborne in February 1942. The chief of SOE, Frank Nelson, was burned out through overwork, and was replaced in May 1942 by Charles Hambro, whose geniality covered up for the fact that he was still very occupied with managing Great Western Railways.

Charles Hambro

SOE had enemies on all sides. It was resented by MI6, since its noisy exploits drew Nazi attention and interfered with intelligence-gathering. The Foreign Office objected to its political initiatives, especially when they involved de Gaulle and his Free French aspirations. The governments-in-exile frequently were disturbed by its interference in their respective countries. The Army was suspicious of its pseudo-military exploits not always under the control of proper discipline. RAF and Bomber Command saw its demands for air support as a drain on scarce resources needed elsewhere. MI5 disparaged its lax approach to security. The Chiefs of Staff never really understood what it was up to. But Prime Minister Churchill was a constant champion, and defended it from the attacks.

Moreover, the management structure of SOE was frequently inadequate, even dysfunctional. Hambro was not a full-time leader. He appointed Colin Gubbins as Director of Operations, but not all the country sections came under Gubbins’ control. Gubbins was nevertheless overworked, and brought in supposedly ‘able’ officers from outside (e.g. Brook, Dodds-Parker, Grierson, Wilkinson, Mockler-Ferryman, Stawell, Templer) but they all took time to find their feet, and perhaps never really understood what was going on. Many country sections resented being guided by military men who did not understand what they were doing (and perhaps some of those section heads lacked a full grasp of what their missions involved.) SOE in Cairo was an outlier, reporting to local Army headquarters, not SOE in London. While Gubbins had experience of sabotage, he was reportedly much more interested in the building of patriot forces to aid the eventual re-entry into North West Europe. The three biographies of Gubbins that have been written all present him as something of a hero. He was indeed a brave and intelligent officer, and an inspirational leader, but the security disasters took place under his watch, and he was not alive enough to the perils of subterfuge, the exposures that were caused by carelessness, and the misuse of intelligence. He failed to develop a flexible and nuanced strategy for dealing with resistance forces that encompassed both the shifts in military policy and the realities on the ground, where the characteristics of each country (distance, terrain, politics, culture) were markedly different.

1. January: Decisions at Casablanca

The end of 1942 had seen the London Controlling Section issue a Deception Policy Statement for the winter. It was issued on December 27 by John Bevan’s deputy, Ronald Wingate, as Bevan was in the USA, and consisted of a rather woolly policy, reflecting a still fuzzy declaration of intent from the Chiefs of Staff. Stating that the Axis ‘probably appreciates that we cannot attempt a large scale invasion of France and the Low Countries till the summer of 1943’, it stressed a short-term exaggeration of Allied strength in the United Kingdom, and for preparations for an assault on the Continent, as if an attempt could be made in the spring. It also set out an objective of forcing the Axis to withdraw land and air forces from the Russian front, indicating the pressure felt from Stalin at the time. But it was a dog’s breakfast of a deception policy: how the Axis would be misled by such a feint is not explained.

In any case, the initiative was overtaken by other happenings. The dominant event in January 1943 was the CASABLANCA Conference, held from January 14th to the 24th. Of the ‘Big Three’, only Roosevelt and Churchill attended: Stalin declined on the grounds that he had to stay in Russia to deal with the Battle of Stalingrad. Yet he always avoided travelling by airplane, leaving the Soviet Union only once during the war (to attend the Teheran Conference), and he may well have feared a palace coup if he were absent from Moscow for too long. The objectives of the Conference were to set military priorities for the rest of the war, and to discuss several diplomatic issues – presumably the type of clarity in objectives that the LCS was thirsting for.

Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and his team were well-prepared to impress upon their American counterparts the correctness of the Mediterranean focus, the preference for invading Sicily rather than Sardinia, and the necessity of delaying any re-entry into North-West Europe until 1944. Brooke won most of his arguments, assisted by the diplomacy of his predecessor, Sir John Dill. Yet the final communiqués, simplified around the themes of the Mediterranean assault, the continuation of saturation bombing, and President Roosevelt’s bolt-from-the-blue declaration about ‘unconditional surrender’ masked some internal arguments that continued to fester.

The prime irritation was Churchill’s continued pleas for engagements that would satisfy Stalin, even though Brooke and his counterpart General George Marshall, the US Chief of Staff, argued for a tougher line on the Soviet leader, urging that he not be placated out of political necessity, a judgment that would later be shown to be deeply ironic. Thus Churchill raised the spectres of ROUNDUP (the original plan for a full assault on Northern France that would morph into OVERLORD) and SLEDGEHAMMER (a limited invasion), even though, given that it had been decided by then that any entry to the continent would have to be fully committed and irreversible, the two operations should have been merged into one. At the back of the planners’ minds was the notion that it made sense to maintain a hope for a decisive entry into France if the Germans showed signs of weakness or deteriorating morale. Such phrases turn up regularly in War Cabinet minutes, but the signs are never quantified, and they could be interpreted merely as a gesture towards Churchill.

The issue of how broadly the decision that the ‘re-entry’ could not occur until 1944 was communicated, and when it was seriously internalized, is vitally important. The first sentence of Roger Hesketh’s Fortitude, written in 1945, runs: ‘The decision to invade France in 1944 was taken at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943’, but the initial statements from the Chiefs of Staff did not echo such a resolute message, which was to some an inconvenient truth. At this stage, deliberate waffle and evasion seemed to be the order of the day. When Soviet Ambassador Maisky spoke to Eden at the end of the month, Eden, having read the cables from Churchill (who had travelled on to Turkey) could not shed light on any firm decision about the Second Front. Alan Brooke, in his diary entry for January 22, clearly believed that his Mediterranean strategy (and thus a deferral for NW France) had been accepted, but soon understood that the nay-sayers started working as soon as the meetings broke up.

Thus some rather equivocal resolutions were made that belied the decision to defer the assault until 1944: ‘plans for entry into continental Europe in 1943 and 1944 should be drawn up’; ‘first requirement for amphibious operations in 1943 from UK will be to appoint a British Chief of Staff, and Combined Planning Staff ‘ ; ‘amphibious operations from UK in 1943 will consist of a) raids b) operations to seize bridgehead c) return to continent to take advantage of German disintegration’. August 1 was set for (b), in the Cotentin peninsula. What would happen if the bridgehead failed, and the forces were pushed back into the sea, was not discussed. On January 29, the Chiefs of Staff instructed Bevan to prepare ‘strategic deception plans’ in light of the newly made decisions, a directive that would cause the head of the London Controlling Section to withdraw his December 6 policy statement.

Churchill also requested the creation of a paper for Stalin that would express firm intentions rather than vague promises. A wording of sorts was thus compiled, reading as follows:

We shall also concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will be held in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as this operation offers reasonable prospect of success.

Stalin, ploughing forces against the Germans with no regard for loss of life, would surely have found this strategy far too timid and cautious. In any case, the Joint Intelligence Committee took issue with the statement, which underwent several revisions before being transmitted to Stalin in February. Impatient for news, Stalin sent on January 30 a telegram to Roosevelt and Churchill seeking elucidation on Second Front policy.

According to Robert Marshall, Churchill, despite being embarrassed by Roosevelt’s sudden call for ‘unconditional surrender’, then made a blunder of his own, stating to the Press on January 19 that an invasion of Europe would occur within nine months. To support his claim, in All The King’s Men Robert Marshall quotes words from Charles Wighton’s Pin-Stripe Saboteur. Yet that memoir, written by Jacques Weil (number 2 in the JUGGLER network of F section) under a nom de plume, includes no such passage. The work is moreover confusing and unreliable, since it merges the characters of Worms, the network leader, and Weil into one agent known as ROBIN. If such a statement had been made, the Press and Churchill’s opposition in the House of Commons would surely not have let him forget it. Maybe this was an item of oral testimony that Marshall picked up. Yet E. H. Cookridge echoes (or is the source of) this story in his Inside SOE (p 209), where he writes, of the Prime Minister in January: “The Prime Minister spoke of an invasion of Europe within nine months.”

As far as the implications for SOE were concerned, Brooke did have a message for the group, hinting at concealed mistakes in the past, and perhaps suggesting a shake-up:

Plans must envisage making the maximum use of S.O.E. activities and that these activities must be closely coordinated with the military operations proposed. This has not always been done in the past.  

The irregularities in SOE to which Brooke was referring were not revealed. Nor was it made explicit how and when this message was communicated to the Minister responsible for SOE, Lord Selborne, to the SOE Chief, Charles Hambro or (as I suspect may have happened by now) Hambro’s successor and perhaps co-leader, Colin Gubbins. (Frank Rymills, one of SOE’s pilots, states in his memoir that Gubbins was already SOE chief in November 1942, an assertion of fact that is tantalizingly reinforced by Gubbins’ own War Record file at the National Archives.) Nevertheless, new directives were issued to SOE on January 22 which Buckmaster, the head of F Section, in his in-house history written in 1945 (HS 7/121), translated into the following objectives:

a) the sabotage of the German war effort by every means available;

b) the full support of the CARTE organisation as long as its potentialities continued to justify such support.

This was a strange interpretation, since the first objective was dangerously unqualified, and the focus on the discredited CARTE organisation was simply erratic and irresponsible. By this time, SOE management realized that the claims made about the potential of CARTE had been grossly exaggerated, and they suspected that it had been penetrated by the Germans, as indeed it had. For Buckmaster to focus on CARTE indicates either that he was entirely in the dark, or that he was being deliberately obtuse, perhaps to switch attention away from the PROSPER network, the reputation of which was much stronger at the time.

The role of Gubbins in this scenario is critical, as he would seem to be the officer at the nexus of the three nodes of operation: 1) the involvement of SOE personnel in Bevan’s deception plans; 2) the management of SOE as a sabotage organization; and 3) the close liaison with the Chiefs of Staff to ensure co-ordination with military strategy. Thus his movements and decisions are of vital importance.

Irrespective of his precise appointment in September 1942, Gubbins may well have been present at the Casablanca confabulations. In November, the SOE station known as MASSINGHAM had been established in Algiers, and Gubbins had flown out to sort out some of its problems on January 21, specifically to investigate SOE’s involvement in the assassination of Admiral Darlan. (According to Peter Wilkinson, in Gubbins & SOE, Gubbins spent six weeks in the area, yet the SOE War Diary at HS 7/286 has Gubbins attending a meeting on February 12 at the War Office to discuss overlap of responsibilities. His exact movements at this time have not been determined.) In his biography of Gubbins, SOE’s Mastermind, Brian Lett states that, around this time, Gubbins became the official SOE representative to the Chiefs of Staff, so it would have been entirely natural for him to be briefed by his close friend Brooke when he arrived. Moreover, Wilkinson writes that Gubbins had frequently attended Chiefs of Staff meeting on Nelson’s behalf, at the time when Brooke’s predecessor, Sir John Dill, was in the chair.

Thus it would appear that Gubbins, who (according to Rymills) had been given Déricourt’s curriculum vitae in November, was perfectly happy, while he was in Africa, to delegate key decisions on F Section to the Regional Controller for Western Europe, Robin Brook, and to the F section chief, Maurice Buckmaster, and allow Déricourt to perform whatever task had been set him. By then, Déricourt had been trained on procedures for handling Lysander and Hudson flights, and another pilot, Hugh Verity, who had become very friendly with the Frenchman, allowed him to take a flight in a Lysander in early January. Déricourt had in fact been prepared to be dropped into France at the end of December, but the bad weather caused a postponement for another month. In Buckmaster’s report on ‘drops and outcomes’ for this period, Déricourt is clearly identifiable as ‘One Lysander specialist’.

Lysander and Pilots

An explanation of aviation schedules is now probably appropriate. The Lysander was a small plane, with room for a single pilot only (thus no navigator), and space for three passengers (four at a squeeze). With an extra fuel-tank, it could achieve only about 500 miles on a round-trip. It had to fly at night, to avoid German attacks. It might seem counter-intuitive, but flights in the summer had to be curtailed because of the length of daylight hours, which put particular pressure on longer journeys (such as to Poland or Czechoslovakia, where Whitley bombers had to be used.) Moreover, the Lysander could carry out a mission only during the full-moon period, as the pilot needed to follow landmarks on the ground (rivers, roads, towns) to navigate: spending too many seconds looking at a map could be very dangerous. The pilot would look for flares in letter formation to confirm that the meeting-party was present and correct. Thus there was a window of only a week or so (Hugh Verity stretches it to a fortnight) each month when flights could be attempted. And heavy clouds were an obstacle that could not be overcome: an unpremeditated storm could cause havoc.

The next moon-period was on January 22, 1943, and Déricourt, now with the codename GILBERT, was flown over to France accompanied by Jean Worms, the leader of the JUGGLER circuit. Déricourt had an alias of Maurice Fabre, a name that he would soon drop, since his identity was well-known in Paris. Worms parachuted first, to be welcomed by a reception committee laid on by Francis Suttill (PROSPER), who had been in France for just under four months, and his courier, Andrée Borrel (DENISE). Rymills, their pilot that night, wrote: “Déricourt was dropped ‘blind’, that is without a reception committee and landed in a large field north of Orleans near Pithiviers.”

Most of Déricourt’s movements in January are probably not so significant: he made his way to Paris to seek out his mistress Julienne Asner, who was not at home; he caught a train to Reims, to visit his mother. The next day he returned to Paris to find Julienne at home, and then departed for Marseilles to pick up his wife. Then, soon after their return to Paris, probably at the end of January, Déricourt renewed his contact with the Sicherheitsdienst officer Karl Boemelburg.

Back in MI5, which had a mission to protect the realm against dubious entries and re-entries to the country, matters were moving slowly but steadily. Earlier in the month, in recognition of possible security exposures, Geoffrey Wethered had been appointed operational security liaison officer with SOE. By the end of the month, Wethered’s investigations had led to the discovery that Déricourt, with a questionable history, was reportedly working for SOE. As evidence of its vetting procedures, Guy Liddell had also noted, on January 13, that the W Board had decided to run Walenti (Garby-Czerniawski, another refugee from Nazi-controlled France) as double-agent BRUTUS, but not yet for deception purposes, confirming the still cautious and tentative policy with DAs.

The XX Committee, however, appeared to have been left out in the cold. In December, John Masterman, the chairman, had voiced his concerns about not receiving guidance from the LCS Controller, John Bevan, about his deception plans. Masterman nevertheless undermined his argument by again expressing the notion that deception was not the prime objective of DAs managed by his Committee – the meetings of which Bevan incidentally no longer attended, even though he was still a member. (Bevan sent his newly-appointed deputy, Major Wingate, in his place.) Four meetings of the XX Committee were held in January, but Bevan and his deception plans never received a mention. The only relevant reference appears to come on January 14, when Major Combe of MI11 says that the Inter-Service Security Board (LCS’s predecessor) has a deception order of battle which would shortly be handed over to the Controller! Masterman’s passivity is noteworthy.

Yet Bevan’s behaviour was already drawing other adverse reaction. ‘TAR’ Robertson, of B1A, as a member of Bevan’s TWIST committee, was moved to approach Guy Liddell to express his concerns about the Controller’s attitude towards deception. On January 23, Liddell wrote in his diary:

TAR is a little worried about the attitude of the Controller of Deception, who seems anxious to give directions in detail about the channels through which his information is to be passed. I said that I thought it was up to the Controller to state the nature of the information and the time when he wishes it to reach the enemy. He is entitled to know the grade of the agent who was to pass this information in order that he could assess the extent to which the information was likely to be believed. The rest of the business seemed to be a matter for us.

This seems a highly ingenuous observation by Liddell. He knew about Bevan’s rival TWIST committee, and he had downplayed the role that the XX Committee, and its DAs, could play in deception, as part of his tactic for boosting Bevan’s schemes. As he reflected on the exchange, Liddell may have missed the point – that Bevan was using MI6/SOE DAs as his medium, and Robertson was explicitly criticizing how Bevan treated them at TWIST gatherings.

2. February: Churchill’s Faux Pas

As instructed, John Bevan quickly presented his new Deception Policy for 1943, on February 2. He introduced it by declaring that it was based ‘on the SYMBOL [i.e. Casablanca] decisions’. Yet the reader might quickly conclude that Bevan had not received the major email concerning the 1944 decision, but was processing the diluted and vague directive given above, since his very arch comments on the North Western European Front ran as follows:

            Germany probably assumes that we cannot attempt a large-scale invasion of France and the Low Countries till the summer of 1943. Nevertheless she remains apprehensive, but owing to her heavy commitments elsewhere she must set upon that assumption.

Since the prime achievement of Brooke at Casablanca had been to convince the Americans that France could not be invaded until 1944, the idea that the ‘apprehensive’ Germans might not consider the invasion likely until the summer of 1943 might suggest a poor interpretation of intelligence. Yet Bevan persisted with the December assumptions: his deception plan was based around the notion that indications of enough strength to invade in July 1943 were practical, and would be adequate to convince the Germans that they should maintain considerable forces in Western Europe. He continued with the recommendations to support the ‘Object’ for the containment of enemy forces in western Europe (and I list these in full since it will be instructive to compare them with what the XX Committee later records):

            (i) Exaggerate Allied strength in the U.K., both in men and material, including the rate of the build-up of BOLERO.

            (ii) Carry out suitable dispositions of our forces to simulate invasion preparations.

            (iii) Initiate intensive invasion training.

            (iv) Accelerate our physical preparations (both real and by means of decoys and dummies) for a return to the Continent.

            (v) Indicate to the enemy that every available man and all possible resources are being mobilized for an attack across the Channel in conjunction with an assault on the south coast of France.

This design had problems. If Brooke approved it in principle (since he knew it had to be a feint), he must have had serious concerns as to how the Germans would be deceived, given the paucity of US and British troops available on mainland UK, and the lack of landing-craft. If Churchill approved it (since he still had aspirations of launching an attack on France in 1943), it would unnecessarily have alerted the German to a real operation. Moreover, the statement contained an existential paradox that colours all the proceedings of this period: if one of the goals was to keep German forces in Western Europe to help the Soviets, why would a re-entry to the Continent in 1943 ever be considered? Ignoring this dichotomy, Bevan added that the threat should be extended ‘over as wide an area as possible’, but his uncertainty was echoed in his comment on Timing:

            We should in the first instance indicate that the invasion will take place in July. This date will have to be postponed when the time comes and our activities will be continued until the end of September.

How the Germans would be taken in by this scheme is not explained. The problem was that Bevan could not devise a sturdy deception plan if he did not know what the real operational plan was. Nevertheless, according to Michael Howard, citing CAB 121/105, the Chiefs of Staff approved the plan on February 9. [The so-called ‘Minutes’ in the CAB 80 series rarely record decisions taken. As M. R. D. Foot described such a policy: ‘an admirable measure from the point of view of security, maddening though it is for historians’. In fact, decisions taken by the Chiefs of Staff are kept separate from the submitted papers and reports, and many can be found in the CAB 79/27 series.]

Churchill & Maisky

And then, the day after he returned from his Mediterranean journey, on February 8, Churchill had a meeting with Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador, at which he made a major gaffe. It is not always safe to rely on Maisky’s record of such meetings, since he tended to embellish them to suit his political cause, and his standing with Stalin, but the kernel of this encounter is probably true. Churchill, probably the worse for wear from drink, lamented to Maisky the fact that the Americans would not be able to supply the divisions required for the Channel assault later that year. As David Reynolds and Vladimir Pechatnov state: 

. . . the ambassador had captured the essence of the PM’s original draft message to Stalin – which the Americans had tried to conceal. As with most of Maisky’s important cables, copies of his report – sent on the evening of 9 February – were distributed to all Politburo members. After reading it, the Soviet leadership would have had little confidence in the ‘information’ on Allied strategy for 1943 that Churchill provided later that day in the sanitized telegram.

The official telegram to Stalin (massaged by the JIC after the Casablanca offering) included the following text:

            We are also pushing operations to the limit of our resources for a cross-Channel operation in August, in which both British and US units would participate. Here again, shipping and assault-landing craft will be limiting factors. If the operation is delayed by the weather or other reasons, it will be prepared with stronger forces for September. The timing of the attack must, of course, be dependent upon the condition of German defensive possibilities across the Channel at the time.

It is almost beyond belief to think that the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Chiefs of Staff approved such a mendacious and weaselly communication. Stalin’s response was surprisingly temperate – and he did not deign to make invidious comparisons between the horrors of Russian winters and troublesome summer storms in the English Channel.

Alan Brooke

Brooke did not seem unduly alarmed about the mixed messages: maybe he had not read the detailed directives. He customarily spent most of the time he had free in fishing, shooting fowl (grouse, partridges and pheasants, depending upon the season), watching birds, and performing carpentry.  He recorded most Chiefs of Staff meetings in February as ‘dull’. Churchill was sick with pneumonia for the rest of the month, and Roosevelt had also fallen ill. But the Allied capacity for self-deception more than enemy deception was crystallized in two almost simultaneous messages – one from Roosevelt to Stalin, and the second recorded by Brooke in his diary. On February 22, Roosevelt wrote to Stalin as follows:

            I understand the importance of a military effort on the Continent of Europe at the earliest practicable date in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army, and you may be sure that the American war effort will be projected on to the Continent of Europe at as an early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities can be provided by our maximum effort.

On February 25, Brooke posted:

            Am very worried by way in which Americans are failing to live up to our Casablanca agreements. They are entirely breaking down over promises of American divisions to arrive in this country.

This was a dismal situation that could not last. How could the American and British leaders carry on a proper plan to deceive the enemy over their operations if they had no coherent understanding of what they were embarking on themselves, and felt that they had to deceive their other Ally?

The ambiguous information from Casablanca trickled down through informal channels, as well. On February 8, Guy Liddell recorded what one McDermott told him about the conference. If this note represents the highlights, however, it does not suggest a comprehensive account:

            McDermott tells me that at the Casablanca Conference it was decided (1) that convoys should have more escort since as a rule only ships outside the convoy got caught;(2) that bombing of U-Boat bases, factories, oil installations, aircraft factories and Berlin should take priority; (3) details about plan HUSKEY [sic]. [The source was presumably Geoffrey McDermott, sometime Foreign Office Adviser to MI6.]

This was clearly not enough to guide any new activities with DAs. If Liddell had been told more, he discreetly left it out of his diary. It would take a while for the implications of the decisions taken to be made available for the Security Service.

Meanwhile, the XX Committee had started to try to re-energize its own activities, although at first without any apparent further guidance. Plan MINCEMEAT (the planting of papers on a corpse for the Spaniards/Germans to find) was discussed on February 4, and it was resolved that ‘Major Wingate should put the plan before Colonel Bevan in order to obtain approval from the D’s of P [the Directors of Plans]’. And then, on February 25, the minutes refer to a revealing correspondence with Bevan. Wingate introduced it by saying that:

            Although the general deception policy had not yet been approved by the combined Chiefs of Staff, authority had been obtained to begin the implementation of such policy in anticipation that approval would be obtained.

This was an extraordinary statement, in more than one way. There was surely no fresh policy emanating from the LCS since the February 2 document, so why would the indication be given that it was not yet approved? Was Bevan himself the ‘authority? Given the audience, timing and specificity, this was a very significant event. The text of the policy statement went on as follows:

            (i) We are to threaten the Germans and Italians on all possible fronts.

            (ii) We are to exaggerate our strength and ability to undertake major operations in all possible theatres but, in particular, in France and the Balkans.

            (iii) We are to threaten Norway, both in the Spring and, possibly, again in the Autumn and we are, where possible, to indicate that an attack will be launched from Iceland as well as from this country.

            (iv) We are to exaggerate the rate of build-up of Bolero.

            (v) We are to indicate to the enemy that every available man and every available resource are being mobilized for an attack across the channel, the actual objective to cover as wide an area as possible.

            (vi) We are to attempt to bring the German Air Force into battle.

            (vii) We are to attempt to contain U-Boats in the North Atlantic (it was suggested that this could be best achieved by the building up of Bolero.)

            (viii) The Mediterranean policy was entirely in the hands of Colonel Dudley Clarke but the probability was that its objective would be to contain troops in southern France and the Balkans.

            (ix) No indication is to be given that the Allied nations are considering any threat to neutral countries.

This directive excited the committee, who focused first on the need to exaggerate the number of troops in the country (BOLERO). But the text is quite remarkable. It contains passages from Bevan’s paper of early February (e.g. ‘every man and every available resource’), but it is clearly a re-packaging and much bolder expansion of Bevan’s original ideas. Moreover, it is a clear statement of deception without any indication of the operation that it is designed to conceal. The implicit message is: ‘we do not have enough resources to launch a major assault to the continent in 1943 but must convince the enemy otherwise’. It would be hard to interpret the instructions as indicating that the prospect of a 1943 re-entry was solid. Thus it seems unlikely that Churchill authorized it, as he at this stage was still optimistic that such an attack could become a reality – unless he himself was helping to design a major deception operation to aid the Russians. Who could possibly have engineered this, and given it the mask of ‘authority’, if the policy itself had not been approved? Either Howard was wrong about the previous approval, or this statement was considered different enough to require a separate process of sign-off. (This important anomaly can be explained by Wingate’s reference to the ‘combined Chiefs of Staff’, namely the inclusion of the USA body. This was resolved only after the passing of several weeks – as I explain below.)

Masterman himself is not of much help. In his coverage of the period in The Double-Cross System, he never refers to the Casablanca Conference, and summarises deception for 1943 in the following words: “The basic idea of the deception policy during 1943 up to the beginning of the winter was to ‘contain the maximum enemy forces in western Europe and the Mediterranean area and thus discourage their transfer to the Russian front’”, not an idea that appears in the minutes of the February 25 meeting, an event that Masterman overlooks in his book, but more suggestive of the March directive (see below). It does, however, constitute a profound retrospective echo to the major theme of deception policy at that time, although the emphasis has subtly changed from ‘forcing the Germans to transfer troops from the Russian front’ (Bevan) to ‘discouraging transfer to the Russian front’.

Masterman incidentally also inserts the correct (but in the circumstances somewhat sophistical) observation that:

            The cover or deception plan cannot be devised until the real plan is communicated at least in outline to those in control of deception, and then in turn the cover plan has to be accepted and approved.

Very true. Yet the XX Committee was working in the dark: it had to guess what the real plan was, and it was encouraged to initiate its own activities before the cover plan had been approved. It was all very irregular.

Lionel Hale

What is noteworthy, however, is that the facts of the feint were now known by all fourteen attendees of the XX Committee – and surely by the members of the TWIST Committee, including Lionel Hale of SOE. Hale had been appointed head of the Press Propaganda section at SOE in July 1942. (One might question why SOE, which was a very clandestine organisation, and worked under cover as the Inter-Services Research Bureau, even had a Press Propaganda section. It certainly engaged in ‘black’ wireless propaganda, but which print media it was able to exploit, and how, is a topic for another time.) The critical question then becomes: at what level was this information disseminated within SOE? Why would Hale have been indoctrinated into the deception campaign, but not Buckmaster?

A few commentators have used these events to suggest that some of the exploits in France were simply early manifestations of later policy. For example, Marnham, West, and Cruickshank have suggested that aspects of the COCKADE deception plan were executed early in 1943. That is, however, strictly a misrepresentation. There were common facets in the half-baked initiatives that Bevan distributed in February, and in the official COCKADE plans that were not drafted until late April and approved in June, as I shall explain next month, but the deception plan had in the interim changed. For instance, Marnham writes: “The deception plans laid by the LCS in February were now given the name COCKADE.” That cannot be strictly true. The February plan had to be revised, and the new conception was not approved until the end of March. COCKADE was based on different assumptions.

Thus granting the COCKADE moniker to any maverick initiatives in February, with their paucity of specific detail, and their obvious lack of authorization, incorrectly suggests that they had a (premature) seal of approval. And their timing suggests that they may have been prompted by some other trigger. Last but not least of all, SOE was not viewed by the Chiefs of Staff as a medium for deception at this time: it was a sabotage organization. The War Cabinet’s recognition that resistance groups might be employed as agents of deception was not formally recorded until July 18, although of course the idea may well have come from Bevan and his SOE/MI6 sponsors.

One has to consider the role of Maurice Buckmaster, the head of F Section, and how much he knew. He added a very controversial comment about these early 1943 initiatives in his in-house history. One cannot rely on this production very closely: it was written just after the end of the war, when the objective was clearly to show the activities of F Section in the best light. It contains several untruths, of which Buckmaster’s narrative about PROSPER is probably the most egregious. He claimed that PROSPER (Suttill, then known as PHYSICIAN) had been active in the spring and summer of 1942, and added that ’PHYSICIAN proved a real menace to the enemy – so much so that his elimination and the dispersal of his groups became Gestapo Task No.1.’ Yet Suttill did not land in France for the first time until October 1942. Buckmaster’s clumsy observation was presumably to suggest that Suttill’s problems had started way before the misadventures of Déricourt.

Thus one has to take Buckmaster’s assertions about what F Section knew at the time with a grain of salt. After describing a clash between CARTE (André Girard, the eponymous leader of the circuit) and LOUBA (Henri Frager), and then reporting success with sabotage, but also the treachery of Grandclément (an agent ‘turned’ by the Nazis, and later shot by the Resistance), Buckmaster wrote:

            It is important to realize that the seeds of the brilliant success of French resistance in June 1944 were sown in late 1942 – early 1943. Had we been able to increase the scale of delivery of arms and explosives, we could have set the machine in motion earlier if, on the military side, preparations had been completed earlier. In early 1943 we were, of course, working completely in the dark as to the eventual date of the return to the Continent, and. consequently, we chafed against delays and difficulties which turned out in the end not to have vitally affected the issue, because the invasion could not have been staged earlier than it was.

Note the evasive form of Buckmaster’s statement: does ‘we’ signify SOE in general, senior SOE officers, F Section officers, or the whole of F Section? And why ‘of course’ – as if being kept unilluminated was standard operating procedure? ‘Working completely in the dark’: if true (and one must question it), that was not a good atmosphere for carrying out subversion exercises that were well co-ordinated with military strategy. Yet it suggests that at some stage after those ‘early’ days in 1943, SOE had been enlightened as to the D-Day date, and its policies should therefore have been revised to reflect the new reality (see below, for March). If, as everyone else appeared to understand, the purpose of the current deception policy was to divert German forces from the Russian front, why would the Allies want to consider a re-entry to France in 1943?

Indeed, other evidence suggests that SOE’s senior management clearly understood what was going on. Peter Wilkinson (who, after all, worked there with Gubbins, supervising the Polish, German, Austrian and Czech sections) wrote in Gubbins & SOE:

            It was no secret in Baker Street that the British planners had tacitly accepted a long ago as October, 1942, that there was no prospect of undertaking a major cross-Channel invasion in 1943. Consequently SOE’s French sections were counting on at least twelve months in which to lay their plans.

This is quite extraordinary, and as an assessment of pre-Casablanca thinking, very premature, and thus rather untrustworthy. (I note that the same Peter Wilkinson, in Foreign Fields, wrote on page 127 that ‘In the autumn of 1942 our plans were based on the assumption that an invasion of the Continent would take place during the summer of 1943.’ So much for reliable memoirs.) Yet, if a colleague controlling another set of sections knew that fact, but the head of the French section was in ignorance, it points to some serious dysfunction. Moreover, ‘it was known in Baker Street’. How could Buckmaster not have learned about the delay, especially if a brother-officer had been aware of the French section’s plans?

Yet elsewhere, Wilkinson wrote, in apparent confirmation of the above chaos:

            When the Chiefs of Staff’s directives were received by CD, security demanded that their distribution should be severely restricted and their contents bowdlerized. No particular importance seems to have been attached to ensuring that these directives were brought to the notice of country section heads with the force of an imperative.

We have to recall, however, that Wilkinson’s account of the years 1943-1944 was guided by David Stafford’s book on European Resistance and by the assistance of the ‘SOE adviser’ in the Foreign Office, as the author admits he had no direct access to SOE files for this period. This is unstable ground. Wilkinson’s ‘authorized’ biography of Gubbins has only two entries for Buckmaster, and none for Suttill, Bodington or Déricourt, which is simply shocking.

It is evident that, by mid-1945, Buckmaster had been apprised of the reality of earlier invasion plans for 1944. Given the destruction of his major network, with concomitant loss of life, was he not entitled to have felt grossly betrayed if that were so? Maybe he was told to smother his despair. Moreover, his assessment of the situation is not sharp. It consists of an illogical and twisted betrayal of how subversion was supposed to be co-ordinated with, and subordinate to, military plans, and reflects confusion over the perennial problem of how scattered guerilla operatives were going to be converted into effective paramilitary units. A machine of sorts was nevertheless already in motion, and not restrained.

I shall resume the matter of Buckmaster’s equivocation later, and simply cite here what Buckmaster stated when provoked in 1958 by Dame Irene Ward’s motion tabled in the House of Commons, following the publication of the books by Jean Overton Fuller and Elizabeth Nicholas that laid bare some of the problems in F Section. Referring to Churchill’s supposed slogan of ‘Set Europe Ablaze’, Buckmaster wrote:

            But it was obvious that the conflagration must be controlled; it must be kept dormant until it could be supported and play its full part in the military operation of a return to the Continent.

Henri Déricourt was inactive in February – at least as far as flights and parachutists were concerned. But the process of arming French civilians began apace that month, although the authorised historian misrepresents the facts. After his statement that the Chiefs of Staff had approved Bevan’s plans on February 9, Howard wrote: “Then there was a long pause. No serious measures of deception could be undertaken until operations themselves had been determined, and about these operations nobody, with the exception of the Prime Minister, was enthusiastic.” (This is a bizarre presentation of events, given that Churchill was the outlier, and Howard’s logic misrepresents the relationship between operations and deception.) Yet in some areas there was no ‘long pause’. In anticipation somewhat of the coming disaster, but as a way of capturing the contemporaneous dynamics of the situation, I quote a passage from William Mackenzie’s ‘Secret History of SOE’:

            About February 1943 Antelme put de Baissac in touch with Grandclément, who claimed to have at Bordeaux 3,000 men organized by OCM. This association appeared to bear very rapid fruit. By the middle of 1943 the ‘Scientist’ circuit claimed to be able to mobilise 17,000 men, and it received 121 air supply operations between November 1942 and August 1943 – including inter alia 7,500 Stens, 300 Brens and 1,500 rifles. This was a big affair – too big in any case to survive intact until a D-Day so far distant as June 1944. The disaster came in September 1943 when Grandclément was arrested in Paris and was effectively ‘turned’ by the Gestapo: on grounds of conscience, so he claimed, because the real enemy was Communism and it could be fought effectively only with German aid. Whether sincere or not, the theory was disastrously convenient to the whole German scheme of political warfare: and its immediate consequence was the betrayal by Grandclément of the whole circuit and the loss of its rich store of arms.

Mackenzie focuses attention on Grandclément rather than the larger disaster of PROSPER, but the facts are clear. The French Resistance was preparing for an imminent invasion, and it started before Bevan’s plan had been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. What needs to be established is whether anyone in SOE really thought that this mobilization exercise was a prelude to invasion, or, if not, why they continued to execute a project that was both unauthorized and inherently catastrophic. While it was true that proper deception could not take place until operations were determined, some activities seemed to be going ahead that were in contravention of what was the intended scheme. 

3. March: SOE Receives its Directive

March started off in disarray. It is difficult to detect a strategic pattern in the actions and pronouncements of the primary agents. The Chiefs of Staff appeared to be focused on the situation in Yugoslavia, and judged that SOE needed to be provided with six Halifax bombers to help supply Mihailović. They also approved an extraordinary request to release 1,800 Sten guns and 700,000 rounds of ammunition to SOE ‘for SOE’s own activities’ – which were left unspecified. At the same time, Churchill expressed concern at the potential delays in executing HUSKY, and confided to his chief staff officer, Hastings ‘Pug’ Ismay, that SLEDGEHAMMER (in 1943) and BOLERO might have to suffer instead. This may have prompted Brooke to suggest that the appointment of a Chief of Staff for Cross-Channel Operations could be deferred. Yet he was overruled, and on March 9, the Chiefs decided they needed to appoint such a Supreme Commander.

The mission for COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander – the latter not yet having been appointed) was, however, couched in the old language of carrying out ‘raids’ and forming ‘beachheads’, ‘bridgeheads’ and ‘lodgements’ in Northwest France, with a goal set for essaying one such venture in the Cotentin peninsula on August 1, 1943. (The problem with beachheads was that, as at Anzio, they tended to stay on the beach for too long.) The text continued: ‘and to exploit success if German morale and resources permit, then prepare for a full-scale assault in spring of 1944’. De Gaulle was also restive, provoked by the deportation of French workers to the Reich to demand immediate delivery of arms and food to the ‘French army’.

Alan Brooke consequently met with Jean Moulin and General Delestraint, head of de Gaulle’s ‘army’, who were informed of a possible bridgehead that autumn. We owe it to Patrick Marnham, who uses valuable French sources, for an account of their exchanges. Delestraint made an impassioned case for sending equipment to the ‘50,000 paratroopers on the ground’, apparently constituted from the ‘thousands of fugitives from the French police’ who had fled to the hills after the German deportation order. Marnham describes a second encounter on March 10 as follows:

            They were told that although the Allies did not intend to carry out landings in France before the end of the year, there remained ‘the possibility of establishing a bridgehead on French soil before the autumn of 1943’. Both ‘Vidal’(Delestraint) and ‘Rex’ (Moulin) took that rather vague suggestion seriously, but in doing so they were thoroughly misled.

This was somewhat cowardly behaviour from Brooke, trying to get the Frenchmen off his back. He knew by then that the strategy was to draw more German forces into France during 1943, so why would he raise hopes that a ‘bridgehead’ might not only take place, but might lead to greater things?

Yet it was Hambro himself who tried to apply a restraining hand. As Olivier Wieworka notes in his The Resistance in Western Europe, 1940-1945, Hambro wrote to Brooke on March 16, warning of the danger of uncontrolled uprisings and ‘the danger of premature outbreaks in France owing to the repressive measures taken by the Germans in connection with the relève [the program to repatriate French POWs in exchange for workers who volunteer to go to the Reich]’ adding:  “We are doing our best to persuade the Fighting French to damp down these movements as far as possible.” Many in the French Resistance had been encouraged by the invasion of North Africa to believe that France would soon be next, and the communists were applying pressure in their strategy of continuous aggression. Brooke also records a meeting with Hambro on the last day of the month, where Hambro complained to him about the degree to which the Foreign Office was interfering in SOE’s activities. The nature of the ‘interference’, and the way in which Brooke (who notoriously refused to get involved with the politicians) might intercede in such matters, is not stated. It probably did not concern de Gaulle, since both SOE and the Foreign Office had a heightened distaste for the antics of the Free French leader.

A dose of more official cold water was soon poured on capacious plans for ‘re-entry’ to Europe in 1943. At a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on March 5, BOLERO had been pushed down the list of priorities, behind HUSKY, assistance to Turkey, and the planned re-capture of Burma. At this stage the group realized that any 1943 cross-Channel operation would have to rely entirely on British resources, and thus would massively increase the risks. On March 11, Churchill wrote to Stalin:

            With regard to the attack across the Channel, it is the earnest wish of the President and myself that our troops should be in the general battle in Europe which you are fighting with such astounding prowess. But in order to sustain the operations in North Africa, the Pacific, and India, and to carry supplies to Russia, the import programme into the United Kingdom has been cut to the bone and we have eaten, and are eating into, reserves. However, in case the enemy should weaken sufficiently we are preparing to strike earlier than August, and plans are kept alive from week to week. If he does not weaken, a premature attack with inferior and insufficient forces would merely lead to a bloody repulse.

            Bridgehead Revisited, one might say. A touch more realistic, but still a very deceitful and equivocal message about German strength and its possible deterioration, the aggregation of US and British forces, and the chances of a ‘strike’ in the summer. Not Churchill’s finest hour.

Frederick Morgan

All this rather chaotic set of events must have prompted the Chiefs of Staff to take a firm re-assessment of the situation. On March 13, the name of Lt.-Col. Frederick Morgan was approved as COSSAC, and Morgan immediately tried to bring some structure to operations. On March 20, a fresh directive for SOE was issued by the Chiefs, and at the end of the month, the special sub-committee on patriot forces (which had been established as far back as December 4, 1942, but for some reason had been dilatory in completing its work) reported its findings, attempting to bring organization to the nature and capabilities of the resistance forces.

While Morgan’s memorandum added some much needed realism by pointing out how more complex the issue of landing vast amounts of troops in France was than engaging in land battles, it is the new instructions to SOE that are of more importance here. The text, from CAB 80/68, also available in the SOE War Diaries, is included as an Appendix in David Stafford’s Britain and European Resistance 1940-1945, and is significant for several reasons:

i) It for the first time regularised the definitions of ‘Resistance Groups’ and ‘Patriot Forces’, the former consisting of ‘secret armies’ and ‘sabotage groups’ working behind enemy lines, and the latter ‘any forces which may be embodied in areas liberated by our armies’.

ii) It reinforced the need for subversive activity to be tightly woven with strategy and operational plans.

iii) It reminded SOE of its need to liaise closely with the PWE (the Political Warfare Executive) and SIS in the realm of intelligence gathering.

iv) It stressed the necessary focus on sabotage, and the curtailment of any activities that did not support the January 19 and 23 strategy papers.

v) It pointed out that guerrilla activities should be aimed at diverting German pressure from Russia, and hindering the consolidation of German forces on the Eastern Front during April, May and June.

vi) As far as France was concerned, it stated that ‘with the ultimate object of invading north-west Europe, it has been decided to assemble the strongest possible forces (subject to certain prior commitments to other theatres) in the United Kingdom to be held in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent as soon as German resistance has weakened to the required extent’.

vi) It hinted at arming resistance groups by advising that ‘you should direct a special effort towards supplying the resistance groups in France with the means of enabling them to play an active part when they are required to do so in support of Allied strategy.’

vii) France was given a priority lower than that of The Italian Islands, Corsica and Crete and The Balkans, but above the rest of Europe.

I find this a confused and confusing paper. (It was signed by Portal of the RAF, Pound of the Royal Navy, and Brooke’s deputy, Nye, Brooke being sick with influenza at the time: one wonders whether Brooke would have allowed such waffle to be drafted.) In what way is it a mess? It emphasizes strategy papers dating from January, when plans for a full assault in 1943 had already been overtaken by events, requiring the cut-back in BOLERO. It thus dangerously dissembles about the level of commitment currently being made to the assembly of forces in the United Kingdom. Its acceptance of the policy that pockets of resistance groups engaged in occasional sabotage, yet individually tied to their domiciles, could be quickly be reorganized into military forces contradicts what experts were concluding elsewhere. It surely does not explain how SOE could confidently make assessments about the diversion of German forces from the Eastern Front, or why ‘guerrilla activities’ would in themselves provoke a massive transfer of such. It fails to show enough imagination to consider how the morale of guerrillas might be affected if they knew that their activities were designed to attract more Nazi attention as opposed to accelerating the arrival of Allied forces. It leaves a highly ambiguous directive about arming resistance groups in France in preparation for a military role in the event of the re-entry while also lowering France’s priority in the larger scheme of things. It reflects some serious self-delusion in transferring the notion of the role of ‘resistance’ from native French citizens to the avowedly stronger forces of the German army. Yet the overwhelming conclusion is that no instructions are given to the effect that SOE should be involved with deceptive operations in parallel with subversive activity.  As a matter of protocol, SOE was invited to ‘prepare an appreciation’ on how well it could deliver against these rather muddled objectives.

Incidentally, I believe that Robert Marshall seriously misrepresents this document, and its effect on SOE. He writes (on page 126 of All The King’s Men) that the paper

              . . .went on to say that SOE should concentrate its efforts to support the Allied strategy for the war, which as to defeat Germany in 1943  . . .   At Baker Street they began to roll up their sleeves and spit on their hands. The directive came as the clearest signal yet that 1943 would at last be the year of the return to Europe.

The document says nothing about defeating Germany in 1943, nor does it make any suggestion about a ‘return to Europe’, apart from a very explicit statement about the planned offensive action in Italy that year, in support of which SOE is instructed to provide sabotage in Corsica, and assist revolt against Italy’s fascist government. The directive implicitly ordains that SOE should be focused on sabotage and guerrilla warfare ‘rather than on preparations for future secret army uprisings’, as David Stafford sagely points out. The atmosphere at Baker Street described by Marshall is totally antithetical to that presented by Wilkinson.

Douglas Dodds-Parker

Douglas Dodds-Parker, who was responsible for flight operations at Tempsford and Tangmere until Grierson took over in the summer of 1942, was rather dismissive of such directives, writing in Setting Europe Ablaze (p 54):

            The nature of clandestine survival and supply in face of ruthless Nazi/Fascist/Communist repression was little understood by those in high authority, and only just discovered by those charged with putting the directives into practice who had to cope with the non-existence of adequate lightweight transmitters, of essential false papers, of aircraft in competition with demands from Bomber Command.

On the matter of whom exactly he had in mind, when referring to ‘those in high authority’, the Chiefs of Staff, or his own bosses in SOE, Nelson, Hambro and Gubbins, Dodds-Parker is, perhaps diplomatically, silent.

On March 6, Hambro had announced the retirement of the rather anonymous Mr. Hanbury Williams, and promoted Gubbins to be his senior deputy, declaring that Gubbins ‘in my absence will be the Acting Head of S.O.E.’, and thus intimating that Hambro himself would become even less involved in the day-to-day business of SOE. It was clearly now up to Gubbins to interpret the latest directives. At the end of the month he appointed Colonel Eric Mockler-Ferryman as head of North-Western Europe, thus introducing an additional layer of management between himself, Brook, and the country sections. (Mockler-Ferryman had been an Army intelligence officer in North Africa, and had taken the blame for an intelligence failure that was not his fault.) One would expect Gubbins to have discussed the new instructions with his subordinates, and work out the implications for the country sections. Yet what is extraordinary is the fact that Buckmaster’s in-house history declines to mention the vitally important March paper at all, suggesting, perhaps, that he was not informed of it. (Of course, he might have decided that it was politically astute to overlook it completely, but he then might have appeared very foolish if indeed some other agency or person revealed that he had known about it.)

Thus F Section proceeded with business as usual, pursuing the January objectives that the March paper had ambiguously just re-endorsed. Buckmaster’s comments for March included this text:

            Our achievement was the sending of three men and forty containers, of which ten were delivered into enemy hands because of faulty dropping. We reported at the end of March that unless during April and May we succeeded in sending stores and money in large quantities in the field as well as up-to-date directives in writing, we risked seeing the whole fabric crumble and waste away.

Buckmaster hinted at the perennial problem of maintaining the morale of the resistance groups, and concluded this section as follows:

            At 28th March, 1943, it could be said in general terms that only the lack of stores on the ground prevented our being able to carry out orders for action over a great part of France.

            These were not the words of someone who had been told that the re-entry to France would not occur until 1944, that the emphasis was on sabotage, and that France was now a lower priority than Italy and the Balkans. Yet his opinion was echoed by his colleague Bickham Sweet-Escott, who wrote of this period:

            The emphasis was now far more on helping existing guerrilla bands and building up secret armies in the countries to be liberated than on mere sabotage and the isolated clandestine operations such as Rubble [the extraction of ball-bearings from Sweden to the UK] or the purloining of ocean liners.

Is this confirmation that lower-level officers in SOE were not being told the correct story?

Buckmaster’s history was distributed, during the period of August to October 1945, to Brook (D/R, head of Low Countries and France), Major I. K. Mackenzie (Brook’s successor, not Professor William, the historian), Colonel Keswick (AD/H, head of the Mediterranean group), DCD (Gubbins), VC/D (Sporborg), AD (Colonel of the Far East group), and AD/2, his deputy. It had already been approved by Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman (AD/E – director of the London group, aka North West Europe), Col. Saunders (AD/M) and Colonel Dumbrell (M/T, probably i/c Training). Brook and Mackenzie judged it accurate: no responses were recorded from the others.  Perhaps that is not surprising. At some stage, Buckmaster must have been told about the March directive, but had been encouraged to keep quiet about it. Yet the fact that so many high-ups in SOE would let the fallacious history pass without any mention of the critical events of March 1943 is very revealing. They were either clueless, or inattentive. If they thought that the History would eventually damage the service’s reputation, they should simply have terminated it. But they did nothing.

Colonel Bevan, having been criticised by Robertson in February, had meanwhile been subject to another assault, this time by Lieutenant-Commander Ewen Montagu of Naval Intelligence, who sat on both the TWIST and the XX Committees. Thaddeus Holt, in The Deceivers, drawing upon the Naval deception file at ADM 223/794, reports that Montagu wrote a very poisonous attack on Bevan on March 1, in which he referred not only to Bevan’s personal defects in not understanding the subject, and engaging in unauthorized schemes, but also to the intellectual deficiencies of the members of LCS. Foot claimed (in his Introduction to Mackenzie’s Secret History of SOE) that Bevan did not judge SOE secure enough to ‘take part in his exceedingly secret work’, with Operation STARKEY being the only exception, but the representation of SOE on his TWIST committee would belie that. Montagu would later point to increasing friction between the XX Committee and Bevan over lack of communication, although he admitted that matters improved over time.

Ewen Montagu

Montagu’s attack may have triggered another action: according to Montagu himself, Bevan was not indoctrinated fully into the essence of ‘secret sources’ (the ISOS decrypts of ULTRA) until this month – an event which would have given him a radical new insight into the methods by which DAs were managed and verified. Holt’s stance is thus to defend Bevan, and downgrade Montagu as someone who overvalued his own abilities, and was probably jealous of Bevan, but the evidence would suggest that Montagu’s argument had some merit. In any case, his judgments were ignored.

The XX Committee discussed deception plans seriously in March, with Montagu providing constructive ideas, making requests through Wingate for Bevan to act upon. On March 4, the group covered the topic of the creation of artificial wireless traffic. The following week, a report from the Combined Planners, dealing ‘in great detail with suggestions for the deception plan based on the principle of containing enemy troops in western Europe’ was read out by Colonel Mountain of GHQ Home Forces. The Committee members were thus well indoctrinated into dummy invasion plans. Rather oddly, the meeting resolved that Bevan be apprised of Mountain’s notes on Exercise SPARTAN, as if Bevan would normally not have been in the loop, and Masterman was authorized to write a letter to Bevan requesting W/T cover. (SPARTAN was a GHQ exercise held that month in southern England to test the ability of troops to break out of a beachhead, and turned out poorly for several Canadian commanders. The XX Committee planned to use the DA known as BALLOON to pass on controlled information about SPARTAN to the Nazis.)

In any event, Masterman’s letter to Bevan was duly composed and sent, but a handwritten inscription states that no answer had been received by March 25. At the March 18 meeting, Colonel Petavel represented the LCS, and a productive discussion ensued that resulted in more recommendations for dummy wireless traffic. Wingate assured the group, at the March 25 meeting, that Bevan would reply to Masterman’s letter ‘within the next few days’. Operation MINCEMEAT (Montagu’s project) was discussed, but further progress on dummy traffic seemed to be stalled, as matters concerning W/T cover were out of the Committee’s hands. The XX Committee was thinking industriously about how it might aid deception, but was not actually contributing much.

We owe it to Guy Liddell to learn more about some SOE personnel activities at this time. On March 29, he recorded a conversation he had had with John Senter of SOE Security, who wanted to recruit Cyril Harvey for a new counter-espionage section that SOE was setting up. Liddell also had a meeting that day with Mockler-Ferryman (whom he describes merely as ‘late D.M.I. in Africa’, as if he were not aware of his recent important posting in SOE), and he was rather dismissive of Mockler-Ferryman’s understanding of counter-espionage. Gubbins apparently had a high regard for Mockler-Ferryman, whose main mission, very poignantly, was to control the guerrilla effort in Western Europe and to co-ordinate SOE activities with bombing strategies, but maybe the extra level of management helped to distance Gubbins from the misadventures that had already started.

Whoever was driving Henri Déricourt’s agenda was unswayed by any of this, and continued with the project, which had, of course, been germinating since well before Casablanca. Déricourt arranged his first operation for March 17/18, code-named TRAINER. It was a double operation, involving two flights from 161 Squadron at Tempsford, using Lysanders piloted by Peter Vaughan-Fowler and Frank Rymills. The flights were carried out apparently without incident apart from a temporary uncontrolled ignition of the engine of Vaughan-Fowler’s plane after landing – an incident that Vaughan-Fowler attributed to Déricourt’s failure to arrange a smooth landing-area. As Foot records: “Claude de Baissac, Antelme, Flower and a wireless operator left for England, and Goldsmith, Lejuene (Delphin), Dowlen and Mrs Agazarian arrived.” Marshall provides more details.

Marshall describes Déricourt’s meetings with Suttill and his network earlier in March, but also draws attention to the fact that the Frenchman had another meeting with Boemelburg shortly after the operation:

            Within days of the March operation, there was another meeting with Boemelburg – a kind of re-appraisal, with a view to formalizing the situation. At that meeting Déricourt provided Boemelburg with a detailed description of everyone who had travelled in on the Lysanders. Boemelburg asked him if he knew anything about PROSPER, to which Déricourt replied that he had heard it had something to do with the invasion.

The source for Marshall’s comments was a June 1983 interview with Horst Kopkow, head of the SD’s counter-intelligence and counter-sabotage unit in Berlin, to whom Boemelburg reported.

The anomaly of the suspended deception plan which Bevan dangled so enticingly over the XX Committee in late February can be explained by the fact that the Chiefs of Staff had to gain approval for the plan from their American counterparts. (The sequence of events can be inspected in the COCKADE archive, at WO 106/4223.) For some extraordinary reason, their feedback was not received until March 28, and they made a number of important proposals for changing the text, including a preference for not understating the perceived strength of the Wehrmacht, and a request to have the following important statement inserted: ‘No equipment or supplies required for actual operations will be diverted for this purpose’ –  the news that Brooke must have received via other sources, and recorded in his diary entry for February 25, and which Churchill was referring to in his encounter with Maisky. It is obvious that Churchill and Brooke had received early feedback from Washington about the inability of the Americans to commit to the BOLERO plans, but they had probably not shared this intelligence until the formal response from the US Chiefs of Staff arrived. (If Roosevelt and Churchill had discussed the topic on their scrambled telephone, it is possible that the Germans had also learned of it, as the Deutsches Reichspost was intercepting and deciphering their telephone communications at this time. That would add an eerie dimension to the whole deception story for COCKADE. See David Kahn’s The Codebreakers for more.)

After explaining the reasons for their recommended changes, the US Chiefs concluded their assessment with the words, which very crisply abandoned any notions of threatened assaults in North West France, whether bridgeheads, lodgements or raids:

            U.S. Chiefs of Staff do not think threat of attacks on Northern Front in conjunction with attacks on Southern France a practical deception. To threaten Southern France is, in their view, what matters. Alterations do not appear to be important and we recommend acceptance to avoid further delay.

London did not argue with Washington, and Bevan’s revised draft was made official in the War Cabinet minutes. Thus the attempt to suggest possible attacks on North Western Europe in 1943 was unceremoniously quashed by American plain speaking. The message was blunt: ‘Any such feints will be a waste of effort.’

John Bevan then had the last word for this month. He had left for Algiers on March 11, returning only on the 27th, so he had to conduct a quick analysis. On March 31, he submitted a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff in which, after explaining the disagreements with the US Chiefs, he pointed out that ‘the possibility of carrying out a real operation against Northern France appears to have receded’, because of the BOLERO situation and the shortage of landing-craft that would be available. He thus recommended the removal of references to ‘across the Channel’, to be replaced by vaguer words of ‘against Western France’, implying that assaults in the South might still be possible. He apparently goaded the Chiefs into swift action, as will be described in next month’s bulletin. His behaviour needed to very precise since, having pre-empted the clarification of policy by announcing prematurely to the XX Committee that new deception plans had been authorized, he now attempted to gain confirmation from the Chiefs of Staff that real operations in Northern France in 1943 were off the cards. But would he inform the XX Committee of this change? And would SOE receive the new message?

4: Arms Shipments to France

As an intermission between the two quarters, I step back to record what is known about arms shipments to the French resistance during these first six months of 1943. The sources are varied, consisting of:

1) The Air Ministry’s report on its contributions to the activities of SOE (which was compiled before the loss of so many SOE papers in the post-war Baker Street fire);

2) Appendix C in Foot’s SOE in France, based on the RAF source and the in-house SOE history (HS 7/1);

3) French records, represented in different aspects by Foot and by Robert Marshall in All The King’s Men;

4) Informal statements by German army veterans; and

5) Occasional contributions in personal memoirs of participants.

The context for these arms drops goes back to May 21, 1941, when Gubbins laid out what he saw as the minimum required to equip the Secret Armies. Mackenzie presented Gubbins’ calculations for Poland, Czechoslovakia and France in the following table:

                                                Poland             Czech              France             Total

                                                (84 Bns)          (100 Bns)        (70 Bns)

Light machine guns                5,124               6,100               4,270               15,500

Sub-machine guns                  13,112             16,800             11,760             42,000

Pistols                                      43,680             52,000             36,400             132,000

Wireless sets                           1,260               1,500               980                  3,770

Containers                               10,5000           12,500             7.875               30,875

Aircraft sorties                        2,625               3,125               1,968               7,718

Mackenzie adds the following commentary, describing Gubbins’ figures as something of a ‘pipe-dream’:

            Brigadier Gubbins did not forget that there were all sorts of incalculable factors – it would be a remarkable piece of organisation (for example) if the equipment reached the Resistance with less than 25-30 per cent wastage from enemy action; abortive aircraft sorties must be allowed for: and so forth. But most of these imponderables tended to increase rather than reduce his figures: and no one could say that his scale of equipment was too high for guerrillas whose target was to be the German army, even in its decline, or that rebellions would have been worth staging with smaller forces.

Major problems were implicit in this project. The proposals resulted in a very long and controversial analysis, which essentially determined that the requested number of sorties would make intolerable demands upon bomber services, with little potential benefit if the secret armies were not going to be activated until the allied forces had arrived, and air superiority had been gained. (Both Poland and Czechoslovakia were soon largely removed from the equation.) Yet what did not appear to be discussed was how the weaponry would be kept concealed, and maintained properly. No date for re-entry to mainland Europe had been set at this time, of course, but D-Day was in fact three years out – an extraordinary period of time to keep stores of munitions secreted from the Nazis, and a potential ‘army’ in permanent readiness.

Gubbins constantly noted how concerned he was over the ability of the Secret Armies he nurtured to be ready when the professional forces arrived, and that sense of urgency often undermined what should have been a more careful policy towards the provision of arms. SOE appeared too often to be responding to ‘demands’ rather than executing its own strategy. And the separate goals of sabotage and creating secret armies constantly came into conflict. As Bickham Sweet-Escott (who in the spring of 1943 came to run the RF section alongside Buckmaster’s F Section) wrote in Baker Street Irregular (p 109):

             . . . the more we concentrated on spectacular action, the less likely we were to build up a nation-wide organization against D-Day. For the more spectacular the action, the greater the risk that the people in the field would be caught, and if they were caught there would be no secret army when the allies eventually landed. The two dilemmas faced us in all our work throughout occupied Europe.

What is perplexing is why the repeated pleas for more aircraft suddenly gained a more positive response at the end of 1942. The RAF History, citing a note of February 8, 1943, runs as follows:

            In September/October of 1942 when S.O.E.’s demands for air transport operations increased considerably, he, the Director of Plans [Group Captain Grierson, who had joined SOE in April 1942], had pointed out to the Air Ministry that S.O.E. would require more and more aircraft, and the increase in the establishment of No.138 Squadron and the use of No. 161 Squadron were to some extent the result of his verbal [sic! not ‘oral’] representations.

            Nevertheless, however capable Grierson was, and no matter how strong his relationships with the RAF top brass, and irrespective of his powers of persuasion, it is difficult to understand why the RAF would succumb to his earnest implorations at a time when SOE senior management had, according to other accounts, just learned that the re-entry into NW France would not occur for another eighteen months. Moreover, Grierson was known not to be the sharpest knife in the drawer. In his memoir Foreign Fields the SOE officer Peter Wilkinson wrote that he and Charles Villiers were ‘both a good deal quicker witted than Grierson who, unlike Dick Barry, had not had the advantage of an expensive education and spoke no foreign languages.’

I refer readers to the very useful Appendix 12 of John Grehan’s RAF and the SOE (described as ‘an official history’, although it does not appear to be authorized as such) for a comprehensive account of such operations. As interesting background material for understanding the tasks involved, I simply reproduce here a description of the loads that were dropped by the Whitley bombers, categorized as containers, packages and personnel:

            The containers were long cylindrical metal holders with a parachute stored in one end. Two types of loads were known to Bomber Command, the standard load and the special load. In the standard load, usually dropped to the F.F.I. [Forces Françaises de L’Intérieure] elements, were small arms, ammunition, hand grenades and other useful accoutrements whilst the special loads were made up of particular types of explosives and perhaps tools specifically collected for a particular set of sabotage against a known target. These containers were stored in the bomb bays of the aircraft in the same manner as a bomb. The packages were steel framed boxes more or less 2 1/2’ square and weighing an average of 100-140 lbs. A small number of these could be placed inside the fuselage and manhandled out of the dispatching hole in the fuselage floor by one of the aircrew known as the despatcher. Their contents were similar to those in the containers and they had parachutes and static lines which operated in just the same manner as for parachutists.

Whitleys were phased out in 1942, and replaced by Halifax bombers during 1943. M. R. D. Foot also has a useful chapter on this subject in Communications, from his outline history of SOE.

The RAF records are highly informative, since they provide detailed figures for total delivery by country, by year (although records before 1943 were patchy), and thus comparisons can be made about priorities – and what was operationally possible, because of distances. The first major item of data is the Tonnage Delivered 1941-1945.  France had a total of 8,455 tons, over three times as much as that as delivered to the rest of Europe (essentially Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark). Cross-referencing of the Appendices in the RAF book leads to the fact that a total of 6,720 containers was shipped in 1943, of which 5,299 (about 80%) went to France.

The figures quoted in the official SOE history confirm the overall total of tonnage delivered from the UK (11,141½), but would seem to overstate vastly the number of sorties attempted. The account also presents some apparently high figures for the arms and explosives delivered to France over the whole war, citing: stens 90,776; H.E. 548,506 lbs.; and brens 10,411. Marshall’s figures (below) state that 16,500 kg. (i.e. about 36,000 lb.) of high explosives was delivered in the first six months of 1943. Extrapolating from the ratio of containers sent in the remainder of 1943, and especially 1944 (when the USAAF stepped in to help the RAF), the numbers are however not unreasonable. In the second half of 1943, containers to France increased by 250% over the first six months, and the numbers for 1944 were almost ten times as much as for 1943.

Data before 1943 are very sketchy, but the RAF reports indicate that a total of 201 containers was dropped over France in the whole of 1942. For the first half of 1943 (the period under review), the figures for France were as follows:

January-March: 79 Sorties, of which 22 were successful. 20 tons were delivered, comprising 170 containers and 57 packages.

April-June: 342 sorties, of which 165 were successful. 148 tons were delivered, comprising 1,361 containers and 236 packages.

(The numbers increased markedly in the third quarter of 1943 before dropping back to second quarter quantities in the fourth quarter.)

What is noteworthy about these figures is the rapid increase in attempts to supply secret armies in the second quarter of the year, but also an increasingly high failure rate, which might suggest that the shipments were lost, damaged irretrievably, or even picked up by enemy forces.  Foot described the process as follows:

            What proportion of these stores were warlike it is no longer possible to say exactly; but the percentage was undoubtedly high, well over 80 and probably over 90. Equally it is impossible to say what proportion of them fell straight into enemy hands, or were captured before effective use could be made of them; though again, one thing is sure – the proportion was much lower. RF section for one worked on the ‘completely arbitrary and empirical’ percentage calculation that ten per cent of any month’s load would soon be in enemy hands, that ten per cent would be lost, one way or another, in transit, and that twenty per cent would be immediately absorbed in current resistance activities; leaving sixty per cent of what had been sent available for subsequent operations.

Foot echoes the RAF figures, although he lists only successful sorties (22 and 165, respectively), thus distorting for his masters (or for posterity) the effectiveness of the overall project. Yet, if we inspect Buckmaster’s figures (representing F Section, of course, and not the Free French responsibilities), we read that, in March 1943, the section had a ‘programme’ for sending out as many as 1000 containers, a goal that had to be drastically revised. For April, however, Buckmaster claimed that sabotage attacks ‘increased by leaps and bounds’, and that the section was able to send ‘as many as 183 containers’ – more than the total amount for all of France for the first quarter. May and June were also ‘record months’, although he does not provide details. Foot noted: “Several different sets of figures have been drawn up: all conflict.”

A dampening but equivocal observation also appears in the official SOE History at HS 7/1:

            The second major problem was the maintenance of the security of the Resistance organisation against penetration by the enemy. In some countries [sic!] such as in Holland penetration was so cleverly done that it passed unnoticed and men and supplies were sent straight into the hands of the enemy. Admittedly serious mistakes were made, mistakes which could have been avoided if more care had been taken but taking matters as a whole considering the large numbers of people employed in various capacities in Resistance movements and the general characteristic of Continental peoples to be insecure, it is surprising how much was achieved and how little success the enemy had.

This is the nearest SOE got to a mea culpa, but it is still an evasive and incomplete admission.

Robert Marshall’s statistics tend to endorse the trends described by Buckmaster, although he indicates a far more dramatic increase in April ‘of more than two thousand per cent’. In a footnote, Marshall describes how ‘the catalogue of materiel [sic: ’matériel’] dropped by SOE’s French Section to all the French networks was compiled from the archives of the Ministère de la Guerre at the Château de Vincennes in Paris’, giving a reference of 13P68: Materiel sur parachute et deportation). Foot quotes the same source, giving the totals for the period, for both RF and F sections of SOE. In Marshall’s table the containers are broken down by their contents:

                                  January    February  March    April     May    June

Stens                           87                    64        32        644     1006   2353

Incendiaries                 35                 74        –           1044    1877   10,790

Pistols                          24                   63        34        421       716      877   

Grenades                     36                  98        163      2508     4489     5537

High-Explosives (kg.) 88               253      162      1806    3872    10,252

Marshall adds that the PROSPER network received over 20 containers of arms in April ‘by far the lion’s share of material sent to France’. Yet this statement does not tally with either the RAF report, or with Buckmaster’s claims, either in simple numbers, or in relative significance. According to Marshall’s rough comparisons, it would suggest that only one container was dispatched in March, for instance, when Buckmaster reported that forty were sent, of which ten fell into enemy hands. (The explosives for the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hitler in July 1944 came from SOE stocks.) It perhaps reflects a failure to understand how much material could be packed in a single container, but, overall, simply proves that a lot of these reports are inherently unreliable.

Patrick Marnham’s observations are also a trifle puzzling. In War In The Shadows (p 120), he states that ‘In France as a whole the delivery of arms to the Resistance was heavily reduced in the first part of 1943’ (presumably he means the first three months, but it is not obvious that this was a true or significant trend, as it is doubtful that substantially larger volumes had been shipped in 1942 before bad weather intervened in the winter). Next, quoting an article by Wieworka, he makes the imprecise claim that ‘throughout the month of June arms deliveries to PROSPER continued at a growing pace’, but adds that PROSPER ‘was the only exception to the general decline in deliveries’. That was surely not so, however one looks at the data provided, and the RAF records show that the July-September quarter was twice as productive as the previous quarter. Mackenzie also reported that ‘up to June 1943 the whole Suttill circuit had received 254 containers of stores, and in ten days in June it beat all records by receiving 190 more containers.

It is difficult to place any reliable structure around these datapoints. For example, if one plots a probable growth curve in containers sent to all of France from January to June, based on RAF figures for total containers, and the data from Marshall’s table, one could project a sequence of:

January – 90; February – 70; March – 10; April – 200; May – 550; June – 811. That might tally with Buckmaster’s claim of 183 containers for F Section in April, but not with his citation of 40 for F Section in March, nor with Marshall’s assertion that the PROSPER network, with 20 containers, received ‘the lion’s share’ of all that went to France in April.  In addition to that, Foot’s breakdown of the French data indicates that the Free French overall received about 52% of all supplies against F Section’s 48%, and Mackenzie claims that the PROSPER network alone jumped to 190 containers in ten days in June! It is all a mess.

What is undeniable that a considerable uptick in arms shipments occurred in the second quarter of 1943. In SOE in France, Foot reports (p 209), quoting a ‘Foreign Office file’ from 1945, as follows:

            Von Rundstedt recorded 1943 as ‘a serious turning point in the interior situation in France . . . the organized supply of arms from England to France became greater every month’, and his headquarters was given ‘an impressive picture of the increasing danger to the German troops in the territories of the West . . . Not only the murders and acts of sabotage against members of the Wehrmacht, against Wehrmacht installations, railways and supply lines were on the increase, but in certain districts organized raids of gangs in uniform and civilian clothes on transports and military units multiplied’.

SOE was clearly executing its sabotage mission very capably, but were the recipients of its supplies performing their destructive acts, and readying their weaponry, because they believed that an invasion was imminent?

Jacques Weil evidently thought so. In Pin-Stripe Saboteur he wrote (p 166):

            Preparations for the “Second Front in 1943” – which all the Resistance organizations in Northern France were certain would take place some time during the summer or autumn – were well advanced by the middle of May. The barns and the cowsheds of Northern and eastern France were indeed bursting with the guns and ammunition, the explosives and the other supplies dropped in steadily growing quantities by the increasing number of R.A.F. aircraft allocated for liaison with the Resistance.

I notice a paradox in these accounts. As I shall explain in next month’s segment, in the late spring of 1943 SOE officers made fervent appeals to the Chiefs of Staff that aircraft support was inadequate to maintain the enthusiasm and sense of purpose of the French resistance, who were hungry for arms and supplies. Yet Mackenzie’s observations lucidly point out how the increase in shipments that were made in the first six months of the year constituted a major risk, as the volumes were ‘too big to survive intact until a D-Day so far distant as June 1944’. In that contradiction lies the unresolved dilemma of SOE’s muddled policy.

5. Interim Conclusions:

I detect two histories here. First is the ‘authorized’ history, carefully managed by the SOE Adviser to the Foreign Office, which lays out how well SOE was overall led, how it operated in accordance with the requirements of the Chiefs of Staff, and how it contributed greatly to military success. Yes, mistakes were made, but such were inevitable under the conditions, and damage was well-managed.

And then there is the subterranean history, where policy was fragmented, or incompletely thought through, where maverick activities carried on without proper authorization or supervision, and needless sacrifices were made. Not enough attention was paid to security, and senior officers did not trust their subordinates with the facts, with the result that the latter became scapegoats for gross failures of judgment and unnecessary loss of life. The increase in shipping weaponry to mostly phantom ‘secret armies’ in France occurred just at the time when the Chiefs of Staff wanted to rein in the premature arming of forces that would not be useful for more than a year. Using outdated guidance, SOE was able to convince the RAF to supply extra flights to its French networks, many of which had been infiltrated by the Germans. Bevan’s London Controlling Section jumped the gun over deception plans. The Americans essentially headed off a half-baked British plan to have it both ways, but their delays in so doing meant that COSSAC was given inappropriate instructions, an incorrect new directive was issued to SOE, and news of the revisions was not properly disseminated. That SIS was behind the project to use Déricourt as a channel for disinformation to the Sicherheitsdienst is clear. Who convinced the RAF to increase the allocation of bombers to deliver on rapidly expanding container shipments is still a mystery.

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